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CHAPTER 1 
Reconsidering Racial Identity among White Americans 
In F. Scott Fitzgerald’s famous novel, The Great Gatsby, one of the central 
characters, Tom Buchanan, remarks to his wife, “[t]he idea is if we don’t look out the 
white race will be – will be utterly submerged…It is up to us, who are the dominant race, 
to watch out or these other races will have control of things.” Fitzgerald’s book is set at 
the beginning of the Roaring Twenties, in the aftermath of World War I, and following 
intense domestic racial tensions resulting in the race riots of 1919’s Red Summer. It was 
published in 1925, just after the passage of the American Immigration Act of 1924, which 
slowed down to a trickle the massive waves of European immigrants who had arrived 
during the previous two decades. The Act established strict immigration quotas, sharply 
curtailing “non-white” immigrants from Asia and Southern and Eastern Europe. Many of 
proponents of this draconian law embraced the argument espoused by Tom Buchanan; 
they were supremely interested in controlling the ethnic composition of the United States 
(U.S.) population and believed in the racial superiority of Northern Europeans. They also 
saw the law as part of a larger effort to establish a distinct American identity—an identity 
that was biased toward Anglo-Saxon culture and that privileged “whiteness” (King 
2002).While these events occurred more than 85 years ago, the sentiments surrounding 
them are familiar. Indeed, they are uncannily echoed in places like Samuel Huntington’s 
infamous Who Are We? Challenges to America’s National Identity, published in 2004. 
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Huntington argues that American is a nation defined by an “Anglo-Protestant” culture, 
which is being weakened by Mexican immigration and the “Hispanization” of the U.S. 
(Huntington 2004c). Like the American Immigration Act of 1924, this book follows a 
decade’s worth of mass immigration to the U.S., although this time mostly from Latin 
America. And just as in the 1920’s, immigration is at the forefront of national public 
debate. Across the country, state governments have passed stringent immigration 
legislation.  
Coinciding with these laws, public dialogue has once again shifted toward the 
implications of the changing racial and ethnic composition of the U.S.  Debates about 
language, citizenship, and race have been renewed in the past several years and even 
more so in the wake of the election of America’s first non-white president, Barack 
Obama. What these changes mean for the status of white Americans has not gone 
unnoticed by the popular press; today’s media headlines ask question like, “Are whites 
racially oppressed?” (Blake 2011) and is this “The End of White America?” (Hsu 2009). 
Following the 2012 reelection of Barack Obama, political pundits discussed the end of 
the “white establishment” and questioned the future of “the white vote” (Robinson and 
Robinson 2012).  
There are several important characteristics to note about this dialogue. First, it 
reflects an apparent anxiety about the racial composition of the U.S. Second, it reveals 
concerns about racial and ethnic conflict in which the dominance of whites, as a racial 
group, seems to be in jeopardy. What remains to be seen, however, is whether these 
considerations are mirrored more broadly in the American public. Do white Americans 
actually feel some sense of anxiety about the status of their racial group? Do they even 
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identify with their race, and does this identification have political consequences? For 
most of the past 50 years, the answers to these questions among political scientists have 
usually been “no.” When it comes to considerations of race and ethnicity, whites, 
previous findings suggest, are driven primarily by hostility toward members of racial 
outgroups. Because of their numerical majority and political dominance, whites do not, 
by and large, possess their own sense of racial identification, and they do not feel 
consciously compelled to protect some sense of group interest.  
Today’s political and social climate in the U.S., however, suggests a need to 
reconsider our existing understanding of intergroup relations, particularly with respect to 
race. Two decades of mass immigration to the U.S., the election of America’s first black 
president, and the nation’s growing nonwhite population have dramatically changed the 
political and social landscape. Such changes may signal an end to the security of whites’ 
dominance, which has previously allowed the group to take their racial identity for 
granted. Furthermore, much of the existing work on race relations was developed to 
explain conflict between blacks and whites, and changing racial dynamics suggest that 
existing theories may not adequately explain contemporary race relations.  Thus, this 
dissertation reconsiders existing models of prejudice and group cohesion, and it argues 
that racial identity is in fact become a meaningful antecedent of whites’ political 
behavior.   
In particular, I challenge the conventional argument that white racial identity is 
inconsequential and argue that previous work has overlooked the possibility that this 
identity’s significance is conditional. When the dominant status of whites relative to 
racial and ethnic minorities is secure and unchallenged, white identity likely remains 
 4 
 
dormant. When whites perceive their group’s dominant status is threatened or their group 
is unfairly disadvantaged, however, their racial identity may become salient and 
politically relevant. For many years, there was little doubt that whites constituted an 
overwhelming numerical majority of the American population and fully controlled 
government institutions at all levels. Recent social and political trends—including an 
erosion of whites’ majority status and the election of America’s first black president—
have signaled a challenge to the absoluteness of whites’ dominance. Under these 
conditions, white identity may play a powerful role in political preferences.  
The theory developed here furthers our understanding of intergroup relations by 
explaining the conditions under which a group identity becomes salient for members of a 
dominant group.1 It also provides insight as to when this identification becomes 
politicized and explores the political implications of this identity. I argue that scholars 
have failed to find compelling evidence linking white racial identity to whites’ political 
preferences because they have looked during the wrong time, in the wrong place, or with 
suboptimal measures of identity. In a departure from most previous efforts, I measure 
identity at the national level, among representative samples of whites, using a broader 
range of survey measures.  
 I bring to bear evidence from four national surveys, including a number of time-
series studies from the American National Election Studies (ANES) spanning over 
twenty years, three diverse open-ended surveys, and two original experiments to show 
that a majority of whites do in fact identify with their racial group in the contemporary 
U.S. Furthermore, I demonstrate across each of these datasets that when whites perceive 
                                                            
1 A dominant group is one which possesses a disproportionate share of a society’s privileges, resources, and 
power (Knowles and Peng 2005). 
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that their status as the dominant group in the nation is in jeopardy, white racial identity 
significantly informs their political attitudes. As I will discuss more fully below, these 
results have important implications for our understanding of racial conflict broadly; they 
suggest that the politics of race today is not exclusively about outgroup hostility and elite 
efforts to exacerbate or quell such sentiments. Instead, disputes may be just as much 
about maintaining power and privilege. And if the circumstances that I argue are 
responsible for awakening white identity persist, race relations in the U.S. may be 
increasingly defined by whites’ desire to protect their ingroup interests.  
A Look Ahead 
The landscape of existing theories on racial attitudes and intergroup relations 
spans over seventy years, yet very little of it touches on how dominant groups 
conceptualize their own group’s interests. Instead, most work focuses squarely on 
outgroup attitudes among dominant groups, like white Americans, and on ingroup 
attitudes among racial and ethnic minorities. In Chapter 2, I describe how the literature 
came to be defined by this paradigm and flesh out the ways in which existing theories can 
aid our thinking about racial identity among whites. The key to understanding the 
formation and import of identity among dominant groups, I argue, is in perceptions of 
threat; for such groups, identity becomes salient in reaction to beliefs about the relatively 
threatened or waning status of the group. White Americans, in particular, are responding 
to the threat of population changes and the electoral success of non-white candidates like 
Barack Obama.  
Lack of prior evidence for white racial identity can be attributed, in part, to a lack 
of adequate measures of this identity on public opinion surveys. When good measures 
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were available, they were often used only on surveys conducted among regional or 
convenience samples. Chapter 3 tackles these challenges directly. When employing a 
measure that captures the degree of centrality of this identity among a national sample of 
whites, a very different account emerges. An impressively large proportion of white 
Americans do identify with their race in the contemporary United States. Importantly, 
this measure of identity is not simply racial animus, egalitarianism, or another well-
established attitudinal or political predisposition by another name. White identity is its 
own politically meaningful construct. Furthermore, it seems that the propensity to adopt 
such an identity may be more likely among individuals with particular personalities—
those that have a preference for social hierarchy and who endorse authoritarianism. 
Whites who adopt a strong racial identity also share a number of important beliefs 
about national identity, racial conflict, group competition, and group privilege. These 
beliefs contribute to the content of white identity, which Chapter 4 describes in more 
detail. High white identifiers tend to possess more exclusionary views about American 
identity, perceive greater competition between their own racial group and others, and 
possess a greater sense of racial alienation—the belief that their group has been or is 
currently being treated unfairly in society. At the same time, white identifiers recognize 
and enjoy their group’s privileged status and express little collective guilt. Meanwhile, a 
noteworthy proportion of individuals reject the notion that their racial identity is 
important, and their rationale for doing so offers further insight into our understanding 
racial attitudes; many of these low white identifiers describe their racial identity as 
inconsequential on grounds that reflect a subscription to colorblind racism. 
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White identity is politically powerful. In Chapter 5, across twenty years of the 
American National Election Studies Time Series, and among four additional cross-
sectional datasets, I provide robust evidence that white identity is often the most 
meaningful predictor of political preferences in a number of domains. Higher levels of 
white identity are associated with more restrictive views on immigration, and in what is a 
testament to the striking impact of this identity in the present day, higher levels were also 
significantly associated with opposing Barack Obama in the 2012 presidential election. 
This chapter also illustrates where white identity matters and where it does not. White 
identity is very much ingroup oriented; it predicts support for policies that benefit 
whites—as some social welfare programs like Social Security and Medicare are framed 
as doing—and opposition to policies that threaten whites’ privileged status. White 
identity, however, it is not a proxy for outgroup attitudes in domains like welfare, federal 
spending on aid to blacks, and other racialized policies generally associated with 
outgroup aminus.  
To what extent does group-threat moderate the effect of white identity on 
evaluations? The experiment described in Chapter 6 tests the claim that high identifiers 
are sensitive to threats directed at their group. When reminded of looming population 
changes, in which whites will no longer hold a majority status in the U.S., white 
identifiers respond with anger and fear. In other words, they report feeling genuine 
emotions on behalf of their group, a finding which lends further credence to the notion 
that white identity is a meaningful construct. At the same time, the threat of population 
displacement does little to forge relationships between identity and political constructs, in 
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part because powerful associations already exist. White identity may in fact be 
chronically salient in the present political milieu.  
One explanation for the lack of evidence for white identity in earlier research is 
the notion that proclaiming such an identification may have been seen as taboo at one 
time. White identity, after all, has been associated with extremist hate groups who 
embrace white supremacist beliefs. Thus, Chapter 7 examines the possibility that efforts 
to measure white identity are vulnerable to social desirability biases. And in fact they are, 
to some extent, but not enough to diminish the power of this identity. More interestingly, 
however, are the results of an experiment in which the effort of whites to organize on 
behalf of their group—in this case, a story based on a real attempt on the part of a college 
student to establish a white student union on a university campus—is associated with 
white supremacism. When such a connection is made, white identifiers do not reject their 
identity. Instead, they become measurably more liberal in their policy preferences. These 
results support the claim the white identity is not a construct limited to a small subset of 
marginalized and radical whites; rather, a significant proportion of whites have adopted 
this identity without readily associating it with extremism.  
The concluding chapter summarizes findings, considers their implications, and 
grapples with what the future holds given the apparent import of white racial identity. 
Racial conflict in the U.S., it seems, can no longer be characterized primarily by white 
animosity toward blacks. Amidst a rapidly shifting racial landscape, in which 
immigration and trends in birth rates have brought Hispanics into the fray across the 
nation, whites’ concerns over their ingroup’s power and privileges are also a driving 
force in racial conflict. Furthermore, these same trends are not limited to the United 
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States. Large influxes of immigrants have also challenged the political, social, and 
numerical dominance of whites in Western Europe, and I speculate in Chapter 8 about the 
extent to which the findings in this project may extend across the Atlantic Ocean. This 
much seems clear: racial identity, at least in the U.S., is not a phenomenon limited to 
subordinated groups. White Americans do indeed identify with their racial group, and the 
factors that gave rise to the salience of this identity are likely to increase in magnitude in 
the coming years. Thus, the work here revises our existing understanding of racial 
conflict, and provides important evidence for the way in which racial attitudes will likely 
influence political outcomes in the future.     
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CHAPTER 2 
A Theory of Dominant Group Identity 
Over its history, the nature of scholarship on intergroup relations has been 
influenced by the social and political milieu (Huddy 2004). Pioneers of this work focused 
on how membership in and identification with socio-demographic groups influenced 
individuals’ political beliefs and behavior (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944). Much of this work coincided with observed 
political homogeneity along occupational, religious, and racial lines in the U.S., and 
scholars argued that campaigns effectively strengthened the relationships between group 
ties and political preferences. Then, beginning in the early 1950s in the wake of Nazi 
Germany and the mass genocide of Jews and other groups, work on intergroup relations 
shifted from a focus on political cohesion to an emphasis on conflict and prejudice 
(Adorno et al. 1950; Allport 1954; M. Sherif 1958). During this time, social scientists 
were responding to outcries from intellectual and political elites who argued that 
Americans needed to confront domestic racial and ethnic inequalities in order to 
denounce sincerely the doctrines of racial superiority promoted by fascist and Nazi 
ideologies (Montagu 1942; Myrdal 1944; Wolsko et al. 2000). By the late 1970s, the 
study of intergroup relations had shifted once again. An interest in both ingroup solidarity 
and intergroup conflict emerged out of the civil rights era and the modern women’s
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movement, where considerable group cohesion on the part of blacks and women 
characterized political conflict (Gurin 1985; Miller et al. 1981; Olsen 1970; Tajfel and 
Turner 1979; Tajfel 1974; Verba and Nie 1972).  
  Today, the extent to which research focuses on either ingroup solidarity or 
outgroup hostility is a function of the group whose behavior is of interest. Indeed, just as 
scholarly attention to group cohesion or conflict has shifted in response to political 
realities, the perspectives regarding the study of intergroup relations have also varied 
depending on the specific group being studied (Jackman 1994). For some groups, much 
of the focus is distinctly ingroup oriented. For example, a great deal of the work on class 
and gender focuses on group consciousness and collective action among the working 
class and women, with limited research directed toward group members’ outgroup 
attitudes or animosities.  For other groups, attention has been primarily directed at 
outgroup attitudes and prejudice.  This divide is perhaps most apparent with respect to the 
study of race in the U.S., where work on whites as a group deals almost exclusively with 
racial prejudice and the relationship between these attitudes and whites’ political 
preferences. Research on African Americans and other racial or ethnic minority group 
members, however, is characterized by an interest in cohesion and group identification. 
These different theoretical emphases are not simply the result of normative interests in 
eradicating racial conflict and promoting equality; rather, they are born out of empirical 
realities. For groups like African Americans, group cohesion and identity are easily 
measured and politically impactful. For white Americans, evidence of widespread 
solidarity along racial lines has often seemed scant in existing public opinion data. As a 
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result, many scholars have dismissed the notion that racial identity among whites plays an 
important role in political attitudes or behavior. 
The Concept of Identity 
Interest in group cohesion among certain groups has led to the development of an 
extensive field of study surrounding the concept of group identity. Since the 1970s, social 
scientists have been increasingly interested in the behavioral consequences of group 
identity, which is generally defined as a psychological, internalized sense of attachment 
to a group (Conover 1984; Huddy 2003; Lau 1989; Miller et al. 1981). For political 
scientists, group identity has long played an important role in theories of political 
behavior. Indeed, one of the central and persistent findings of research in this domain is 
that subjective group loyalties can be powerful predictors of political preferences. We 
know that group identifications are significant because they provide important cognitive 
structures through which individuals navigate and participate in the political world.  They 
can serve as cues for political preferences, and they may promote political engagement.  
 Group identity has certainly played a particularly important role in our 
understanding of political behavior among African Americans. Starting generally with 
the work of Matthews and Prothro (1966), who named “an interest in and identification 
with other members of the race” as a prerequisite for black leadership, scholars have paid 
significant attention to racial identification among blacks in the U.S., and with good 
reason. There is substantial empirical evidence that racial identification has important 
political consequences for blacks. Strong racial identities lead them to participate in 
politics at greater rates (Miller et al. 1981; Olsen 1970; Verba and Nie 1972), as well as 
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to be more supportive of both redistributive policies beneficial to their group and 
government intervention on behalf of their group (Bobo 2004; Dawson 1995).  
This attention to identity has not been extended to whites when it comes to race 
for two primary reasons. First, the overwhelming focus of research on racial conflict has 
been driven by normative efforts to study outgroup hostility among whites. This reason 
alone does not sufficiently explain the direction this work has taken, however, especially 
since many theories of intergroup relations suggest that ingroup identity is an important 
and necessary element for the existence of outgroup derogation (see Brewer 1999 for a 
review). Rather, contemporary work rarely investigates the impact of white racial identity 
because previous attempts to document such effects have come up empty. The apparent 
lack of evidence for ingroup identity among whites has been attributed to the group’s 
dominant status. As Sears and Savalei explain,  
In general, whites remain dominant in American society—numerically, social 
economically, and politically—and overt, explicitly racial conflict is now 
relatively rare. As a result, whites’ whiteness is usually likely to be no more 
noteworthy to them than is breathing the air around them. White group 
consciousness is therefore not likely to be a major force in whites’ political 
attitudes today (2006, p. 901). 
 
In other words, the experience of being white in the U.S., and the privileges and 
advantages white individuals incur as a result of their objective race, make it unlikely that 
their race comprises a salient identity. Compared to members of a racial or ethnic 
minority group, white individuals are less likely to experience prejudice, discrimination, 
or disadvantages as a result of their race. Furthermore, white Americans live in a cultural 
environment where their group is considered “mainstream” by way of the group 
possessing the dominant status in society (Doane 1997).  Thus, “to be white in America is 
not to have to think about it” (Terry 1981, p.120). It is perhaps not surprising then, that 
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our understanding of intergroup relations with respect to white Americans is dominated 
by theories that focus on outgroup attitudes. 
 Yet the conditions I just outlined describe a state of the world that may not always 
be true. Consider the public discourse during the 1920’s with respect to race and 
immigration, the Civil Rights Era, and today’s sharp political divide over immigration 
and changing demographics. These are points in time in which race is salient, when who 
is part of the ingroup and who is not—when who is white and who is not—is more likely 
to be recognized consciously. Moreover, consider potential differences in individual 
experiences, where some whites live in racially diverse communities where white is not 
the “norm” or others for whom the experience of “whiteness” and racial differences are 
part of a cultural and regional socialization, as may be the case for many individuals born 
and raised in the southern part of the U.S. The purpose of this exercise is to suggest that 
just because racial identity is not routinely relevant for white Americans does not mean 
that it is never relevant.  
The argument I put forth here is that white identity—and by identity I mean a 
conscious, psychological attachment to one’s racial group and belief the group has shared 
interests—has periodically become a salient and important factor with respect to whites’ 
political attitudes and evaluations under certain conditions—namely, when whites 
perceive that their status as a dominant group, and the privileges that accompany such 
status, are somehow threatened. As I described in Chapter 1, in the contemporary 
political environment, a number of factors have potentially presented a threat to whites’ 
dominance including population changes, immigration, and the election of Barack 
Obama.  Thus, it is important to reconsider under what conditions racial identity does 
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matter for whites and to examine whether white identity is in fact presently a meaningful 
group identity.  
Theories of Intergroup Relations 
In order to understand the nature of a dominant group identity, it is important to 
consider existing knowledge of intergroup relations more generally. Both ingroups and 
outgroups are attended to broadly across the theoretical landscape, but especially with 
respect to those theories specifically designed to explain racial conflict. Such theories 
generally fall into two categories: those that focus on individual-level predispositions that 
influence attitudes and behavior with respect to outgroups and those that focus on 
identity, group categorization, and group interests. With respect to race relations in 
particular, included among the former set of theories are symbolic politics theory, racial 
resentment theory, and ethnocentrism (Kinder and Kam 2009; Kinder and Sanders 1996; 
Sears 1993). At the core of each of these theories is the assumption that symbolic 
predispositions, acquired early in life through socialization, exert strong influences over 
adults’ political attitudes and behavior. These theories do not propose that group 
categorization or attachment to particular groups serve as driving forces in explaining 
prejudice or general group conflict. In particular, symbolic politics theory and racial 
resentment theory posit that in the post-Civil Rights era, whites’ opposition to policies 
benefiting blacks is driven no longer by a belief in racial inferiority; instead whites 
perceive blacks as insufficiently adhering to American values like hard-work and 
patriotism (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1993).  
These theories do not suggest that ingroup identity influences or cultivates 
attitudes toward outgroups, or that contextual factors affect the level and salience of an 
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identity. Rather, these beliefs are based on early-acquired (or perhaps genetically 
acquired) predispositions, which serve as enduring influences on adults’ political 
attitudes, with the most salient political symbols determining which predispositions are 
actually evoked. According to these theories, such predispositions are more crystallized, 
politically powerful, and negative than other political attitudes.  
Kinder and Kam (2009) argue that another predisposition—ethnocentrism—
undergirds group conflict. They define ethnocentrism as “a predisposition to divide 
human society into in-groups and out-groups” (2009, p. 31) and claim that it is a 
fundamental characteristic of individuals, acquired through genetics, social learning, 
personality, and education. This ingrained preference for one’s ingroup, coupled with 
dislike for outgroups writ large, plays an important role in shaping public opinion. But 
like racial resentment, ethnocentrism is viewed as a stable disposition, whose levels do 
not fluctuate within individuals depending on context. 
These individual predisposition-based theories dominate our understanding of 
whites’ race-related political preferences, and for good reason. There is substantial 
evidence that racial outgroup animosity of whatever brand, be it symbolic racism, racial 
resentment, modern racism, or ethnocentrism, is an important predictor of whites’ 
political preferences (Kinder and Kam 2009; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears 1993). Yet 
there are also important reasons to reconsider whether these theories can broadly and 
comprehensively account for race relations in contemporary politics. For example, 
symbolic racism and racial resentment were originally designed to explain racial attitudes 
among whites toward blacks in the context of the historical experience between blacks 
and whites. As Sears and Savalei argue, “because of the long history, salience, rigidity, 
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and categorical nature of the racial color line,” whites’ prejudice toward blacks is a result 
of powerful predispositions that influence political attitudes. How well do these 
predispositions apply to intergroup relations in a dramatically changing racial landscape, 
where the traditional black and white biracial divide is being revised by Hispanics and 
Asians? Furthermore, and more central to my argument in this dissertation, is whether 
these theories offer a panacea-like explanation for whites’ attitudes when the conditions 
thought to make racial identity among whites irrelevant no longer apply.  
 Pointing out these limitations is not to say that individual predispositions and 
general outgroup animus do not play an important role in understanding today’s political 
phenomena in a multi-racial country. Rather, these predispositions may be part of a more 
complicated portrait of intergroup race relations in which identity plays an important role 
for whites as well as racial and ethnic minorities. As Bobo (1983) argues, racial attitudes 
are likely multidimensional, and which factors matter depends on the issue at hand or the 
object of evaluation, in addition to context and circumstances.  
In contrast to predispositional theories, group-identity theories suggest that people 
have psychological tendencies to form groups and to exercise ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup animosity (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1974). Theories falling within this 
domain include social identity theory, realistic group conflict theory, group position 
theory, and social dominance theory. These theories focus on the role that group 
categorization, attention to ingroup interests, and identification with a group has in 
driving behavior.  Many of these theories, like social identity theory, suggest that to some 
extent, group categorization is automatic and inevitable (Duckitt 2003; Huddy 2003; 
Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1974)(Duckitt 2003; Huddy 2003). In fact, in a series of 
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studies, which encompass what we now know as the minimal group paradigm, Tajfel and 
his colleagues demonstrated that merely categorizing individuals into arbitrary groups in 
a lab setting is sufficient to elicit ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (Tajfel, 
1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
Yet these group-oriented theories often fail to generate much traction when it 
comes to understanding the racial attitudes and racially motivated behavior of whites. In 
part, they generally overlook the notion that group identities matter for some groups but 
not others, or that the political and social relevance of a group identity may be 
conditional. At other times, they fail to test and empirically demonstrate whether ingroup 
identity exists among relevant groups at all. But I argue that the basic premise of many of 
these theoretical accounts—that ingroup identity and favoritism is implicated in 
understanding intergroup relations, even among whites, is indeed true, under certain 
conditions. That is, ingroup identity does not explain whites’ race-related political 
preferences all the time; identity becomes relevant when whites feel like their dominant 
status is in jeopardy. I argue that this conditional relevance likely applies most to 
dominant groups—those that possess the greatest control over social, economic, and 
political institutions within a society—more broadly (Doane 1997). Thus, in describing 
the theoretical landscape of group-oriented theories in the pages that follow, and in laying 
a framework for understanding racial identity among whites, I propose that many of the 
claims made could apply to other dominant groups across societies.     
In making this argument, I draw on a number of components central to each of 
these group-based theories. In the pages that follow, I describe how each offers important 
insights regarding the development and import of group identity more broadly, and I 
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discuss how these points may apply specifically to the development and relevance of 
dominant group identity, especially with regards to racial identity among white 
Americans. I also speak to the ways in which each of these theories falls short of 
individually offering a broad theoretical framework that can account for the way in which 
white racial identity affects political preferences, and I attempt to fill in some of these 
gaps with a revised theoretical account.  
Two of the foundational theories in the study of intergroup relations are social 
identity theory (SIT), and its close cousin, self-categorization theory (SCT). These 
theories begin with the assumption that ingroup bias can emerge under even the most 
minimal conditions. According to the SIT approach, a need for positive self-regard or 
enhanced self-esteem motivates such bias; when individuals feel that the group to which 
they belong is positively distinct from outgroups, their self-image as a group member is 
subsequently enhanced (Abrams and Hogg 1988). The authors of these theories, Henri 
Tajfel and John Turner (1979), also argue that individuals’ beliefs about the nature and 
structure of relations between social groups in society is what promotes group-oriented 
behavior in the first place. Namely, systems characterized by marked stratification move 
individuals away from interacting as individuals on the basis of interpersonal 
relationships and instead toward engaging as members of social groups with certain 
orientations toward other groups.  
Central to this approach—and to others, as I will describe in more detail below—
is the observation that the hierarchical arrangement of groups, coupled with the relative 
security of a group’s position, are important elements in the expression of identity. In 
particular, according to social identity theory, groups are more likely to express hostility 
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toward outgroup members when their place on the social hierarchy is unstable and 
resources are scarce. In fact, the security of a group’s position is considered to be a more 
proximal predictor of bias than are levels of personal self-esteem (Hornsey 2008).  This 
latter point is especially relevant when it comes to dominant identities. Often, by nature 
of their high-status position in society, dominant groups like white Americans enjoy an 
unthreatened, privileged status. As a result, social identity theory might predict that 
expressions of ingroup bias and outgroup hostility are often minimized. It would also 
expect that animus and derogation directed toward outgroups are more likely to occur 
when the dominant group’s power is challenged.  
There is a nuanced but especially important clarification to be made here, 
however. Social identity theory predicts a reciprocal relationship between ingroup bias 
and outgroup hostility, regardless of whether the status of a group is a dominant or 
subordinate one. This expectation is problematic when it comes to explaining behavior 
among white Americans. In some instances, and counter to the expectations of social 
identity theory, expressions of outgroup hostility (e.g., racial resentment) among whites 
seem to occur quite often without an accompanying ingroup bias or an expression of 
ingroup identification of any sort (Kinder and Winter 2001; Sears, Laar, and Carrillo 
1997; Sears and Savalei 2006). Furthermore, I argue that ingroup bias does not 
necessarily give way to outgroup hostility among whites. Whites may very well be 
concerned with their ingroup and desire to protect its status without expressing 
resentment toward outgroups or by subscribing to negative stereotypes about such 
groups.  
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Social identity theory, like other work situated in the group-identity framework, 
falls short in offering an account of the development and relevance of dominant group 
identity in one other important regard—it devotes little attention to explaining individual 
differences in identity acquisition. In fact, social identity theorists assume that group 
identities develop uniformly across group members and usually regard the relevance of a 
particular identity as an all-or-none phenomenon. As I will discuss further, however, 
there is considerable variation in who identifies as white and in the propensity to adopt a 
group identity more generally. Thus, social identity theory does not account for ingroup 
variation in the strength of identification or its potentially conditional relevance (Huddy 
2001). Factors like personality differences, the length of time one has been an objective 
group member, and vulnerability to threat all might explain individual differences in the 
propensity to adopt a dominant group identity. In other words, even when conditions are 
ripe, not all whites will report that their racial identity is salient and significant. 
Another group-based theory—social dominance theory (SDT)—does account for 
individual variation in the adoption of strong group identities.  SDT argues that humans 
possess a general tendency to form and maintain group-based social hierarchies (Jim 
Sidanius and Pratto 2001). Individual variation in the desire for group-based dominance 
is, in part, a function of one’s social dominance orientation (SDO)—a personality trait 
which embodies the extent to which an individual prefers hierarchy and tolerates 
inequality (Pratto et al. 1994).  Levin and Sidanius (1999) argue that higher levels of 
SDO are associated with stronger ingroup identifications among high-status group 
members. Furthermore, individuals who strongly identify with their group are more likely 
to support attitudes and policies that reinforce their group’s dominant status (Levin et al. 
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1998). This framework is appealing for understanding why some dominant group 
members possess stronger levels of ingroup identification, and it seems reasonable to 
expect that whites who possess higher levels of SDO might also identify more strongly 
with their racial group.  
But this theory also has a number of important and relevant shortcomings when it 
comes to understanding racial identity among whites. For one, SDT adopts a static view 
of intergroup relations; SDO is portrayed as a stable predisposition that is normally 
distributed across individuals, and levels of SDO are not supposed to fluctuate. Except 
levels do vacillate among individuals (Levin and Sidanius 1999), suggesting that there is 
contextual variation in the expression of SDO that scholars have yet to explain and that is 
inconsistent with the SDT framework (Huddy 2004). Furthermore, because SDO is 
believed to be a stable predisposition, SDT does not make claims about why the adoption 
or relevance of a particular ingroup identity should shift over time. In fact, Sidanius, 
Pratto, and their colleagues argue that members of the dominant group should all 
consistently possess a greater sense of ingroup favoritism, but this is clearly not an 
empirical claim born out in public opinion data (Jim Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell 1994; 
Jim Sidanius et al. 2004). For instance, SDT would predict that men, members of a high 
status group, should all possess relatively high levels of SDO, but scores vary widely 
among both men and women, and they do so over time. Indeed, as I will demonstrate in 
the next chapter, there is also considerable variation across whites in the extent to which 
they possess a racial identity. Lastly, SDT cannot adequately explain why some group 
members become more accepting of apparent outgroup members over time, like when 
whites become more tolerant of immigrant groups like Italians and Jews (Huddy 2004). 
 23 
 
Thus, while social dominance orientation may indeed be a fundamental personality trait 
that captures an important set of attitudes regarding inequality, egalitarianism, or support 
for a hierarchical arrangement of groups within a society, it seems that social dominance 
theory does not fully account for important conditional or contextual effects in the 
application of social dominance orientation. 
Other theories do not offer an explanation for individual-level variation in the 
strength of a group identification, but they do account for contextual factors. Group 
position theory, in particular, offers a useful framework for thinking about the import of 
racial identity among whites under certain conditions. According to Blumer, intergroup 
conflict does not simply arise from individual orientations, negative feelings, or 
socialized predispositions toward outgroups. Instead, hostility and perceptions of 
competition emerge through beliefs developed over time about the position in the social 
hierarchy that ingroup members should rightfully occupy relative to outgroup members 
(Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Central to the establishment of a sense of 
group position is the belief that ingroup members are superior, an assumption that the 
ingroup has a proper claim over certain rights and privileges, and a perception that 
outgroup members desire a share of these rights and resources.  
It is important to note that according to group position theory, beliefs about the 
position of one’s group relative to outgroups, as well as perceptions of threat, are part of 
long, collective, social and historical processes. In their extension of this theory, Bobo 
and Hutchings (1996) argue that these same collective historical experiences also 
engender racial alienation—or a sense of disenfranchisement and deprivation—especially 
among subordinate groups. The greater the dominance or security of a group relative to 
 24 
 
outgroups, the less alienated and threatened group members feel. When dominant group 
members feel that their status is waning relative to subordinate groups, however, hostility 
ensues.  
Existing work on group position theory has largely assumed that identities 
develop uniformly across racial groups. Yet we know that within groups, some 
individuals possess higher levels of identity than others. Thus, I add a straightforward but 
important clarification to the theoretical expectations born out from group position 
theory: it is the individuals who most identify with their ingroup that ought to be the most 
attuned to and responsive to threats to their groups’ status. In short, it is the high 
identifying whites who should feel alienated and who will be most likely to perceive 
racial and ethnic minorities as competitive threats.  
Other work also assumes that group identity exists among both dominant and 
subordinate groups, and that such identification plays an important role in intergroup 
conflict. In particular, realistic group conflict theory argues that perceptions (either 
objective or subjective) of zero-sum competition between groups over real or symbolic 
resources fuels intergroup hostility (Bobo 1983; J. W. Jackson 1993; Muzafer Sherif et al. 
1961). Integrated threat theory takes a similar position, but includes realistic and 
symbolic threats, in addition to threats stemming from intergroup anxiety and 
stereotyping (W. G. Stephan et al. 2002). Relatedly, work under the umbrella of the 
“power-threat” hypothesis presumes that whites feel increasingly threatened when living 
in proximity to a sizeable portion of racial and ethnic minorities (Blalock 1967; Key 
1949; Nagel 1995). Minority visibility increases whites’ perceptions that they are 
engaged in competition over scarce resources with such groups, leading whites to express 
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more prejudiced or hostile attitudes and to oppose policies that would benefit racial 
outgroups (Corzine, Creech, and Corzine 1983; Giles and Evans 1985a; Reed 1971).  
The majority of these resource-competition theories take the existence of ingroup 
identity for granted. They presume that whites conceive of their racial group as a 
meaningful entity, and that whites are collectively concerned about the social and 
economic position of their group. Thus, most of the empirical examinations of the 
hypotheses under the umbrella of group position theory, realistic group conflict theory, 
and the power-threat hypothesis do not measure ingroup attachment or identity. Instead, 
they measure individual-level perceptions of threat and competition, or they examine 
whether levels of outgroup animosity vary with either these perceptions of threat or with 
the racial composition of an individual’s locale. They largely leave untested whether 
whites actually possess an ingroup identity, and whether threat does indeed moderate the 
relationship between identity and political preferences. As a result, this work essentially 
sidesteps the fundamental critique levied by proponents of predispositional theories like 
symbolic racism—namely that whites do not possess a salient attachment to their racial 
group.  
 It seems clear that individually, none of these group-oriented theories offers a 
comprehensive framework for understanding ingroup identities among dominant groups. 
Many assume identity exists, but never measure it. Most offer no account for potential 
fluctuations in the levels or salience of this identity, and still others say little about 
individual variation in identity among group members. Collectively, however, they offer 
important insights when it comes to hypothesizing about the way in which, and under 
what conditions, dominant group identities become salient predictors of political 
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preferences. Social identity theory describes the important psychological benefits ingroup 
identities provide. Furthermore, social identity theory, social dominance orientation, and 
group position theory make strong cases for the way in which individuals are organized 
within groups in stratified, hierarchical societies. Social dominance theory also offers one 
potential explanation—personality—individual variation in the propensity to adopt a 
group identity.2  
The Role of Threat 
 Perhaps most importantly, what many of these group-oriented theories have in 
common is that they emphasize the importance of threat in either strengthening ingroup 
identity or in moderating the relationship between identity and attitudes. Indeed, authors 
of some of the earliest work on intergroup relations noted that threat to the group and 
intergroup competition are some of the most powerful forces in identity formation (Coser 
1956; LeVine and Campbell 1972; Muzafer Sherif et al. 1961).  
There have been several proposed psychological explanations for the relationship 
between threat and identity salience. Experimental work in the 1950’s and 1960’s 
demonstrated that stress increases cooperation, group integration, and solidarity. 
According to this early research, group cohesion is instrumental in nature; some have 
argued that it provides psychological comfort in the face of anxiety (Mulder 1963; 
Schachter 1959; Weller 1963), while others suggest that cohesion is the result of group 
                                                            
2  To be clear, this reading of the theory is a bit of a stretch beyond what the architects of SDT claim. They 
suggest that most members of a dominant group should possess similarly high levels of SDO, but I argue 
that this point seems overstated (Jim Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell 1994). What seems more likely is that 
individual variation in SDO across and within groups is likely a function of differences in levels of ingroup 
identification.  
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members’ efforts to resolve a problem in which cooperation is required (Berkowitz, 
Levy, and Harvey 1957; Deutsch 1949; Hamblin 1958).  
It is this work that led to more recent studies conducted under the auspices of 
realistic group conflict theory, which focus on group cohesion amidst competition over 
control of political, economic, social, and cultural structures (Blumer 1958; Coser and 
Rosenberg 1957; Giles and Evans 1985a). And while most of this research either assumes 
but does not measure ingroup identity among dominant groups like whites, or  instead 
focuses primarily on group cohesion among racial and ethnic minorities, some work in 
this vein has in fact explored the impact of threat on group identity among dominant 
groups. For instance, Baker (1975) demonstrates that solidarity among whites in South 
Africa was driven by threats to their cultural distinction. Giles and Evans (1985), using 
data from the 1972 American National Election Study, find that white respondents who 
perceived blacks as too influential and believe that the civil rights movement was moving 
too quickly, were more likely to rate whites positively on the white feeling thermometer.  
Threat is important because not only does it serve as an important element in 
identity acquisition, but it also increases the link between an identity and politics. It does 
this first by increasing the salience of the identity in the public domain, and then by 
orientating the group toward political solutions to the threat. The political environment 
sends a variety of signals with respect to threat and identity, and several scholars have 
shown that identity salience in the political world can strengthen identities generally. Lau 
(1989), for instance, finds that liberals and conservatives felt much closer to their 
ideological group when residing in a district with a contested election. Politicians can 
also increase the salience of an identity by publicly making group members aware of their 
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grievances, which in turn reinforces group identity and its connection to political 
preferences (Huddy 2003). The authors of The American Voter found that a group 
member running for political office strengthens the salience of the group and political 
issues relevant to the group (Campbell et al. 1960), although this relationship is likely 
different for members of a dominant group. Because most politicians are white, a 
member of an ingroup running for office is not novel; it is simply a reassertion of the 
status quo. It is more likely, then, that a member of a racial outgroup running for office 
will strengthen the salience of ingroup membership. This event serves both as a threat to 
the group’s dominance and makes the ingroup more salient by forcing a comparison to 
the outgroup.   
The politicization of an identity does not simply affect the salience of an identity. 
It may also change the nature of the identity itself, shifting it from a simple attachment to 
the group to a politicized attachment. Scholars refer to this concept as group 
consciousness, which entails identification with a group, a political awareness of the 
group’s position in society, and a commitment to collective or political action aimed at 
benefiting the interest of the group (Miller et al. 1981).  Previous work has concluded that 
group consciousness is generally lacking among whites, but as I will discuss in more 
detail in chapter 5, the same changes in the political and social environment that have led 
to the increased salience of white identity suggest a need to reexamine levels of white 
racial consciousness.  
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Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate 
When theories of intergroup relations have examined ingroup identification, they 
have often been concerned with the relationship between ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup derogation. In fact, the two constructs are often studied interchangeably, with 
the assumption that positive ingroup attitudes are reciprocally related to negative 
outgroup evaluations (Muzafer Sherif 1958; Sumner 1906).  Yet some of the earliest 
researchers of intergroup conflict were not convinced that such relationships are 
inevitable. For example, in his classic treatise on prejudice, Gordon Allport explained, 
“while a certain amount of predilection is inevitable in all in-group memberships, the 
reciprocal attitude toward out-groups may range widely” (1954, p.42). Others have 
corroborated this view, arguing that ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice are 
distinct, separable phenomena with different origins (Brewer 1999). Understanding the 
relationship between two two phenomena is especially important when considering the 
implications of the development and increased salience of ingroup identity. 
Brewer (1999) argues that we are more likely to observe a positive correlation 
between ingroup favoritism and negative outgroup attitudes under certain conditions. 
First, she suggests that when ingroups become large and depersonalized, the customs of 
the ingroup take on the character of moral authority. Digressions on the part of outgroups 
from the moral order are then viewed with intolerance and contempt. These negative 
evaluations do not inevitably lead to intergroup hostility and conflict, however. Rather,  
changes in the social order that might foster integration or close contact between ingroup 
and outgroups serve as key catalysts likely to kindle animosity or even “ethnic cleansing” 
directed at outgroups. Brewer adds that moral superiority serves as justification for group 
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domination. This framework seems to describe very closely the hierarchical relationships 
between whites and racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S. By nature of their dominance, 
whites have coopted the mainstream and archetypal representation of “American.” 
Failure on the part of non-white groups to assimilate to these norms is met with 
disapproval. Relationships with non-whites are defined by segregation, and increased 
contact or integration is viewed as a threat.  
Brewer also posits that the reciprocal relationship between ingroup identity and 
outgroup animus may be limited to circumstances in which groups are engaged in 
competition over physical resources or power. Under such conditions, identification and 
interdependence are directly associated with fear, anxiety, and hostility directed toward 
the threatening outgroup or groups. Both of these scenarios—threats to moral superiority 
or competition over resources—seem likely when it comes to characterizing intergroup 
relations between whites and racial and ethnic minorities. Thus, we might expect to 
observe a strong relationship between white ingroup identity and negative attitudes 
toward outgroups, or between white identity and opposition to policies that benefit 
outgroups.  
Duckitt and Mphuthing (1998), however, provide a very important clarification to 
the reciprocal relationship between ingroup and outgroup attitudes. They confirm that 
ingroup and outgroup attitudes seem to be associated primarily under conditions of 
intergroup competition. But in their analysis of black Africans’ attitudes toward whites, 
they find that ingroup identity was associated only with hostility toward Afrikaans 
whites—the group with which they were specifically thought to be engaged in intergroup 
conflict. Higher levels of ingroup identity among black Africans were not associated with 
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hostility toward English whites or whites in general. One interpretation of these results is 
that ingroup identity does not foster hostility toward all outgroups; rather, it is 
specifically directed toward the group viewed as the source of threat. This latter point is 
especially important as it helps distinguish white identity from ethnocentrism and 
clarifies the likely relationship between identity and attitudes. Essentially, Duckitt and 
Mphuthing’s findings lead to the proposition that when white identity is made salient in 
response to threats, the subsequent relationship between identity and attitudes will not 
necessarily be one of widespread animosity; instead, negative reactions among high white 
identifiers are likely to be directed specifically at the source of the threat. 
 A Theory of Dominant Group Identity 
The existing literature on intergroup relationships provides important insights 
when thinking about the development, activation, and application of ingroup identity 
among dominant groups. When groups are arranged hierarchically in society—as is the 
case with respect to racial and ethnic groups in the U.S.—dominant status uniquely 
shapes group identity. In particular, I argue, like Doane (1997), that dominant group 
identity and its assertion is reactionary in nature. Such an identity becomes relevant when 
the dominant group feels provoked to defend politically and ideologically its position 
within a system of stratification  
Because dominant groups usually coopt the cultural mainstream of the larger 
society, their group identity is often taken for granted or seen as invisible. In fact, this 
identity usually because subsumed under the umbrella of a national identity. As I will 
discuss further in subsequent chapters, however, dominant group members often prefer a 
particular flavor of national identity—one that mimics the particular customs and culture 
 32 
 
of the dominant group often at the expense of subordinate groups  (Theiss-Morse 2009). 
Thus, when the dominant group’s power is secure and unchallenged, their group-specific 
identity will be largely latent across the dominant-group population. For this reason, we 
would expect that throughout certain periods of American history, white identity will be 
politically and socially inconsequential. Threats to the group’s status and dominance 
(either objective or subjective), however, may serve both to strengthen this identity and to 
make it salient. For whites, such challenges may come in a variety of forms, including 
population changes, demands on the part of racial and ethnic minorities for increased 
equality, and large influxes of immigrant groups who, before assimilation, import new 
customs and cultures that threatens to displace Anglo-protestant American culture, 
potentially serve as threats to whites’ dominance. Furthermore, perceptions of economic 
competition or the electoral success of non-white political candidates may also serve as 
tests to the status quo.  Such threats may be short-lived, only temporarily priming ingroup 
identity. But when threats are persistent and significant over a period of time, they may 
make ingroup identity chronically salient.  
If white identity is chronically salient, then we would expect first to observe that a 
substantial portion of whites across the U.S. report that they strongly identify with their 
group. These high identifiers should be more sensitive to threats directed at their group, 
and they should be more likely report perceptions of competition with outgroups. This 
identity should then be significantly related to policies that benefit whites and aid them in 
maintaining their dominance, policies that reduce threats to whites’ status, and to 
policies, groups, and political figures associated with threats. An important clarification 
here, in keeping with Duckitt and Mphuthing’s (1998) findings, is that threats to whites 
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should not generate broad hostility toward all outgroups. Thus, we would not expect 
white identity to be associated with policies that benefit racial and ethnic minorities but 
that are otherwise unrelated to threats to whites. I will test these propositions in the 
chapters that follow.  
Unfortunately, existing work does not offer a comprehensive understanding of 
sources of individual variation in the propensity to adopt a group identity. For this reason, 
throughout most of this dissertation, I remain agnostic about the adoption or acquisition 
of ingroup identity among whites. I also do not have the longitudinal data needed to best 
measure identity acquisition over time. Part of my efforts in this study, however, are 
exploratory in nature with respect to these distinctions, and many of the conclusions I 
draw should spur further theorization and research on the development of white identity. 
Furthermore, some existing work does indicate that individuals with certain personality 
types and of certain ages, levels of education, and socioeconomic status are more likely to 
identify with groups, especially dominant groups. Other work also hints at the possibility 
of contextual factors. I explore all of these possibilities in the next chapter.  
Previous Work on White Identity 
Most of the published work specifically examining the relationship between white 
racial identity and political preferences has been undertaken by proponents of 
predisposition-based theories who have set out to demonstrate that group-oriented 
theories do not explain whites’ racial attitudes. Frequently, these scholars examined 
identity using the proximate measures available on public opinion surveys. Generally, 
this means that they have been limited to using a single item roughly measuring ingroup 
affect at a single point in time. Kinder and Winter (2001), for example, operationalized 
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white ingroup identification using a measure of closeness to the group from the 1992 
American National Election Study (ANES).3 They found that ingroup identity is much 
lower among whites in the 1992 sample than it is among blacks. Furthermore, they argue 
that ingroup identity among whites is of little consequence for the black-white racial 
divide in public opinion on the majority of race-related matters. Yet Wong and Cho 
(2005) demonstrate that average responses to the closeness question on the ANES can 
fluctuate dramatically.4 In 1992, only 45% of whites indicated that they felt close to 
whites, but by the year 2000, 75% of white respondents said they felt close to whites.5 
These rapid changes suggest racial identification is relevant among whites. This identity   
and its political consequences may wax and wane depending on social, economic, and 
political circumstances.  
 In other work, many of these same scholars have found evidence for white 
identity, but have often prematurely rejected it as inconsequential because it does not 
approach the levels blacks possess. For example, Sears and Savalei (2006) find that when 
given the choice, 20% of white Americans in their sample would prefer a hyphenated 
“White-American” identity. The authors dismiss this figure since it is not nearly as great 
as the level of blacks who claim to prefer an African-American identity (50%), but 20% 
is arguably a consequential percentage. Other work has shown that whites’ perceptions of 
group conflict with blacks is a meaningful predictor of whites’ opposition to some racial 
policies, but despite a substantively and statistically significant regression coefficient, this 
                                                            
3 A closeness measure asks respondents to indicate whether they feel close or closest to their own racial 
group out of a series of listed groups.  
4 Identification among blacks, on the other hand, does not fluctuate much over time. 
5 It’s important to note that the 2000 data reported in Wong and Cho (2005) are from face-to-face 
respondents only and those provide comparability to the other years by eliminating any potential survey 
mode differences.  
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variable is written off by the researchers because the magnitude of the coefficient is not 
as great as that of symbolic racism (Sears and Henry 2005).  
Despite the lack of evidence for white racial identity marshaled by authors of 
predispositional theories of intergroup relations, there are some hints of the import of 
white racial identity in both the political science and social psychology literatures. For 
example, Hutchings et al. (2006), using data from the 2004-2005 National Politics Study, 
found that whites who preferred an identification with their racial group were more likely 
to view relations with blacks, Latinos and Asians in zero-sum terms. Sears and colleagues 
(2001) found that white UCLA students who strongly identified with their ethnic group 
were more inclined to vote for an ingroup member and to demonstrate and sign a petition 
on behalf of a group-related cause.  
Others, like Branscombe, Schmitt, and Schiffhauer (2007) find that white 
Americans assigned to think about white privilege expressed greater levels of modern 
racism than those assigned to think about white disadvantage or a non-race related topic. 
Winter (2008) finds that whites who rate whites warmly on the ANES feeling 
thermometer are more supportive of spending on social welfare programs that benefit 
whites, like Social Security. These findings hint that when it comes to whites, behavior 
and preferences may be driven by factors beyond predispositions and that ingroup 
favoritism might play an important role.   
Other fields have also considered the importance of racial identification among 
whites. Indeed, primarily within sociology there exists a line of work on white identity, 
although from an entirely different perspective than the psychological sense of ingroup 
identity and preference I focus on here. Research under the auspices of “whiteness 
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studies” has focused, from a normative perspective, on critiquing the reproduction and 
maintenance of systems of racial inequality (Hartigan 1997).6 A great deal of this 
research has focused on the invisibility of whiteness or the notion that whites do not think 
about their racial group in a meaningful way (Delgado and Stefancic 1997; Lipsitz 1998; 
Perry 2001). Ethnographic work has consistently found that individuals described being 
white as “nothing” or “normal” (R. L. I. Jackson and Heckman 2002; Perry 2002, 2007). 
Yet some of these same scholars are revising their understanding of whiteness as 
invisible in light of the shrinking size of the white population and the increased presence 
of non-whites in the U.S. (Frankenberg 2001).  
“Whiteness” studies also focus on the construction of social privilege and power 
from which whites primarily benefit, all while whites deny that such stratification has a 
racial basis (Frankenberg 1993). Some of this research explains how whites actively try 
to minimize or deny their privileged status, often through subscription to ideologies like 
color blind racism (Doane and Bonilla - Silva 2003; Lipsitz 1998; Lowery, Knowles, and 
Unzueta 2007). Other scholars have been extremely critical of this link between identity, 
privilege, and racism, so much so that they have started a “new abolitionist movement” 
aimed at eliminating “whiteness” (Ignatiev and Garvey 1996; Mazie et al. 1993; Roediger 
1994). Work under this vein emphasizes whiteness as a means by which to justify 
systems of oppression and privilege and argues that this identity should be deconstructed 
and eliminated.  
Social psychologists have also tackled the issue of whiteness, although less 
through the lens of a constructed ideology and more by recognizing whiteness as a 
                                                            
6 See McDermott and Samson (2005) for a comprehensive review. 
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distinct racial identity. This work was largely pioneered by Helms (Helms 1984, 1995), 
who developed a five-stage model of identity formation. Her model lead to the 
construction of the White Racial Attitude Identity Scale (WRAIS).7 Unlike the way in 
which I describe racial identity throughout this dissertation—as a conscious favoritism 
for one’s ingroup and recognition that one’s group has shared interests—Helms defines 
racial identity as  progression from abandonment of racism to the adoption of a nonracist, 
positive identification. In other words, this identity is viewed as a normative, 
psychological process resulting in a “healthy nonracist identity.”8 This scale has been 
primarily used by psychologists as a way to understand how behavioral predispositions 
produce psychological counseling outcomes.  
The common thread tying together much of this work is an emphasis on the need 
for whites to become aware of their racial identity and the privileges that accompany 
being white as part of a move toward social justice and change. As I will discuss more in 
Chapter 4, much attention has been paid to measuring whites’ perceptions of their own 
privilege (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Schiffhauer 2007), and even of a subscription to 
collective guilt (Iyer, Leach, and Crosby 2003; Swim and Miller 1999). This work has 
important goals, but it addresses white identity in a very different manner than what I 
present in this dissertation. Nevertheless, it is worth attending to at least briefly here, as 
much of what these scholars observe about the privileged place of whites has important 
                                                            
7 The particulars of Helms' theory and scale have been subject to noteworthy debate and criticism (Leach, 
Behrens, and Lafleur 2002; Rowe, Bennett, and Atkinson 1994) 
8 Some work responding to Helms has discussed the development of “white racial consciousness” (LaFleur, 
Rowe, and Leach 2002; Leach, Behrens, and Lafleur 2002). These scholars do not define consciousness in 
a politicized sense (Miller et al. 1981), however. Instead, they define consciousness as the common 
constellation of attitudes whites hold about racial outgroup members.  
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implications for thinking about how and when white ingroup identity matters in the first 
place.   
Other bodies of research have touched on constructs related to white racial 
identity. Sociological research throughout the twentieth century spent considerable effort 
studying ethnic identity (Alba 1990). As European immigrants flooded into the U.S. 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, identity was organized less 
around race and more around national origin. But by the 1990s, European immigrants had 
essentially completely assimilated into American society. Indeed, a significant number of 
whites in the U.S. can trace their roots to residence in the U.S. for more than four 
generations, and do not clearly identify with any specific European ancestral group (Alba 
and Chamlin 1983). Moreover, data from the 1980 General Social Survey (GSS) showed 
that a sizeable portion of whites select “American” as their ethnicity or reported no 
ethnicity at all (T. W. Smith 1982; White and Stephan 2000). In the present day, 
European ancestral origins have little impact on most Americans political and social 
attitudes (McDermott and Samson 2005). Thus, while white racial identity may be 
partially rooted in Europeanism, it is a pan-European identity not entrenched in the 
culture or heritage of any one specific ethnic group.  
Finally, previous attention to white identity has at times focused on more 
extremist views, including white supremacy. When I discuss white racial identity, I mean 
a broad identification across the white population, and not a marginalized, extremist 
identity that is often associated with white supremacist groups like the Ku Klux Klan, 
neo-Nazis, skinheads, and militia movements. A rise in these movements, which overtly 
engage in the production of a white, masculine, patriarchal ideology, may indeed be 
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fueled by some of the same threats that motivate whites more broadly to identify with 
their group (Ferber 1998). But the extremism adopted by these hate groups is not what 
characterizes the white identity I describe throughout this dissertation.  
 This point is not intended to sidestep what may be a more sinister side to the rise 
in white identity discussed here. In fact, Swain (2002) and Swain and Nieli (2003) have 
suggested that the large influx of nonwhite immigrants arriving in the U.S. in the 1980s 
and 1990s and the prospect that whites may soon become a minority, coupled with white 
hostility over affirmative action, and the ability for whites to access, via the Internet, 
communities that might promote ideologies disregarded by the mainstream media, have 
led to an environment ripe for a white nationalist movement. They argue that this 
phenomena is not limited to marginalized groups, and their point is worth quoting at 
length: 
  But we believe that the image of the night-riding Klansman—or  of his more 
contemporary reflection in the figure of the tattooed skinhead spewing forth vile epithets 
against Mexicans, Jews, and blacks on the TV talk show circuit—is one of very limited 
usefulness in trying to grasp the nature and appeal of contemporary white nationalism in 
America. For white nationalism is seeking to go mainstream. And in going mainstream, it 
has found it necessary to eschew most of the images and tactics of the older racist right, 
as well as some of its more bizarre rituals and beliefs. While some of the leaders of the 
newer racial advocacy organizations were once active in Klan organizations, many of the 
key personalities involved in the leadership of the movement bear little resemblance to 
the kinds of people we normally associate with the traditional racist right in America. 
Most are better educated, more moderate in their language, and generally more appealing 
as human beings than most of the racist figures with whom we have become familiar 
through our history books or through contemporary television (Swain and Nieli 2003, 
p.6) 
 
 Their work suggests that a rise in white identity might coincide with elite efforts 
to capitalize on whites’ discontent. It is therefore especially important to understand the 
character and implications of white racial identity in contemporary America, because 
such an understanding it prepares us for predicting what is to come as demographic shifts 
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alter the racial dynamics of the nation and provides important insight into recognizing the 
root of racial conflict in the contemporary U.S.  
In the pages that follow, I test empirically the theoretical framework presented 
here, and demonstrate some of the ways in which white identity informs individuals’ 
political preferences. These efforts are in part guided by the previous work described 
here; the empirical tests are designed to distinguish between ingroup and outgroup 
evaluations, as well as to explore the extent to which attitudes in these two domains 
differentially predict political evaluations. This work also pays careful attention to beliefs 
about privilege and guilt, as well as to associations with extremist white supremacists. As 
I will demonstrate in subsequent chapters, beliefs about privilege are an important 
component of white identity, although not in the way that whiteness study scholars 
expect. Furthermore, whites who identify with their race do not endorse white 
supremacism. As we will see, these whites adamantly rejection such associations, an 
outcome which has an important effect on their political evaluations.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Who are the White Identifiers?  
The concept of identity has garnered significant attention across the social 
sciences over the past six decades, as scholars, especially in political science, have come 
to recognize the powerful role identities play in shaping attitudes. Indeed, Smith (2004, 
p.3 02) declared identity “among the most normatively significant and behaviorally 
consequential aspects of politics.” Despite agreement regarding the importance of 
identity, however, there is considerable lack of consensus over its definition and 
measurement. What is identity? How do we determine who identifies with a group and 
who does not? How do we understand the content of particular identities? The answers to 
these questions are at times murky, inconsistent, and incompatible across fields. 
This lack of conceptual clarity has led a number of scholars to refer to identity as 
a “slippery” concept (Abdelal et al. 2009a; Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001b; Lichterman 
1999). But the notion of identity is not difficult to grasp simply because of the disparate 
ways it has been addressed across disciplines; it is also hard to define the concept because 
of its very relative and seemingly incongruent nature. As Citrin, Wong, and Duff explain 
(2001b, p. 73), identity is “an assertion of both sameness and difference.” Identities, such 
as an understanding of racial group belonging, are formed by drawing boundaries around 
those who are like us and excluding those who are not. That is, they develop, in part, 
through the process of social comparison. This process can be especially elusive for 
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dominant group identities.  Sometimes social boundaries are “us” and “them,” but other 
times, when a group is dominant and has coopted what it means to be mainstream in a 
society, those boundaries might instead be “not-them” and “them”.   
Despite identity’s slipperiness, most work recognizes this relational nature of 
group identities across both dominant and subordinate groups. Individuals perceive 
themselves as similar to some and different from others, and they pursue their goals 
through membership with the groups with which they identify. In this chapter and what 
follows, my aim is to describe the formation and content of racial identity among white 
Americans. As we will see, the nature of this identity is especially rooted in the 
preservation of advantage and privilege, and less so in comparisons or derogation of 
outgroups.  
Considerable agreement also exists among scholars that group identities are 
multidimensional (Cameron 2004). Most work (Klandermans et al. 2002) differentiates 
between at least the cognitive and affective components of identification.9 The cognitive 
dimension refers to the simple act of self-categorization. It answers the question, “Who 
                                                            
9 In addition to the cognitive and affective dimensions, a handful of researchers have also identified an 
evaluative dimension. When scholars of Social Identity Theory write under this paradigm, however, there 
seems to be a great deal of slippage when it comes to the definitions of these dimensions. For example, 
some argue this dimension captures an assessment of the group’s position relative to that of others 
(Klandermans et al. 2002).  Hinkle et al. (1989) refer to the evaluative dimension as instead describing “the 
value group members place on such membership” (p.307). Jackson (2002) claims this dimension entails the 
positive or negative attitudes members have toward the ingroup. Cameron (2004) describes a different set 
of dimensions entirely: centrality, ingroup affect, and ingroup ties. His definition of centrality most closely 
relates to the affective dimension described above, while “ingroup affect” most strongly relates to Hinkle et 
al.’s (1989) definition of the evaluative dimension. The “ingroup ties” component is consistent with a sense 
of interdependence -  another characteristic of identity described by scholars, sometimes as a dimension 
(see Jackson (2002)) and sometimes not (Citrin and Sears 2009). Gibson (2006) acknowledges the three 
dimensions laid out by Klandersman et al. (2002), but then describes identity as having six components, 
most of which do not clearly fit into the three dimensional framework. My task here is not to reconcile 
these discrepancies, however. I point them out primarily to say that while the work on identity is indeed 
slippery, there remains significant agreement that a dimension of this identity, beyond mere categorization, 
captures the strength and centrality of identity. Most importantly, it is this dimension which ought to be 
most closely related to political cohesion. The other dimensions, however they are defined, are less relevant 
for my task at hand.  
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am I?” Does an individual think of herself as a black or white person? Or as a male or a 
female? As a Catholic or a Jewish person? The ability to answer these questions satisfies 
the cognitive dimension of identification. 
 But, as Citrin and Sears (2009) explain, “identifying as is not the same as 
identifying with” (p.147). It is this latter sentiment that characterizes the affective 
dimension of identity.10 This component describes the strength and centrality of, 
emotional significance toward, and psychological attachment to a group.  Most 
importantly, the affective dimension serves as the most powerful predictor of the 
relationship between ingroup attachment and individual behavior (Ellemers 1993; 
Klandermans et al. 2002). We know that stronger identities are associated with greater 
political cohesion, including a propensity to internalize normative group beliefs (Conover 
and Feldman 1984; Hyman and Singer 1968), a greater likelihood of adopting pro-group 
policy positions (Tate 1993), and a proclivity to demonstrate or protest on behalf of one’s 
group (Klandermans et al. 2002; Sears et al. 2003; Simon et al. 1998). As I describe in 
more detail below, this project improves on some previous efforts to measure white racial 
identity by capturing the affective dimension. Doing so is not necessarily a 
straightforward task. If some skeptics are correct and whites do not possess a racial 
identity, this dimension should be the most difficult to assess since it presumes that the 
racial identity is readily acknowledged and meaningful among a large proportion of the 
white American population.  
                                                            
10 Social Identity Theory posits that mere self-categorization can give way to positive affect and a tendency 
to act on behalf of the group (Tajfel 1978), but outside of laboratory settings, researchers have had less 
success in documenting the effects of simple group membership on political cohesion (Huddy 2003). 
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 Whatever scholarly consensus exists with regards to the multidimensionality of 
identity, it quickly disappears when it comes to measurement.  Surveys have been 
primarily used to measure identity because of their centrality to research on public 
opinion and political behavior, yet there have been few efforts to cross-validate survey 
measures of identity or to establish a standard approach.11 Indeed, some have complained 
about the sheer number of different measures used to assess racial identification among 
African-Americans and other racial or ethnic minorities (Sniderman and Piazza 2002). 
What this lack of standardization means in practice, is that there is no one particular 
source from which to draw when implementing a survey measure of racial identity, let 
alone racial identity among whites. Existing work does provide some guidance, however, 
when it comes to developing and employing a measure of identity that captures the 
affective dimension.   
Some work has relied on the “closeness question,” which has appeared frequently 
on the American National Election Study (ANES), and is usually worded as follows: 
“Here is a list of groups. Please read over the list and tell me the letter for those groups 
you feel particularly close to—people who are most like you in their ideas and interests 
and feelings about things.” Respondents who select more than one group are asked to 
indicate the group to which they feel the closest.  
 Wong and Cho (2005) employ this item to measure identity among blacks and 
whites, in one of the few previous efforts to broadly consider the relationship between 
                                                            
11 I focus on survey measurements in this dissertation, but other work has advocated for measuring identity 
through processes like content analysis, cognitive mapping, ethnography, experiments involving implicit 
attitude tests (see Knowles and Peng (2005) for implicit measures of white identity) and minimal group 
assignments (Abdelal et al. 2009b). Psychologists have also developed a “White Racial Identity Attitudes 
Scale” (Carter 1990), but questions regarding its reliability and validity have emerged (Behrens 1997; 
Ottavi, Pope-Davis, and Dings 1994; Swanson, Tokar, and Davis 1994). Furthermore, the fifty-item 
question battery is impractical for use on most public opinion surveys. 
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white identity and political attitudes. They find that racial identity is mostly unrelated to a 
number of policy preferences among whites, and only sporadically related among blacks. 
One possible explanation for the tepid link between identity, measured with the closeness 
item, and political preferences, is that the closeness item only weakly taps the affective 
dimension of identity. In fact, the option on a survey to check the many groups to which 
one feels close may mean that this item actually better assesses self-categorization, which 
is not typically a predictor of political evaluations. Further, because the closeness item 
only roughly distinguishes degrees of identity (the crude distinction between close and 
closest), it does a poor job of capturing the strength of identification, and only does so for 
some group members (the ones who pick race as the identity they feel closest to out of all 
other possible identities listed) (Huddy 2003).12 
Other work has employed “feeling thermometer” measures to approximate 
ingroup identity (e.g., (Conover 1988; N. J. G. Winter 2008). These thermometer items 
are usually presented as a series of questions on a survey, and respondents are asked to 
evaluate a number of different groups on a scale ranging from zero to one hundred. 
Values between zero and 49 indicate “cold” or negative feelings toward a group, and 
values from 51 to 100 indicate “warm” or positive feelings. Evaluations at 50 represent a 
neutral point. When it comes to gauging ingroup identification, this measure is an 
improvement over the closeness item in that assesses the strength of group attitudes. 
Furthermore, all respondents generally have the opportunity to complete a thermometer 
                                                            
12 Transue (2007) uses a measure that asks respondents “[h]ow close do you feel toward your racial or 
ethnic group?” and features response options that more precisely assess degrees of closeness. Because it 
asks about “ethnic group,” however, this measure has the potential to confound white identity with 
national-origin or ancestral identities (e.g., Italian, Irish, etc.), toward which many Americans do not feel 
close (T. W. Smith 1982; C. Stephan and Stephan 2000). He also looks only at a narrow range of political 
dependent variables among a regional sample, but he does find that identity is linked to opposition to 
particularized policies framed as benefitting minorities.  
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evaluation, regardless of whether the group they are evaluating is the one to which they 
feel “closest” or with which they identify most. This measure is not without its 
shortcomings, however.  
 First, the thermometer more accurately assesses group affect, rather than actual 
identification.13 Respondents may report feeling warm toward the group into which they 
are objectively categorized (or to a range of groups beyond their own), but positive affect 
is not a precise assessment of identification, nor do warm feelings toward one’s ingroup 
provide a sense of the centrality of that group to an individual. There is, however, often a 
strong empirical link between ingroup affect or favoritism and ingroup identity (Brewer 
1999; Herring, Jankowski, and Brown 2009; Levin and Sidanius 1999; Perreault and 
Bourhis 1999). In addition to this substantive concern, other work has raised some 
methodological concerns about the inter-comparability of the thermometer items across 
respondents (Brady 1985; N. J. G. Winter and Berinsky 1999) . With the preceding 
caveats in mind, I employ the feeling thermometer as a proximate measure of identity in 
some of the analysis presented here, as it is the best measure of identity available across a 
number of pre-existing opinion surveys. I supplement with more central measures, when 
available, and demonstrate that results are consistent with analysis conducted using the 
thermometer.14  
In an effort to move beyond the closeness and thermometer measures of ingroup 
identity, I turn to existing work in order to find a straightforward survey measure of racial 
                                                            
13 Group affect here is not to be confused with the “affective dimension” of group identity defined by 
Social Identity theorists. Here, group affect describe positive feelings or orientations toward a particular 
group, and differs from the features of the “affective dimension” ideally captured by a measure of identity, 
like centrality and salience.  
14 It is worth noting that some researchers have measured white identity implicitly (Knowles and Peng 
2005). While this work is informative, I argue that their results mostly capture whites’ implicit ingroup 
bias, rather than a conscious, subjective identification with their ingroup.   
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identity that more closely captures the affective dimension. Fortunately, some of earliest 
survey work on public opinion provides a foundation for such a measure.  In 1976, 
political scientist Hooper drew on the work of the Survey Research Center at the 
University of Michigan with regards to measuring party identification. He adapted the 
structure of their partisanship measure to create a survey item that would assess 
individuals’ level of identification with any number of social groups by asking 
respondents how important it is for them to identify with a particular group (Hooper 
1976).15 The benefit of this measure is threefold: First, it takes into account the cognitive 
dimension of identity—self-categorization.  Respondents are only asked about groups 
that they have previously placed themselves into earlier on a survey. Second, it asks 
about the centrality or importance of an identity and assesses the degree to which that 
identity is central. Finally, it is a single, straightforward measure and therefore easily 
included on public opinion surveys. In the following years, variations of Hooper’s 
measure have been used to evaluate identification with an extensive range of social 
groups, including nationalities (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001a; Huddy and Khatib 2007), 
ethnicities (Junn and Masuoka 2008), religious groups (J. A. Winter 1996), and 
artificially assigned groups in laboratory settings (Patterson and Bigler 2007).16 
Thus, throughout this and subsequent chapters, I employ a measure of racial 
identity among whites that similarly evaluates the degree of importance of this identity. I 
bring to bear evidence from three national surveys, conducted between 2010 and 2013, in 
                                                            
15 The exact wording used by Hooper (1976) is as follows: “Is it important to you to think of yourself as a 
[group name placed here]?” 
16 It is worth noting that in his exploratory analysis, Hooper (1976) actually finds a “White Race” identity. 
He does not, however, explore the relationship between any of the social identities he measures and 
political preferences.  
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which samples of white, non-Hispanic adult citizens were asked, “How important is 
being white to your identity?” Response options ranged from “not at all important” to 
either “very important” or “extremely important” depending on the survey. As I will 
demonstrate in the pages that follow, across time and surveys, this measure consistently 
predicts whites’ attitudes toward a number of political preferences. Furthermore, 
substituting alternative measures of identity, like the closeness item or a measure of 
linked fate, does not yield comparatively consistent results. Therefore, because of both 
the attributes of the measure and its predictive power, the racial identity importance item 
is an optimal means by which to measure racial identity among whites.17  
The Importance of White Racial Identity 
In order to test whether white identity is a significant and meaningful antecedent 
of whites’ political attitudes across multiples domains in the present day, I draw on 
survey data from three studies. The first two were conducted among nationally 
representative samples of white adults, including a 2010 survey conducted by Knowledge 
Networks (KN), and the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES). KN recruits 
participants using an address-based probability sampling frame, and participants receive 
free Internet access and a computer, if needed, in exchange for responding to the firm’s 
surveys. 18 This method produces high quality national probability samples, and includes 
households that did not initially have internet access or a computer. This KN study 
included an original survey among U.S. citizens with an embedded experiment conducted 
with my colleagues at the University of Michigan in late June and early July of 2010.  
                                                            
17 Croll (Croll 2008) examines white racial identity, using this measure, among a national RDD sample. He 
looks at a limited number of dependent variables, however. 
18 Knowledge Networks was subsumed under the GfK brand after this study was conducted. 
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The 2012 ANES allows me to replicate and extend the results provided by the KN 
data using what is arguably the best public opinion survey data available among a 
nationally representative probability sample of American citizens. The inclusion of the 
racial identity importance item marks the first time racial identity among whites was 
measured so directly on a nationally representative face-to-face survey. Furthermore, in 
2012, the ANES included both the usual face-to-face study, as well as a companion 
Internet study using KN’s panel, which allows me to make comparisons across modes. or 
most analyses conducted here, I examine these samples separately unless otherwise 
noted.  
The third survey was carried out among a non-probability but nationally diverse 
sample recruited by the firm Survey Sampling International (SSI) in July of 2013. SSI 
recruits individuals to their Internet-based panel via opt-in methods, and provides a 
census-balanced sample by sampling based on demographic attributes within their large 
panel.19 I independently designed the SSI study in order to assess a number of different 
relationships between identity and attitudes using items unavailable on either the 2010 
KN surveys or the 2012 ANES.20 In designing this study, I had the opportunity to buttress 
the importance measure of identity with a second survey item that more directly assesses 
the strength of racial identity. Respondents were also asked how strongly they identified 
with other white people. Response options ranged from “extremely strongly” to “not at 
all strongly” on a five point scale. This item was scaled with the importance item.21  
                                                            
19 SSI’s panel closely matches the characteristics of the larger white, adult, American citizen population 
based on 2010 Census data. For more information on this sampling approach see Berrens, Bohara, Hank, 
Silva, & Wiemer (2003) and Best, Krueger, Hubbard, & Smith (2001). 
20 As I describe in Chapters 6 and 7, this study also included two experimental components. 
21 The Cronbach’s Alpha for the two items is a respectable .70.  
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Throughout this dissertation, I replicate all of the analyses, when possible, across 
each of these datasets. I present the results to demonstrate the generally powerful and 
striking consistency with which white racial identity predicts certain attitudes and 
evaluations in recent years. But I also do so with the caveat that house effects, mode 
effects, and differences in the distribution of key variables in the sample can artificially 
skew relationships. These confounding factors will matter more, as you will see below, 
when it comes to considering the demographic factors that predict racial identity, and less 
when it comes to the relationship between identity and key political evaluations. In 
Chapter 7, these differences, especially with regard to mode, are a strength in that they 
allow me to test for potential social desirability effects. With these qualifications in mind, 
I proceed by first considering the distribution of racial identity across each dataset.  
The Distribution of White Racial Identity 
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of responses to the identity importance item 
across the three surveys.22 Notice that between 58 percent and 70 percent of whites 
reported that their identity is at least moderately important.23 Approximately 20 percent 
indicate it is “very important.” And between 11 and 20 percent say that this identity is 
“extremely important.” These results demonstrate that when a national sample of white 
Americans are asked about their racial identity, a solid majority indicate that their race is 
at least somewhat central to their identity. This finding that runs counter to earlier work 
in political science and sociology predicting that whites, largely unaware of their racial 
                                                            
22 The KN survey question had only four response options, rather than five. 
23 This distribution of results is similar to those obtained by Croll (2008) using the American Mosaic 
Project Survey - a nationally representative random-dial telephone survey conducted in the summer of 
2003.  
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identity, report low levels of identification (Doane 1997; Frankenberg 1993; Sears and 
Savalei 2006). This large percentage is also noteworthy in that a much greater percentage 
of whites are willing to adopt a white identity than we would expect if this measure were 
simply a proxy for more radical beliefs like white supremacism or old-fashioned racism. 
Thus, it appears that in recent years, a sizeable portion of whites claim that their racial 
identity is indeed important.  
Table 3.1 The Distribution of the Importance of White Identity 
 
KN  
(2010) 
ANES  
Face-to-
Face 
(2012) 
 
 
ANES 
Internet 
(2012) 
SSI 
 (2013) 
Not at all important 8%  23% 22%    19% 
A little important (KN = "Not very important") 27 18 20 12 
Moderately important (KN = "Somewhat important") 38 25 28 28 
Very important  27 20 19 21 
Extremely important - 14 11 19 
Observations 752 860 2387 797 
Source: 2010 Knowledge Networks study, 2012 ANES (face-to-face sample), 2013 Survey Sampling 
International study. Entries are percentages of respondents. KN & ANES data are weighted.  
If the distribution of the importance item across these three surveys reveals 
noteworthy proportions of high white identifiers, then why have previous empirical 
studies of white identity rejected it as invisible or inconsequential? Sears and Savalei 
(2006), for example, use data from the Los Angeles County Social Survey (LACSS) from 
1994 to 2002 to examine the distribution of the same racial importance item, as well as a 
number of different questions they argue should tap different dimensions of racial group 
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consciousness. They find that across each of the measures, levels of identity among 
whites are relatively low, and far fewer whites report any identification when compared 
to blacks. They subsequently conclude that racial identity is not a meaningful concept for 
whites.  
Fortunately, I am able to compare the LACSS data to more recent measurement 
efforts. My colleagues and I asked the same battery of questions on the 2010 Knowledge 
Networks Study that Sears and Savalei examine in the LACSS. Table 3.2 compares the 
distributions that Sears and Savalei report in their 2006 article (using data from 1994 to 
2002) to the distributions found among the 2010 KN sample. The differences are striking. 
A much greater proportion of whites in the KN sample report that their racial identity is 
“very important” (27% compared to 15%), significantly more indicate a strong degree of 
linked-fate (35% compared to 16%), and many more prefer identifying as both American 
and white (44% compared to 20%). Large differences do not emerge with respect to only 
a single item—a preference for identifying mainly as white, which is not surprising given 
the strong relationship between dominant identities and national identities that I explain 
in more detail in the next chapter.  
Table 3.2 Comparing Whites’ Responses to Identity Questions from the Los Angeles County 
Social Survey and a 2010 Knowledge Networks Survey 
 LACSS 1994-2002 2010 Knowledge Networks 
Survey 
 
How important is being 
white to your identity? 
(“very important”) 
 
 
15% 
 
27% 
Do you think what happens 
to whites will affect what 
happens in your life? (“a 
lot”) 
 
16 35 
Identify “mainly as white” 5 2 
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Identify “both as an 
American and as a white” 
 
20 44 
N 1,478-2,021 752 
Source: Los Angeles County Social Surveys, cumulated 1994-2002 & 2010 Knowledge Networks 
study. Data are weighted. 
 
It is not possible to definitively explain the different distributions of these data, 
but there are a number of reasonable possibilities. First, unlike the KN sample (whose 
distribution looks very similar to the ANES and SSI surveys), the LACSS was conducted 
among citizens of a particular metropolitan area, rather than in a national sample. It is 
possible that levels of racial identity are lower in this particular area. In the 2012 ANES, 
the number of white respondents from Los Angeles County is too small (even after 
pooling the face-to-face- and internet samples) to draw strong conclusions about the 
distribution of white identity there in the present day, but it is still worth a quick 
examination. Out of the 60 respondents, only three (5%) indicated their identity is 
extremely important. Ten (approximately 17%) said it is very important.24 These values 
are in fact much lower than what we observe nationally in 2012. Thus, levels of racial 
identity may in fact be lower in Los Angeles County than elsewhere in the nation.  
Second, identity in the LACSS was measured in the 1990s and early 2000s. It is 
possible that changing demographics and other threats to whites’ status lead to not only 
an increase in the salience of a pre-existing white racial identity, but also an increase in 
identification itself. Indeed, there is evidence that threat does elevate levels of ingroup 
solidarity (Coser 1956; Giles and Evans 1985b; LeVine and Campbell 1972). Thus, levels 
                                                            
24 19 (approximately 32 percent) said their racial identity is moderately important, 9 (15% said it is a little 
important), and 19 (approximately 32 percent) indicated it is not important at all.  
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of white identity might have increased significantly since the LACSS data were collected. 
Unfortunately, existing data do not allow me to explore this hypothesis empirically.25  
The differences in these distributions suggest that both measuring identity 
importance at the national level and at different points in time can yield dramatically 
different results. The fact that many whites, across multiple surveys conducted within the 
past three years, report identifying with their racial group, however, supports the notion 
that in the contemporary political environment, this identity may have become more 
politically relevant. I test that proposition directly in Chapter 5. Next, I turn to a 
discussion of the discriminant validity of this identity measure, an examination of the 
antecedents of white identity, and a review of other attitudes and evaluations correlated 
with white identity.  
The Correlates and Discriminant Validity of White Identity 
I argued in Chapter 2 that white identity is not simply racial resentment or 
ideology by another name. It is an independent identity based on the belief that whites, as 
a group, have collective interests. If white identity is in fact a separate and distinct 
construct, it should not be interchangeable with other political predispositions or 
identities. To see whether this important prediction bears out, I examine the correlation 
between white identity and a number of social and political predispositions across the 
2010 KN, 2012 ANES, and 2013 SSI datasets using the racial identity importance item.26  
                                                            
25 House or mode effects may also be contributing to the differences observed, as the LACSS data were 
collected via RDD surveys. Racial identity was measured in 2003, however, among a nationally 
representative sample using RDD for the American Mosaic Project Survey described by Croll (2008), and 
in those data, 37 percent of whites report that their racial identity is “very important.” Thus, it seems 
unlikely that the RDD mode alone is contributing to the large differences observed here.  
26 In the case of SSI, I use the two-item measure combing the importance item with the strength item.  
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 I begin with the most central and significant political predisposition—
partisanship.27  Political science scholarship has long recognized party identification as a 
durable, stable attachment, and most Americans think of themselves as either Democrats 
or Republicans (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 1998). Because 
party identification plays an important role in informing Americans’ political preferences, 
it will therefore be included in many of the analyses of public opinion throughout this 
dissertation. Accordingly, it is important to know that the role white identity plays in 
informing political preferences is indeed independent of partisanship. Is white identity 
just another manifestation of Republican or Democratic identity? As Table 3.3 reveals, 
partisanship and white identity are not strongly correlated. To be sure, across each 
survey, white identity is positively correlated, and sometimes significantly so, with 
Republican identification. The correlation coefficient, however, hovers around 0.1. By 
these measures, then, partisanship and white racial identity are not one in the same. 
What about the relationship between white identity and ideological identification? 
Many Americans describe themselves in these terms, and these identifications are 
politically meaningful.28 Conservatives tend to favor the free market, are more concerned 
with national security, and adopt more racially conservative attitudes. Liberals favor 
redistributive policies and equality (Conover and Feldman 1981; Levitin and Miller 
1979).  Perhaps white identity is simply another expression of an individual’s ideological 
position. Table 3.3 shows the correlation between political ideology and white identity. 
White Americans who claim their racial identification is important to them are more 
                                                            
27 Across each survey, partisanship is a seven point scale, recoded from zero to one, with zero representing 
“strong Democrat” and one representing “strong Republican.”  
28 In every survey ideology is measured with a seven point scale ranging from zero to one, with zero 
representing “extremely liberal” and one representing “extremely conservative.”  
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conservative on average, although just as was the case for partisanship, these differences 
are rather small.  
Table 3.3 The Relationship between White Identity and  
Political and Social Predispositions 
 ANES Face-
to-Face ANES Internet KN SSI 
Party Identification 
(Republican) 
0.07 0.01 0.17* 0.11* 
(852) (2386) (750) (797) 
Ideological Identification 
(Conservative) 
0.07* 0.05* 0.19* 0.16* 
(814) (2380) (742) (714) 
Limited Government 
-0.04 -0.07*  -0.08 
(856) (2382)  (796) 
Egalitarianism 
0.05 0.00  -0.03 
(860) (2387)  (797) 
Racial Resentment 0.13* 0.14* 0.28* 0.31* (859) (2387) (745) (796) 
Note: Table entry is the Pearson correlation coefficient. Number of observations appears in parentheses. 
*p<=0.05 Source: 2010 Knowledge Networks study, 2012 ANES (face-to-face sample), 2013 Survey 
Sampling International study. Entries are percentages of respondents. KN & ANES data are weighted. 
SSI analysis uses the two-item measure of racial identity.  
  
Is white identity more strongly associated with views about the size and role of 
the government? Americans tend to endorse the notion of a more limited government, 
and attitudes about the scope of government correspond to opinions across a range of 
policies (Markus 2001). Again, we can see from Table 3.3 that the relationship between 
the two constructs is underwhelming. Higher levels of white identity are associated with 
less support for limited government, but the correlation is small and insignificant in two 
out of the three datasets in which the measure was available.  
Perhaps racial identity among whites is significantly related to egalitarianism—
that is, for the idea of equality of opportunity (Feldman 1988).  Scholars have argued that 
egalitarianism is the value central to the debate over social welfare policy (Feldman and 
Zaller 1992), and others have suggested that beliefs about white’s power and status might 
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be significantly related to concerns of equality (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Schiffhauer 
2007).  As the coefficients in Table 3.3 reveal, however, white identity is not significantly 
related to egalitarianism. The coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero in 
each sample.  
Finally, is white racial identity simply an expression of outgroup animus? Is it 
primarily capturing dislike for racial outgroups? The last row in Table 3.3 confirms that 
white racial identity and racial animus, here measured with racial resentment (Kinder and 
Sanders 1996), are not one and the same. While white identity is significantly and 
consistently correlated with racial resentment, such that high identifiers tend to possess 
more resentful attitudes, the correlation is not so strong as to conclude that these 
measures are capturing the same underlying construct.  
Because there is considerable debate in the group identity and conflict literature 
over the extent to which ingroup favoritism begets outgroup animus (Brewer 1999), it is 
worth looking more closely at the relationship between racial identity and racial 
resentment. Figure 3.1 presents the distribution of racial resentment among high white 
identifiers (individuals in the top quarter of the scale, that is, those scoring at .75 or 1 on 
the identity scale coded to range from zero to one).   
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Figure 3.1 Distribution of Racial Resentment among High White Identifiers  
 
Source: 2012 ANES (face-to-face sample). Data are weighted. Bars represent percentage of white 
respondents. N=290 
 
 
The graph illustrates that the distribution is skewed slightly left, such that a 
greater proportion of high identifiers do indeed score moderately high to high on the 
resentment scale. The skewness is not especially dramatic, however. There is still a 
sizeable proportion of high identifiers who are in the moderate to low-range of 
resentment. Furthermore, if we look at the distribution of racial resentment among the 
moderate to low white identifiers (those scoring at .5 or below on the identity scale coded 
to range from zero to one) in Figure 3.2, we can see that a significant proportion of these 
individuals also possess high levels of racial resentment. These graphs illustrate quite 
clearly that white identity does not directly map onto expressions of racial animus. A 
significant number of low white identifiers possess high levels of racial resentment, just 
as a significant number of high white identifiers report moderate to low levels of 
resentment.  
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Figure 3.2 Distribution of Racial Resentment among Moderate & Low White 
Identifiers 
 
Source: 2012 ANES (face-to-face sample). Data are weighted. Bars represent percentage of white 
respondents. N=356 
 
Partisanship, political ideology, attitudes toward the scope of government, 
egalitarianism, and racial resentment are considered important components of public 
opinion. The analysis presented here provides evidence that white identification is not 
simply one of these other constructs by another name. White identity is a separate and 
distinct concept, which has, as I will demonstrate in subsequent chapters, a significant 
impact on whites’ political preferences above and beyond these other factors.  
White Identity and Other Political Attitudes 
In order to better understand the political implications of white identity, it is 
important to examine how this identity is related to other political attitudes and 
evaluations. How do these individuals orient themselves toward the political world? Are 
they more or less engaged or more or less knowledgeable than their counterparts? 
Knowing the answer to such questions may help us predict how an increase in the 
salience of white identity might affect political outcomes. First, I consider the 
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relationship between white identity and evaluations of the major political parties. Do 
white identifiers have a preference for the Democratic or Republican Party? To find out, I 
examine the relationship between white identity and whites’ evaluations of the two 
parties on the 101 point feeling thermometer measure. The results, presented in Table 3.4, 
show that generally, white identity is associated with warmer evaluations of the 
Republican Party. There is, however, a slight positive relationship between identity and 
evaluations of both parties among respondents in the ANES Internet study, suggesting 
that the preference for Republicans generally is not necessarily a particularly strong one.  
Table 3.4 The Relationship between White Identity and Political Evaluations 
 ANES Face-to-Face ANES Internet KN 
 
Democrats 
FT 
Republican 
FT 
Democrats 
FT 
Republican 
FT 
Democrats 
FT 
Republican 
FT 
White Identity 
 
0.004 
 
0.111*** 
 
0.047** 
 
0.081*** 
 
-0.014 
 
0.167* 
(0.031) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.128) (0.086) 
Constant 
0.491*** 0.465*** 0.421*** 0.434*** 0.484*** 0.400*** 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.091) (0.060) 
       
Observations 841 839 2382 2382 112 112 
 
R-squared 0.000 0.023 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.041 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All data are weighted. All variables 
are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. Source: 2010 Knowledge Networks Study, 2012 
American National Election Study, 2013 Survey Sampling International study.  
 
Are white identifiers more or less knowledgeable about politics? To see, I 
regressed political knowledge on the measure of white identity using both the ANES and 
SSI studies. In the ANES, political knowledge was measured using a scale constructed of 
counting the total correct number of political offices respondents were able to identify out 
of four individuals, including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Prime Minister 
of the United Kingdom, the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Vice 
President. The SSI was similar, except respondents were asked to correctly identify the 
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offices for John Boehner and John Roberts, in addition to correctly indicating which 
political party currently had the majority of seats in the U.S. Senate. 
The results of the model in which white identity predicts political knowledge are 
presented in Table 3.5. Perhaps unsurprisingly, white identity is associated with lower 
levels of political knowledge, a relationship consistent with the lower than average levels 
of education generally possessed by high identifiers.  
Table 3.5 The Relationship between White Identity and Political Knowledge 
 
ANES Face-
to-Face 
ANES 
Internet SSI 
    
White Identity 
-0.077*** -0.087*** -0.152*** 
(0.029) (0.025) (0.048) 
Constant 
0.421*** 0.538*** 0.733*** 
(0.017) (0.014) (0.031) 
    
Observations 
 860 
 
2387 
 
797 
 
R-squared 
0.011 
 
0.008 
 
0.012 
 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in 
parentheses. All data are weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. Source: 2012 
American National Election Study, 2013 Survey Sampling 
International study. 
 
Are white identifiers more interested in politics or more likely to participate? To 
find out, I examine the relationship between identity and both political interest and 
participation in the 2012 ANES. Political interest was measured by scaling together two 
questions. The first asked respondents how interested they were in the political 
campaigns so far that year. The second asked how often they pay attention to what’s 
going on in government and politics (alpha=.78). Political participation was measured by 
taking an average of the total number of political activities in which the respondent 
reported participating, including attempting to influence anyone to vote for a party or 
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candidate, attending political rallies, working for a political party or candidate, wearing a 
button or a sticker in support of a candidate or party, donating money to a political 
campaign or party, discussing politics with friends and family, writing a letter to a 
government official, or voting in the election (alpha=.66).  
The results of the regression model presented in Table 3.6 indicate that white 
identity is not associated with higher levels of interest or participation. White identifiers 
are, on average, neither more nor less engaged in politics.  
Table 3.6 The Relationship between White Identity and Political Interest & Participation 
 Political Interest Political Participation 
 
ANES Face-
to-Face 
ANES 
Internet 
ANES Face-
to-Face 
ANES 
Internet 
White Identity 
-0.021 0.007 -0.038 -0.021 
(0.036) (0.024) (0.025) (0.016) 
Constant 
0.629*** 0.307*** 0.622*** 0.316*** 
(0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) 
     
Observations   860   860  2387 2387 
 
R-squared 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.002 
 
0.001 
 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All 
data are weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
two tailed. Source: 2012 American National Election Study. 
 
The Antecedents of White Identity 
How do identities develop, and who is more likely to adopt a group identity? The 
authors of The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) argued that the strength of an 
individual’s group identification is primarily a function of the length of his or her time as 
a group member. Since their writing, scholars have explored a plethora of additional 
factors that may contribute to the development of strong group identities.  
Some work has suggested that there is significant individual variation in the 
propensity to identify with a social group. In particular, personality traits—rooted in our 
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genetic makeup (Bouchard 1997) and generally stable throughout our lives (Caspi, 
Roberts, and Shiner 2005)—may play a fundamental role in the process of identity 
acquisition.  Existing work has hinted at the possibility that qualities like the need for 
certainty (Mullin and Hogg 1999), cognitive complexity (Neuberg and Newsom 1993), 
and other dimensions of personality may be related to the development of ingroup 
identification and bias.  Duckitt (1989), for example, argues that authoritarian 
personalities are related to the tendency of some individuals to identify with dominant 
social groups. Similarly, Perreault and Bourhis (1999) find that higher levels of 
authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, and a personal need for structure were all significantly 
correlated with stronger ingroup identifications among group members assigned to 
artificially created groups in a laboratory setting. Furthermore, some personality 
research—which in recent years has grown under the consensus that core personality 
traits can be conceived of along five dimensions (the Big Five)—has found that some 
aspects of personality are associated with a stronger sense of self (Lounsbury and Levy 
2007) as well as with social identities like partisanship (Gerber et al. 2010). These 
findings imply that there might be a fundamental inclination among some individuals to 
possess a strong sense of ingroup favoritism and to identify with their racial group.  
Other factors implicated in identity formation have to do with the nature of an 
identity. In particular, one important feature is the identity’s salience. Because the groups 
to which individuals belong and may potentially identify with are numerous, the extent to 
which an individual strongly identifies with a particular group may be a function of its 
distinctiveness. The clarity or separateness of a category helps increase the salience of 
that category, and individuals ought to be more likely to adopt identities that are visible 
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and accessible (Turner et al. 1987). Existing work often points to the importance of 
category salience when it comes to group identity among individuals who find 
themselves in the minority (Brewer and Brown 1998). For example, ethnic minority 
children in a classroom are more likely to describe themselves in terms of their ethnicity 
(McGuire et al. 1978) and children in families where their gender is of the minority are 
more likely mention their gender when describing themselves (McGuire, McGuire, and 
Winton 1979).  
The importance of category salience suggests that context matters when it comes 
to racial identity formation. Specifically, individuals who reside in areas where they are 
the racial minority, or where the racial composition of their locale is more diverse, may 
be more likely to develop a strong racial identity. A similar prediction also emerges out 
of the racial threat literature, albeit with slightly different theoretical underpinnings. 
Research under the umbrella of the “power threat hypothesis” suggests that whites are 
more likely to feel that their group’s power and privileges are threatened when they 
reside in close proximity to sizeable minority populations (Allport 1954; Blalock 1967; 
Blumer 1958; Giles and Evans 1985b; Key 1949; LeVine and Campbell 1972; Nagel 
1995). In other words, rather than mere category salience, the apparent presence of racial 
outgroup members may increase identity salience by fueling perceptions of group threat.  
 With these factors in mind, I examine empirically a number of possible 
antecedents of white racial identity. I begin first with elements likely to be most distal to 
the development of identity, including fundamental individual characteristics like 
personality. Then, I consider more proximate demographic characteristics and finally, 
contextual factors that may explain higher levels of identity.  
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Psychologists argue that core personality traits—which can be organized and 
measured along five dimensions widely referred to as “the Big Five”—serve as important 
lenses through which people experience and respond to stimuli in their environment. Big 
Five personality traits predict a wide range of attitudes and behaviors, including health 
(Goodwin and Friedman 2006), income (Borghans et al. 2008), political ideology, policy 
preferences, partisanship, and political behavior (Gerber et al. 2010, 2011; Mondak 
2010). Furthermore, as Gerber et al. (2011), argue with respect to partisan identification, 
cognitive and affective factors can help shape group attachments. Certain personality 
traits are likely to make the affective and cognitive benefits of group identity more 
appealing, as affiliating with a group provides a cognitive framework to help organize the 
world. It can also yield social benefits, like a sense of belonging. Furthermore, 
personality traits are, arguably, a precursor to the other attitudes and predispositions that 
might contribute to the adoption of racial identity. Thus, I analyze how the personality 
dimensions of Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and 
Openness to Experience affect the strength of racial identity among whites using data 
from the 2012 ANES.  
Like much of the work in the domain of personality research, this analysis is 
largely exploratory, as there is, as far as I am aware, no prior work on the relationship 
between the five factor model of personality and the proclivity to adopt a social identity 
(except for the work of Gerber et al. (2011) on partisanship, described above). There are, 
however, a few predictions to be made about the potential relationship between each 
dimension and strength of racial identification. First, extraverted individuals tend to be 
more sociable and assertive. The sense of belonging that a social identity provides, 
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coupled with the high-status of whites, might therefore make a white identity more 
appealing to extraverted whites. When it comes to agreeableness, individuals who score 
high on this dimension are also likely to be drawn in to pro-social behavior. But, as 
Mondak (2010) argues, agreeable individuals desire to maintain positive relations with 
others, avoid group conflict, and tend to express lower levels of prejudice. If identifying 
as white is rooted in group conflict and perceptions of threat, then we might expect 
agreeableness to be negatively related to a strong sense of ingroup identification.  
Emotionally stable people tend to be calm, relaxed, and exhibit greater self-
control. Individuals at the opposite end of this dimension (also referred to as 
neuroticism), tend to be anxious and nervous. If stronger white identities are associated 
with the maintenance of privilege and activated in response to threat, then individuals 
more sensitive to threats may be more likely to cling to their racial identity. Thus, we 
would expect emotional stability to be negatively related to white identity. Next, 
individuals who score higher on the openness to experience dimension are more likely to 
seek information and exposure to culture and to try new activities and meet new people. 
It seems reasonable that individuals with these traits may be less threatened by other 
racial groups and by circumstances like demographic changes. Therefore, we might 
expect this trait to be negatively associated with white identity. Finally, conscientious 
individuals tend to be organized, reliable, and favor personal responsibility and tradition. 
Because such tendencies seem consistent with traditional Anglo-Protestant values 
potentially most associated with whiteness, it is possible that conscientiousness is 
positively related to stronger white identities. This prediction is rather tenuous, however, 
and it seems more likely that this dimension is not correlated with identity.   
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In addition to the Big Five personality dimensions, I also consider whether two 
other constructs of personality—authoritarianism and social dominance orientation—are 
associated with stronger levels of white racial identity. Building off the work of Adorno 
and his colleagues (Adorno et al. 1950), Stenner (2005) conceives of authoritarianism as 
a “relatively innate and enduring trait” (p. 326) characterized by a preference for 
uniformity and group authority.29 As I described above, previous work has found that 
authoritarianism is associated with a tendency to possess strong group identities, and 
therefore, it would not be surprising to find a link between authoritarianism and a 
subscription to a dominant group identity, like white racial identity.30 Furthermore, 
Stenner argues that authoritarians become more restrictive in their attitudes in response to 
threat, and so among authoritarian whites, a strong white identity may be one possible 
manifestation of racial outgroup threat.  
The architects of social dominance theory argue that individuals vary in the extent 
to which they possess a social dominance orientation (SDO), and they argue that this trait 
is normally distributed across individuals (Pratto et al. 1994; Jim Sidanius and Pratto 
2001). Individuals who score high on SDO desire that their ingroup dominate and be 
superior to outgroups. They also prefer that groups be arranged hierarchically and eschew 
equality. Because strong group identities and ingroup favoritism reinforce their group’s 
position in the social hierarchy, members of high-status dominant groups are thought to 
possess higher levels of ingroup identification. Existing empirical work supports this 
claim (Levin and Sidanius 1999). 
                                                            
29 Authoritarianism is measured in the ANES using four questions about child-rearing.  
30 Some work demonstrates a relationship between some of the Big Five dimensions and both 
authoritarianism and SDO (Akrami and Ekehammar 2006; Ekehammar et al. 2004), but generally, the Big 
Five, authoritarianism, and SDO are seen as separate personality traits (Pratto et al. 1994; Stenner 2005).  
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To see whether any of these relationships between personality and identity bear 
out, I regress racial identity, using the racial importance item, on each of the Big Five 
dimensions and authoritarianism using the 2012 ANES. Results among both the face-to-
face sample and the Internet sample are presented in Table 3.4. The 2012 ANES did not 
include a measure of SDO, but I am able to examine the relationship between SDO, 
authoritarianism, and white racial identity using the SSI survey. These results are 
presented in the last two columns of Table 3.4. 
Examining just the first two columns of Table 3.4, we can see first that, as 
predicted, extraversion is positively associated with stronger levels of white 
identification. Both agreeableness and conscientiousness are generally positively related 
to stronger white identities as well, but the coefficients are much smaller and consistently 
insignificant. The strongest relationship seems to emerge with respect to emotional 
stability. As expected, less emotionally stable (more neurotic) whites appear to possess 
stronger white identities, suggesting, perhaps, that the individuals most reactive or 
sensitive to threat are the ones that cling to a racial identity. Finally, and counter to my 
expectations, openness to experience is generally not associated with white racial 
identity, and coefficients run in separate directions when comparing the face-to-face and 
Internet samples.  
 The results in the third and fourth columns of Table 3.7 indicate that even after 
controlling for the Big Five dimensions, authoritarianism emerges as a significant factor. 
The bivariate regression model in the SSI sample, presented in the fifth column, confirms 
these results. Whites who score higher on authoritarianism report stronger white racial 
identities. This result is consistent with the work of Duckitt (1989), briefly mentioned 
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above, who posits that authoritarianism reflects intense group identification and a 
commitment to group cohesiveness.   
 The last column of Table 3.7 presents the results of a regression model among 
whites in the SSI sample, in which white identity is a function of both authoritarianism 
and social dominance orientation. We can see that while authoritarianism maintains some 
predictive power after controlling for SDO, this latter personality trait emerges as an 
incredibly powerful antecedent of white racial identity. Not only is the size of effect of 
SDO on white identity impressively large, but the R-squared leaps from .03 to .22 when 
SDO is included in the model, indicating that SDO explains a significant portion of the 
variance in white identity.  
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Table 3.7 The Relationship between Personality Traits and White Identity 
 
ANES 
Face-to-
Face 
ANES 
Internet 
ANES 
Face-to-
Face 
ANES 
Internet SSI SSI 
       
Extraversion 
0.108 0.109*** 0.106 0.091**   
(0.085) (0.040) (0.085) (0.040)   
Agreeableness 
0.057 0.012 0.054 0.001   
(0.108) (0.051) (0.107) (0.050)   
Conscientiousness 
0.011 0.080 0.010 0.061   
(0.103) (0.050) (0.102) (0.050)   
Emotional 
Stability 
-0.264*** -0.081* -0.268*** -0.064   
(0.086) (0.044) (0.086) (0.044)   
Openness to 
Experience 
0.068 -0.092* 0.072 -0.059   
(0.105) (0.049) (0.105) (0.050)   
Authoritarianism 
  0.057** 0.124*** 0.146*** 0.053* 
  (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) 
Social Dominance 
     0.495*** 
     (0.035) 
Constant 
0.461*** 0.429*** 0.435*** 0.358*** 0.495*** 0.374*** 
(0.104) (0.052) (0.104) (0.056) (0.018) (0.018) 
       
Observations   597 2384 597 2384    797    797 
R-squared 0.025 0.009 0.036 0.024 0.030 0.221 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All data are weighted. All 
variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. 
Source: 2010 Knowledge Networks study, 2012 ANES, 2013 Survey Sampling International study. 
 
These results provide important evidence that subscribing to a white racial 
identity is in part a function of fundamental personality traits. In particular, less 
emotionally stable whites who prefer cohesiveness and uniformity, and who adhere to 
hierarchy, seem most likely to identify as white.  These traits, however, clearly do not 
capture all the variance to be explained when it comes to identifying as white. 
Furthermore, life experiences and socialization processes can often overpower or alter the 
effects of personality. With this point in mind, I next consider the relationship between 
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white identity and several demographic factors, including age, education, gender, and 
income.  
In the spirit of Campbell et al. (1960), who argue that ingroup identity strength is 
a function of the length of time one has been a group member, my expectations with 
respect to the relationship between identity and age are rather straightforward;  older 
whites ought to possess stronger racial identities. Making predictions regarding the 
relationship between education and white identity is more complicated, however. 
Education is regarded as one of the most influential socializing factors in individuals’ 
lives (Hyman and Wright 1979) . When it comes to racial and other outgroup attitudes, 
higher levels of education are generally associated with reduced prejudice, lower levels 
of ethnocentrism, and greater levels of tolerance (Kinder and Kam 2010; Stouffer 1955). 
Furthermore, Stenner (2005) argues that “there is no more important determinant of 
authoritarianism than (lack of) education” (p.154).  
Gabbennesch (1972) argues that lower education levels give way to higher levels 
of authoritarianism and similar outcomes because a lack of education results in an insular 
worldview he calls “reificiation.” This outlook is characterized by absolutism, adherence 
to conventionalism, and conformity to authority. As Feldman and Stenner (1997) explain, 
we can expect such individuals to “be threatened and disturbed by any events that 
challenge the self-evident truth of established beliefs and the integrity of the social order” 
(p. 767). These same sorts of individuals might be inclined to identify with a dominant 
group, particularly out of a desire to maintain the current racial and social hierarchy. 
Indeed, analysis by Croll (2008) is consistent with this expectation; he finds that more 
educated whites are less likely to report that their racial identity is important. 
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 On the other hand, other work using the closeness item to measure white identity 
has suggested that education is positively correlated with identity, such that more 
educated individuals possess stronger levels of white racial identity (Wong and Cho 
2005). This finding is consistent with an alternative hypothesis, advocated most 
eloquently by Jackman, regarding the relationship between education and attitudes 
toward social dominance. Jackman challenges the conventional proposition that higher 
education leads to an “enlightened” worldview and a greater commitment to tolerance. 
Throughout her work, she describes how dominant groups develop ideologies that 
legitimize the existing hierarchical status quo (Jackman 1994), and she suggests that “the 
well-educated members of these dominant groups are the most sophisticated practitioners 
of their group’s ideology” (Jackman and Muha 1984).31 Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 
(1996) make a similar prediction. They argue that the better-educated members of 
dominant groups, like whites, are more capable of understanding how social policy 
affects their group’s material and symbolic interests. These more educated group 
members are also more likely to comprehend how ideologies of ingroup superiority help 
maintain their group’s relative dominance. Thus, we might expect that the most educated 
individuals are also the most likely to subscribe to a white identity. With these competing 
expectations in mind, it is particularly important to consider the relationship between 
education and white racial identity, as well as to explore the effect that including 
education in a model of identity has on the association between identity and personality 
traits.  
                                                            
31 Jackman’s argument is similar to the system of “legitimizing myths” described by the authors of SDO 
(Jim Sidanius and Pratto 2001). 
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I also consider the relationship between gender and white racial identification. 
Social dominance theory would argue that men, who through socialization and genetics 
hold more hierarchy-enhancing attitudes, should be more likely to identify with a 
dominant group like whites in the U.S. (J. Sidanius, Pratto, and Rabinowitz 1994; Jim 
Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell 1994). Furthermore, the media have widely portrayed 
white men as a particularly victimized group and as the individuals most likely to be 
aggrieved by the gains in social, economic, and political equality achieved by women, 
racial and ethnic minorities, and immigrants over the past sixty years (Kimmel 2013). 
White men might, therefore, feel most threatened by the social changes that make white 
identity salient. In addition, women ought to be less likely to identify as white if the same 
system and set of values that help maintain whites’ dominant status is also complicit in 
preventing women from achieving equality. While this expectation regarding gender and 
identity seems persuasive, it is important to note that Wong and Cho (2005) find that 
women are more likely to identify as white when identity is measured with the closeness 
item. We shall see, however, whether this relationship holds when identity is instead 
measured with the importance item.  
The last demographic characteristic I consider is income. Previous work has 
suggested that “whiteness” is most developed among working-class whites (Roediger 
1991). This group is also the most likely to be threatened economically by labor market 
competition with African Americans and immigrants. As a result, we might expect 
working class whites, with lower levels of income, to be most threatened, and therefore, 
to possess stronger levels of racial identity.  
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Table 3.8 presents the results, across datasets, of OLS models predicting levels of 
racial identity as a function of the personality and demographic characteristics described 
above. Measures of personality were not available in the 2010 KN data, but this survey 
allows us to view the relationship between identity and demographic characteristics when 
personality items are not included in the model. We can see that as expected and across 
each of the datasets, older individuals tend to possess stronger levels of racial identity. 
Education also has an especially powerful effect, although not in the way Jackman or the 
proponents of Social Dominance Theory would predict. More educated whites are less 
likely to report that being white is important to their identity, a finding consistent with the 
notion that higher levels of identity are associated with a more insular view of the world. 
Gender, on the other hand, does not appear to be an important predictor of identity. While 
women seem to have slightly higher levels of identity in the ANES face-to-face sample, 
the magnitude of the coefficient is not particularly large, and the effect is only marginally 
significant. Furthermore, the effect hovers fairly close to zero across the other datasets 
and is not statistically significant. This finding is also inconsistent with Social 
Dominance Theory, which would predict that men possess higher levels of racial identity.  
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Table 3.8 The Relationship between Personality Traits,  
Demographic Characteristics, and White Identity 
 
ANES Face-
to-Face 
ANES 
Internet KN SSI 
     
Extraversion 
0.072 0.082**   
(0.086) (0.041)   
Agreeableness 
-0.022 -0.006   
(0.111) (0.054)   
Conscientiousness 
-0.015 0.074   
(0.103) (0.051)   
Emotional 
Stability 
-0.244*** -0.061   
(0.087) (0.045)   
Openness to 
Experience 
0.128 -0.040   
(0.104) (0.051)   
Authoritarianism 
0.049** 0.099***  0.038 
(0.022) (0.027)  (0.028) 
Social Dominance 
   0.507*** 
   (0.037) 
Age 
0.127* 0.113*** 0.097* 0.073** 
(0.069) (0.038) (0.053) (0.036) 
Education 
-0.125 -0.167*** -0.391*** -0.073 
(0.102) (0.062) (0.087) (0.070) 
Female 
0.060* -0.003 -0.014 0.022 
(0.033) (0.018) (0.025) (0.017) 
Constant 
0.474*** 0.421*** 0.860*** 0.391*** 
(0.119) (0.071) (0.072) (0.062) 
     
Observations 577 2354 752  780 
R-squared 0.052 0.038 0.047 0.223 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All data are 
weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. 
Source: 2010 Knowledge Networks study, 2012 ANES, 2013 Survey Sampling International 
study. 
 
Because so many survey respondents opt out of responding to income questions, I 
present results from the models including income separately in order to avoid missing 
data problems. Table 3.9 presents only the coefficients on income from the full model, 
but results for the remaining variables are available in Appendix D. What is readily 
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apparent from the table is that income has no significant effect on strength of identity. If 
working class individuals are in fact more likely to identify as white, the measure of 
income does not capture this dynamic.32 
Table 3.9 The Relationship between Income and White Identity 
 
ANES Face-
to-Face 
ANES 
Internet KN SSI 
     
Income 
-0.088 0.030 0.030 0.014 
(0.064) (0.030) (0.059) (0.040) 
Constant 
0.441*** 0.424*** 0.853*** 0.391*** 
(0.121) (0.073) (0.073) (0.062) 
     
Observations 502   2288  752 780 
R-squared 0.087 0.039 0.048 0.223 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All data are 
weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. 
Source: 2010 Knowledge Networks study, 2012 ANES, 2013 Survey Sampling International 
study. 
 
It is worth noting that controlling for these demographic factors noticeably 
reduces the effect of authoritarianism on identity, although the relationships between 
identity and the other personality dimensions remain intact. In fact, controlling for 
education among the SSI sample increases the strength of the relationship between 
identity and SDO. While age and education do seem to play a role in the propensity to 
identify as white, it is clear that, above and beyond the effects of demographic 
characteristics, individuals with certain personalities are also quite compelled to adopt a 
dominant group identity.  
Lastly, I turn to examining the relationship between white identity and contextual 
factors. By matching data from the 2010 Census with FIPS county codes available in 
                                                            
32 Including income in the model using dummy variables to capture effects over smaller ranges of income 
does not produce different results. Thus, employing the continuous measure here does not seem to be 
obscuring a non-linear relationship between identity and income.  
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both the ANES and the 2010 KN data, I am able to examine whether respondents who 
live in counties with larger percentages of non-whites have, on average, higher or lower 
levels of white racial identity. Scholars have argued over whether counties are 
meaningful geographic units in which to observe the effect of racial composition on 
whites’ attitudes. Some suggest that neighborhood diversity is more likely to affect 
attitudes (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000), but unfortunately I am unable to explore 
correlations between the size of the non-white population and white identity within 
smaller geographic units using available data. I therefore make do with county-level 
measures of racial diversity.  
I also consider whether respondents residing in the southern U.S. have higher 
levels of white identity, with the expectation that the unique culture of the South and its 
history of racial conflict may lead to higher levels of white identity among its residents.33 
I present the results of OLS models including the percentage of non-whites in a 
respondents’ county and an indicator variable for South in Table 3.10.34  
  
                                                            
33 I define “South” as the 11 former Confederate states.  
34 I do not include the ANES face-to-face respondents in this analysis because the cluster sampling 
procedure employed in the data collection process geographically biases the sample, making it difficult to 
determine whether effects are simply due to the geographic distribution of respondents. 
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Table 3.10 The Relationship between Personality Traits, Demographics,  
Racial Context, and White Identity 
 
ANES 
Internet KN SSI 
    
Extraversion 
0.082**   
(0.041)   
Agreeableness 
-0.006   
(0.054)   
Conscientiousness 
0.075   
(0.051)   
Emotional 
Stability 
-0.062   
(0.045)   
Openness to 
Experience 
-0.041   
(0.052)   
Authoritarianism 
0.099***  0.035 
(0.028)  (0.028) 
Social Dominance 
  0.506*** 
  (0.037) 
Age 
0.113*** 0.111** 0.069* 
(0.038) 
(0.053) (0.036) 
Education 
-0.171*** -0.403*** -0.065 
(0.063) (0.084) (0.070) 
Female 
-0.004 -0.005 0.020 
(0.018) (0.025) (0.017) 
Percent non-white 
0.019 0.115  
(0.054) (0.097)  
South 
0.024 0.027 0.039** 
(0.021) (0.026) (0.018) 
Constant 
0.412*** 0.819*** 0.376*** 
(0.072) (0.076) (0.062) 
    
Observations  2354    745    780 
R-squared 0.039 0.053 0.227 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in 
parentheses. All data are weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. Source: 2010 
Knowledge Networks study, 2012 ANES, 2013 Survey Sampling 
International study. 
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The positive coefficients on both the percentage of non-whites in an individual’s 
county and on the indicator variable for residing in a southern state, suggest that these 
factors may contribute to higher levels of white identity. The results are, however, 
statistically insignificant, with the exception of the variable for South in the SSI data. 
Thus, the extent to which the racial composition of one’s locale effects identity is 
inconclusive. Perhaps, as other scholars have suggested, examining the relationship 
between racial context and attitudes at the county level is not the appropriate level of 
analysis. It is possible that if I were able to consider the composition within a smaller 
geographic unit, I might observe significant effects. Furthermore, the weak results with 
respect to the indicator variable for southern residence may obscure an actual relationship 
between the socialization effects of residing in or being raised in the South. The variable 
used here only captures current residence in the South, rather than the length of time one 
has lived in the South. Significant in-migration from non-southerners might be 
dampening effects.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 This chapter explored a number of important facets of white identity. First, I 
demonstrated that white identity can be measured with survey data using the racial 
importance item. When measured this way among a national sample, it is clear that a 
sizeable proportion of whites subscribe to a white identity—a very different conclusion 
from the one drawn by Sears and his colleagues in earlier work. Differences between his 
results and the ones presented here may very well be due to a combination of time and 
place. Unfortunately, I do not have nationally representative over-time data from which 
to examine the possibility that levels of identity have increased from the late 1990s to the 
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present. It seems quite possible, however, that factors in the political environment have 
not only made white identity more salient, but they have also led to increased adoption of 
this identity. Furthermore, a quick examination of racial identity in Los Angeles County 
with data from the 2012 ANES suggests that for whatever reason, levels of racial identity 
may be somewhat lower among whites in this region. I suggest that context may affect 
racial identity, whether that is due to levels of racial diversity in an area, or something 
unique about the socialization process one experiences in a particular locale. It is possible 
that something about living in Los Angeles depresses racial identity among whites, which 
raises a question about whether we might observe systematic geographic variation in 
levels of white identity across the country. The analysis presented here is not fruitful 
when it comes to examining county-level racial diversity or the effects of living in the 
South, but betters tests with different data might be more illuminating. Unfortunately, 
such data are not presently available, but it is a point worth keeping in mind for future 
survey designs.  
Sears and his co-authors are, of course, not the only individuals who have 
examined white identity. Wong and Cho (2005) also carefully compared racial identity 
among blacks and whites using the closeness measure in the ANES. There are a number 
of important differences between their analysis and mine worth highlighting here. Most 
importantly, they, like Sears, conclude that the predictive power of white identity is 
underwhelming, as they do not find a relationship between this identity and political 
preferences. My work here raises two possible explanations for these findings. First, the 
closeness item may not be adequately capturing the centrality or affective dimension of 
identity, and this dimension ought to have the most predictive power. In fact, differences 
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in the antecedents of white identity measured with the closeness item and with the racial 
importance item hint at the possibility that these items are measuring different things. In 
particular, Wong and Cho find that education is positively correlated with closeness, and 
women are more likely to report feeling close. I do not find a significant association 
between gender and identity, and I find that education has a negative relationship with 
identity.  
Time might also play an important role in explaining differences. The closeness 
item in the ANES was not available on the survey after the year 2000. Factors in the 
political environment, however, which served to threaten the dominant status of whites, 
were not prevalent until after this time period. Thus, it is possible that over the period in 
time in which Wong and Cho were investigating, white identity was not sufficiently 
salient as to inform political attitudes.  
 As I will demonstrate in subsequent chapters, the racial importance item has 
impressive and consistent predictive power, but of course it is only one survey item 
measuring a single (but central) aspect of identity. While it performs quite well, future 
work should consider alternative measures, including a multi-item measure of identity. 
Lee (2009), for example, proposes a measurement approach in which respondents are 
given “identity points” to allocate across a number of social categories. This method 
allows respondents to weight the strength of identification across a range of groups. In 
addition, psychologists have recently moved toward a number of multi-item measurement 
approaches, including Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) collective self-esteem measure. 
Such a measure, adapted for white identity, may increase our understanding of this 
identity and its predictive power.  
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 Another important feature of the racial importance item is its discriminant 
validity. It is clear from analysis presented here that identity is not a proxy for 
partisanship, ideology, support for limited government, or egalitarianism. Furthermore, it 
is not simply another measure of racial resentment. This latter point is particularly 
important, as the weak correlation between resentment and white identity demonstrates 
that favoring one’s ingroup does not, in this case, lead to outgroup derogation. In other 
words, whites can identify with their ingroup without necessarily expressing prejudice or 
dislike for racial and ethnic minorities. This finding is consistent with work in social 
psychology, which finds that ingroup identification is often independent of negative 
attitudes toward outgroups, and that often times discrimination is motivated by 
preferential treatment of ingroup members, rather than hostility toward outgroup 
members (Brewer 1999). These results also illustrate an important distinction between the 
theory presented here and work under the umbrella of symbolic racism. The latter would 
argue that political preferences and policy preferences that hurt racial and ethnic 
minorities are driven by a socialized dislike for the outgroup. When racial identity is 
behind support or opposition to particular preferences, however, it suggests, in part, that 
the attitudes undergirding these preferences are primarily about protecting the privileges 
and power of the ingroup. This is a nuanced but important distinction, especially when 
politicians and academics are in the business of writing prescriptions aimed at reducing 
group conflict. Sometimes such conflict is rooted in prejudice, but other times, it is about 
ingroup favoritism.  
 The analysis examining the antecedents of white identity provides valuable 
insight into understanding who identifies—in a psychological sense—as white and what 
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might drive this identification. It seems clear that there are particular personality traits 
underlying the propensity to adopt a dominant group identity. Especially powerful are the 
effects of authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation. The framework of 
“reification,” offered by sociologist Gabennesch (1972) seems especially useful when it 
comes to interpreting these relationships. He argues that traits like authoritarianism are 
consistent with insular, limited perspectives, all of which are part of a particular 
worldview. Individuals who subscribe to this perspective regard institutions and culture 
as fixed and natural, not as human products, but instead of manifestations of “cosmic 
laws” or “divine will.” While this description might be seem a bit theatrical, it is in 
keeping with the constellation of findings reported here, wherein less educated 
individuals, with particular beliefs about obedience and order (authoritarianism), who are 
also inclined to endorse hierarchy (social dominance orientation) abstractly, are the 
individuals most likely to report a strong white racial identity.  
 It is worth noting that while Social Dominance Orientation does powerfully 
predict white identity, a number of the findings here are inconsistent with expectations 
from Social Dominance Theory. In particular, proponents of the theory have argued that 
men and more educated individuals should be more likely to possess high levels of SDO 
and to subscribe to a dominant group identity. That is not what I find here. In fact, the 
effect of education is not only negative, such that less educated individuals are more 
likely to identify as white, but it is one of the more powerful factors in the model of white 
identity.  
 Regardless, what is certainly clear is that a number of high white identifiers 
recognize their group’s advantaged status. Rather than expressing guilt or sympathy for 
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outgroup members, however, they are mostly satisfied with these privileges. This finding 
is especially interesting in light of recent media attention to the concept of white 
privilege. In particular, a backlash ensued after Time Magazine published an editorial 
from Princeton University freshman Tal Fortgang (2014), who complained about being 
told to “check his privilege.” Fortgang railed against the notion that being white offered 
him advantages, and that the “check your privilege” phrase undermined the personal 
challenges he, or his family, had overcome in order to succeed. In a sense, Fortgang was 
denying the notion that his race had offered him particular advantages—a sentiment 
consistent with some whites’ concern over “reverse discrimination” and other 
disadvantages they feel their racial group faces. 
 Interestingly, this denial of privilege was not especially prevalent in the open-
ended responses I collected. Instead, high white identifiers primarily reported that their 
identity was important because it was “who they are,” how they are seen by others, 
reflective of the world in which they were raised, or because it offered them advantages. 
Furthermore, this recognition of privilege actually served to both strengthen and depress 
group identity, as a number of low identifiers similarly used the language of privilege to 
justify thinking about their racial group only infrequently. More common, among low 
identifiers, however, was the use of “colorblind” ideological terms to explain their lack of 
a racial identity. These individuals seemed to reject a white racial identity on the 
principle that “race doesn’t matter.” 
This latter finding is especially interesting. “Colorblindness” is sometimes seen as 
an ideological tool coopted by conservatives in order to dismiss the existence of 
structural racism and racial inequality. It seems innocuous in that it proposes that 
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individuals “ignore” race when making evaluations. But opponents argue that 
colorblindness allows individuals to ignore the very real disadvantages faced by racial 
and ethnic minorities and to deny the privileges enjoyed by whites. Indeed, some scholars 
have proposed that colorblindness is another manifestation of contemporary racism  
(Bonilla-Silva 2014; Haney-Lopez 2014). This project is primarily focused on who 
identifies as white and what the political implications of this identity are, but these results 
suggest that there is much to be learned about racial conflict by examining the individuals 
at the low end of the identity scale as well. It seems that a significant proportion of them 
have adopted a particular racial ideology that may also inform political attitudes.  
Finally, the results presented here hint at the possibility that there are subsets of 
both high and low identifiers, and the examination of specific heterogeneity among these 
groups is an important undertaking for future research. For example, individuals at the 
low end of the scale might be comprised of both racial liberals and racial conservatives. 
At the high-end of the scale, mixed in with the whites who are comfortable with their 
group’s privileged status, may be individuals who deny this privilege and worry about 
discrimination. Thus, future work should consider more carefully distinguishing between 
different types of high and low white identifiers. 
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Chapter 4 
The Content of White Identity 
In the previous chapter, I explored a range of possible antecedents of white racial 
identity. In subsequent chapters, I turn to describing a number of political consequences 
of this identity. But there are a number of additional elements of this identity that are 
important to consider. In particular, a critical ingredient in determining whether group 
membership gives rise to political cohesion is the content or shared meaning of an 
identity. Do high white identifiers systematically possess certain beliefs? How do they, 
for example, orient themselves with respect to a national identity? To what extend do 
they perceive conflict with other racial groups? Has their attachment to their identity 
become more politicized? In this chapter, I take up these questions and more, as 
examining the collective attitudes and beliefs possessed by white identifiers can provide 
an important glimpse into the content of this identity. In short, such an effort helps us 
understand who white identifiers are and how they conceptualize their own sense of 
racial identification.  
White Identity & American Identity 
 As the dominant group in American society, white identity is often viewed as 
devoid of content and whites are seen as “culturelessness” due to their appropriation of 
what is considered “mainstream.” It is therefore not surprising then that what may often 
be associated with “white” is synonymous with “American.” In fact, psychologists Devos
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 and Banaji (2005) demonstrate through a series of implicit association tests that 
Americans automatically and unconsciously associate “American” with “White,” as 
opposed to with other racial or ethnic groups. Furthermore, they find that the more whites 
displayed this “American = White” association, the stronger was their reported national 
identity.  
Do white Americans also explicitly associate “America” with whiteness?35 To 
better understand what comes to mind when individuals think of “white people,” I asked 
55 white adult U.S. citizens on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service to write, in their own 
words, what they associate with whiteness. Specifically, they were asked the following: 
“When you think about white people in the United States, what comes to mind in terms 
of the kinds of things you associate with whites in the United States? For example, are 
there any symbols, events, things of cultural significance, etc. that you think best 
represent most white Americans?” A noteworthy proportion (20 percent) of these whites 
did mention “America” in their response. More than one said the “American Flag” came 
to mind. Others wrote “Founding fathers” or “average Americans” and “America as a 
whole.  
If whiteness and American identity are so strongly related, then we might expect 
higher levels of white identity to be associated with higher levels of national identity. 
Indeed, this is exactly what I find. I examined the relationship between white identity and 
American identity in the ANES, KN, and SSI studies. As the bivariate ordinary least 
                                                            
35 Devos and Banaji (2005) do find some explicit associations between American identity and whiteness, 
although their sample is composed entirely of college undergraduates, and they are not focused on 
exploring associations with particular kinds of American identity.  
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squares regression results in Table 4.1 illustrate, higher levels of white identity are indeed 
associated with stronger levels of American identity.36  
Table 4.1 The Relationship between White Identity and American Identity 
 
ANES Face- 
to-Face 
ANES 
Internet KN SSI 
     
White Identity 
0.165*** 0.148*** 0.219*** 0.349*** 
(0.025) (0.021) (0.034) (0.031) 
Constant 
0.800*** 0.758*** 0.716*** 0.618*** 
(0.017) (0.013) (0.027) (0.019) 
     
Observations 
  857 
 
2383 
 
  747 
 
  797 
R-squared 
0.077 
 
0.039 
 
0.080 
 
0.140 
Source: 2010 Knowledge Networks study, 2012 ANES (face-to-face sample), 2013 Survey 
Sampling International study. Entries are percentages of respondents. KN & ANES data are 
weighted.  
 
But what exactly is meant by “American identity” here? Previous research has 
demonstrated that that there are multiple conceptualizations of American identity and 
what it means to feel attached to one’s nationality. In particular, scholars have 
differentiated between “inclusive” and “exclusive” national identities, with evidence that 
individuals maintain very different normative conceptions of who represents a “true” 
American. They have assessed these different types of identity by asking survey 
respondents to indicate the importance of a number of different traits in making someone 
a “true American” (Citrin and Sears 2009; Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001b; Citrin et al. 
2014; Wong 2010).  The significant relationship I observe between white and American 
identity hint at the possibility that for high white identifiers, the content of their national 
                                                            
36 American identity is measured, in each survey, with a question asking respondents how important being 
American is to their identity.  
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identity is a rather exclusive one. To find out I measure the nature of American identity 
using the 2013 SSI survey, on which I asked respondents the following:  
Some people say the following things are important for being truly American. Others say 
they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is? 
1) To have American citizenship 
2) To be a Christian 
3) To be able to speak English 
4) To feel American 
5) To have American ancestry 
6) To have been born in America 
7) To have lived in America for most of one’s life  
8) To respect America’s political institutions and laws  
 
I also added an additional item that some previous researchers have included with this 
battery of questions (Theiss-Morse 2009): 
9) To be white 
 
The available response options were on a five-point scale ranging from “not at all 
important” to “extremely important.” Figure 4.1 compares the distribution of responses to 
each of these questions among high and low white identifiers.37 What is immediately 
clear is that a greater percentage of high white identifiers, compared to low identifiers, 
indicate that each trait is very or extremely important in making someone “truly 
American.” There is some agreement between high and low identifiers that having 
American citizenship, feeling American, and respecting America’s political institutions 
and laws are important qualities. Large differences emerge, however, when it comes to 
the ability to speak English, having been born in the U.S. or possessing American 
                                                            
37 Identity is measured in the SSI data by scaling together two survey items: 1) “How important is being 
white to your identity” and 2) “How strongly do you identify with being white?” The white identity 
measure is then rescaled to range from zero to one. High identifiers here are defined as those individuals 
scoring above .5 on the zero to one scale; low identifiers are those with scores below .5.  
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ancestry, and even with regards to being white. In fact, approximately 23 percent of high 
identifiers (compared to 3 percent of low identifiers) claim that being white is important 
to being a “true American.” To be sure, a sizeable portion (43 percent) of high identifiers 
reject the notion that being white is at all important, but this figure still pales in 
comparison to the 85 percent of low identifiers who outright dismiss this trait.  
Differences in response options clearly demonstrate that high white identifiers tend to 
possess more exclusionary beliefs about American identity.  In fact, these results, coupled 
with the strong relationship between white identity and opposition to immigration I 
discuss in the next chapter, suggest that white identifiers might be characterized as 
nativistic. But this is not nativism in a broad sense, in which all immigrants or foreigners 
are seen as threatening; it is a preference for an Anglo-centric America, one where the 
prototypical citizen is white.38 
                                                            
38 To be clear, a significant number of high white identifiers do not in fact require the prototypical 
American to be white. This preference, however, is much higher among high identifiers than low 
identifiers.  
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Figure 4.1 The Nature of American Identity among White Identifiers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 2013 Survey Sampling International study. Bars represent percentage of respondents in each category.  N=782
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There is one other important distinction to be made here. These results do not 
necessarily indicate that this narrow view of American identity is primarily driven by 
outgroup animus or negative evaluations of non-whites. To illustrate this latter point 
more clearly, I created an additive index of all nine of the above survey items to serve as 
a single measure of American exclusionism (alpha=.85).39 I modeled this attitude as a 
function of white identity, age, education, gender, partisanship, political ideology, and 
egalitarianism. The results, presented in the first column of Table 4.2, show that white 
identity strongly and significantly predicts a more exclusionary view of American 
identity, as expected.40 More importantly, the results of the OLS model in the second 
column reveal that when a control for attitudes toward outgroup members—measured 
here as the average feeling thermometer evaluations of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians—is 
included, the effect of white identity is only barely diminished.41 Furthermore, these 
outgroup attitudes are not significantly related to the dependent variable. In short, the 
relationships observed here are primarily driven by whites’ preference for their ingroup, 
rather than dislike for racial and ethnic outgroups.42  
  
                                                            
39 Scaling these items together is in keeping with Wong (2010), who using General Social Survey data, 
combines the same items into a single measure with the exception of the “to be white” question.  
40 These results are robust to controlling for income. 
41 I scaled the three items together because they are so significantly correlated with one another. Including 
each evaluation individually in three separate models does not substantively alter the results presented here.  
42 The relationships described here hold even after controlling for racial resentment.  
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Table 4.2 Support for Exclusionary American Identity 
   
White Identity 
0.370*** 0.361*** 
(0.027) (0.028) 
Age 
0.079*** 0.082*** 
(0.030) (0.030) 
Education 
-0.203*** -0.199*** 
(0.060) (0.060) 
Female 
0.019 0.018 
(0.014) (0.014) 
Partisanship 
(1=Republican) 
-0.010 -0.007 
(0.027) (0.027) 
Ideology 
(1=Conservative) 
0.145*** 0.148*** 
(0.034) (0.034) 
Egalitarianism 
-0.068* -0.051 
(0.039) (0.040) 
Attitudes toward 
racial outgroups 
 -0.031 
 (0.034) 
Constant 
0.426*** 0.433*** 
(0.063) (0.065) 
   
Observations 686 685 
R-squared 0.315 0.317 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in 
parentheses. All data are weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. Source: 2013 Survey 
Sampling International study. 
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Perceptions of Group Competition and Racial Alienation 
There are a number of other attitudes we might expect high white identifiers to 
share beyond a more exclusionary American identity. In particular, one of the 
foundational elements of Blumer’s Group Position Theory is that dominant group 
members believe they are entitled to certain rights and resources that outgroup members 
desire. If this theoretical framework helps explain perceived conflict between whites, the 
dominant group, and racial and ethnic minorities, then we would of course expect that 
whites believe their group faces competition over certain resources from outgroup 
members. This prediction is rather straightforward; if white identity becomes salient in 
response to group threat, high white identifiers should be most attuned to outgroup 
members challenging whites’ status. In other words, they should be more likely to report 
perceptions of zero-sum competition with racial and ethnic minorities.  
We might also expect that the insecurity these whites feel to be expressed in ways 
other than perceptions of competition. For instance, in their work extending Blumer’s 
Group Position Theory to racial and ethnic minorities, Bobo and Hutchings focus on the 
notion of racial alienation. They argue that this concept ranges along a continuum, 
capturing feelings of entitlement and enfranchisement among dominant group members, 
and disenfranchisement among racial and ethnic minorities. They also describe alienation 
as part of collective memory; it develops through shared historical experiences of group 
members as part of their typical social, political, and economic positions. 
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According to their theoretical account, feelings of alienation should be lowest 
among dominant group members, as they are the most secure and least likely to feel 
threatened. The conditions which make white identity salient, however, should turn this 
expectation on its head. That is, if white identity either develops or becomes salient when 
whites feel that their groups’ dominant status is no longer secure, then we would expect 
that high white identifiers also report feelings of racial alienation. And we should 
especially anticipate finding a relationship between white identity and perceptions of 
racial alienation if threat has made identity chronically salient, since longer exposure to 
such conditions ought to increase the collective sense that one’s racial group is being 
unreasonably challenged.  
 Thus, I explore whether higher levels of identity are indeed associated with any of 
these perceptions. I first examine whether high white identifiers perceive zero sum 
competition over jobs and political influence with outgroups—in this case blacks and 
Hispanics. In both the 2010 KN and 2013 SSI studies, respondents were asked the extent 
to which they believe 1) that more good jobs for (blacks/Hispanics) means fewer good 
jobs for members of other groups and 2) The more influence (blacks/Hispanics) have in 
politics the less influence members of other groups have in politics.  
Table 4.3 presents the results of an OLS model in which white identity predicts 
perceptions of zero-sum competition over jobs with both blacks and Hispanics.43 In each 
dataset, and for both groups, white identity is strongly and significantly related, such that 
                                                            
43 Because perceptions of zero-sum competition were measured in this survey after some respondents 
received an experimental treatment, this analysis here only uses respondents in the control condition of the 
study.  
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higher levels of identity are indeed associated with stronger agreement that more good 
jobs for blacks and Hispanics means fewer good jobs for other groups.  
Table 4.3 The Relationship between White Identity Zero-Sum Competition with 
Outgroups over Jobs 
 
More jobs for blacks 
means fewer for others 
More jobs for Hispanics 
means fewer for others 
 KN SSI KN SSI 
White Identity 0.371*** 0.328*** 0.239*** 0.419*** (0.081) (0.099) (0.086) (0.103) 
Constant 
0.184*** 0.291*** 0.276*** 0.319*** 
(0.047) (0.062) (0.049) (0.064) 
     
Observations  120 119  120  120 
 
R-squared 0.186 0.086 0.074 0.123 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All data are 
weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. 
Source: 2010 Knowledge Networks study, 2013 Survey Sampling International study. 
 
The results are not quite as consistent with respect to perceptions of zero-sum 
competition over political influence. As Table 4.4 shows, among SSI respondents, white 
identity powerfully predicts the belief that more political influence for both blacks and 
Hispanics means less for other groups. Among KN respondents the relationship is 
statistically insignificant.44 The coefficients are positive, however, and generally these 
results are consistent with the prediction that white identifiers do in fact perceive greater 
competition from outgroups.  
  
                                                            
44 These tepid results seem to be mostly due to a lack of statistical power. Because these perceptions of 
competition questions were asked in a post-test following several experimental conditions, I only analyze 
results among the control group. This approach leaves me with a limited number of cases. In analysis not 
presented here, however, I find that white identity significantly predicts perceptions of political competition 
among higher white identifiers when all respondents are included in a model with dummy variables 
controlling for each experimental condition.  
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Table 4.4 The Relationship between White Identity & Zero-Sum Competition with 
Outgroups over Political Influence 
 
More influence for blacks 
means less for others 
More influence for Hispanics 
means less for others 
 KN SSI KN SSI 
White Identity 0.074 0.359*** 0.080 0.452*** (0.081) (0.095) (0.103) (0.096) 
Constant 
0.367*** 0.282*** 0.379*** 0.262*** 
(0.056) (0.059) (0.061) (0.060) 
     
     
Observations  119  121  118   121 
 
R-squared 0.009 0.108 0.008 0.157 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All data are 
weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. 
Source: 2010 Knowledge Networks study, 2013 Survey Sampling International study. 
 
 As an additional test of perceptions of group competition, I also examined the 
extent to which levels of identity are related to the perception that blacks, Hispanics, and 
whites have too much or too little influence in politics. Specifically, whites were asked 
whether they think whites/Blacks/Hispanics have too much influence in American 
politics, just about the right amount of influence in American politics, or too little 
influence in America politics. Table 4.5 presents the results of this analysis using data 
from both the 2012 ANES and the 2010 KN study. It is clear that white identity strongly 
and significantly predicts perceptions that blacks have too much political influence in 
both the ANES and KN data. Higher levels of white identity are also related to the 
perception that Hispanics have too much influence, although the results are not quite as 
consistent. It is also possible that with the election of high-profile black politicians, like 
Barack Obama, white identifiers are simply more likely to perceive this group as having 
too much influence compared to Hispanics. 
                                              
 
 
98 
 
Table 4.5 The Belief that Groups have too much Political Influence 
 
 Blacks Hispanics Whites 
 
ANES Face-
to-Face 
ANES 
Internet KN 
ANES Face-
to-Face 
ANES 
Internet KN 
ANES 
Face-to-
Face 
ANES 
Internet KN 
White Identity 0.124*** 0.146*** 0.268** 0.034 0.099*** 0.379*** -0.105*** -0.102*** -0.208* (0.037) (0.025) (0.110) (0.040) (0.027) (0.124) (0.028) (0.023) (0.123) 
Constant 
0.405*** 0.414*** 0.331*** 0.419*** 0.406*** 0.224*** 0.595*** 0.569*** 0.576*** 
(0.020) (0.014) (0.080) (0.021) (0.014) (0.078) (0.017) (0.013) (0.083) 
          
Observations  856   2373   120       857   2373   120    857    2373   120 
 
R-squared 0.020 0.023 0.053 0.001  0.009 0.099   0.023 0.014 0.038 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All data are weighted.  
All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. 
Source: 2010 Knowledge Networks study, 2012 American National Election Study. 
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A clear and consistent pattern does emerge when we examine the last three 
columns of Table 4.5, which show the effects when the belief that whites have too much 
influence is regressed on white identity. The coefficients are significant and negative. Not 
only do high white identifiers believe that racial outgroups have too much political 
influence, they also report that their own group has too little influence. These results 
provide compelling evidence that high white identifiers perceive racial and ethnic 
outgroups as competitive threats, and they are dissatisfied with their own group’s 
position.  
  Next, I examine whether higher levels of identity are associated with perceptions 
of racial alienation. In the KN study, alienation was measured using three survey 
questions. The first asked respondents the extent to which they agree or disagree that 
American society owes white people a better chance in life than they currently have. The 
second was their level of agreement or disagreement that American society has provided 
white people a fair opportunity to get ahead in life. The third measured their agreement 
with the sentiment that American society has not dealt fairly with white people 
(alpha=.73). Only the first two items were employed on the SSI survey. In both datasets, 
these items were scaled together to create a single measure of alienation, which was 
recoded to range from zero to one.  
 Table 4.6 presents the results of a bivariate regression model in which white 
identity predicts levels of white racial alienation. The coefficients are large, statistically 
significant, and positive. Higher levels of white identity are in fact strongly linked to a 
greater sense of racial alienation. Taken together, the results in Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 
paint a clearer portrait of white identifiers. Not only do they seem more sensitive to 
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competition from racial outgroups, but they believe to a greater degree that their group 
has too little political influence and that whites are not receiving the opportunities owed 
to them.45  
Table 4.6 The Relationship between White Identity and Feelings of Alienation 
 KN SSI 
   
White Identity 
0.356*** 0.212*** 
(0.062) (0.027) 
Constant 
0.095** 0.254*** 
(0.042) (0.017) 
   
Observations  121 796 
R-squared 0.201 0.072 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard 
errors in parentheses. All data are weighted. All variables 
are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two 
tailed. Source: 2010 Knowledge Networks study, 2013 
Survey Sampling International study. 
 
Group Consciousness 
If white identity is chronically salient, and if white identifiers feel a greater sense of 
competition and racial alienation, then one manifestation of these attitudes may be the 
development of group consciousness. Unlike group identity, with involves a  
psychological attachment to a group, sometimes coupled with perceptions of that groups’ 
position in a social stratum, group consciousness “involves identification with a group 
and a political awareness or ideology regarding the group’s relative position in society 
along with a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group’s interests” 
(Miller et al. 1981, p.495). Theoretical accounts of group consciousness describe its 
                                                            
45 To be clear, average levels of alienation among even the highest white identifiers are not on par with 
average levels among blacks. Specifically, in the KN sample, the average level of alienation among whites 
is .4 on the zero to one scale. Among blacks, it is .6. This relationship is, of course, consistent with Bobo & 
Hutchings (1996) theoretical account of alienation, which argues that dominant group members should 
possess lower levels of alienation due to their groups’ historically advantaged status in the racial hierarchy.  
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manifestation as a process of politicization derived through the common historical 
experiences of group members; group identity gives way to consciousness when group 
conflict leads to perceptions that one’s group is relatively deprived and collective action 
is an agreed upon means by which to challenge the social order in an effort to improve 
the position of the group. In other words, if whites possess a sense of group 
consciousness, we would expect them not only to identify with their group and feel 
aggrieved, but also believe that whites should work together as a group to resolve these 
grievances.  
The extent to which consciousness is developed among group members has 
important political implications; while identity may embody an attachment to a group and 
a vague desire to protect group interests in the political arena, consciousness suggests that 
group members have internalized a shared ideology regarding the group’s position in 
society and have committed to collective action aimed at addressing the group’s interests. 
Scholars have found that group consciousness generally is more closely linked with 
organized political participation on behalf of a group, be it in the form of lobbying, 
demonstrations, or other efforts to change the social order (Gurin 1985).  
As is the case with racial identity, previous work, conducted primarily in the 1980s, 
suggested that whites do not possess a sense of racial consciousness (Miller et al. 1981). 
These results, however, may be because the political environment was not previously 
conducive to producing a sense of consciousness among whites. Furthermore, most of the 
survey questions intended to tap consciousness were designed to measure it among 
subordinate groups, and the language of these items may not translate well to dominant 
groups. Thus, using the original questions as a guide (Gurin 1985), I generated new items 
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designed to capture a sense of consciousness among whites. I employed these measures, 
which I describe in detail below, in the 2013 SSI study.  
Beyond mere identification, group consciousness entails a sense of collective 
orientation – an indication that the group desires a change in its rank or power because its 
dominance has been challenged. Survey items designed to capture this dimension ask 
respondents whether they think members of their group should work together to change 
laws unfair to their group. I asked white respondents two questions designed to capture 
this dimension of consciousness. The first reads as follows: “How important is it that 
whites work together to improve the position of their group?” The second asks, “how 
important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites?” Both 
questions have five response options ranging from “extremely important” to “not at all 
important.”  
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 present the distribution of responses to these two items among 
whites in the SSI sample. The responses to the first item are fairly evenly distributed, 
with a sizeable portion of whites (approximately 40 percent) indicating that it is at least 
very, if not extremely important, for whites to work together to change the position of 
their group. An even greater percentage of individuals (51 percent) believe it is at least 
very important for whites to work together to change laws that are unfair to whites.  
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Figure 4.2 Group Consciousness: The Belief that Whites Should Work Together 
 
Source: 2013 Survey Sampling International study. Bars represent percentage of respondents. 
N=798 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Group Consciousness: The Belief that Whites Should Work to Change 
Unfair Laws 
 
Source: 2013 Survey Sampling International study. Bars represent percentage of respondents. 
N=798 
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Group consciousness also requires that group members believe the disparities 
their group suffers are the result of some illegitimate, structural barriers, rather than the 
result of inadequacies of individual group members. In the past, survey items have 
measured beliefs about the legitimacy of group disparities or circumstances by asking 
respondents whether they think group members are unable to get jobs due to a lack of 
qualifications or due to discriminatory practices. To measure this dimension among 
whites, respondents were asked the following questions: “How likely is it that many 
whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead?” and 
“how likely is it that many whites are not accepted to some colleges because these 
colleges are admitting minorities instead?” The response options for both items ranged 
from “extremely likely” to “not at all likely.” Figures 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate the 
distribution of these two items. For both questions, close to 40 percent of respondents 
indicate that minorities are being hired or admitted to college over whites.  
Figure 4.4 Group Consciousness: Belief that Employers are Hiringing Minorities 
Over whites 
Source: 2013 Survey Sampling International study. Bars represent percentage of respondents. 
N=798 
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Figure 4.5 Group Consciousness: Belief that Colleges are Admitting Minorities 
Instead of Whites 
Source: 2013 Survey Sampling International study. Bars represent percentage of respondents. 
N=798 
 
 
The distribution of these four items indicates that a sizeable portion of whites 
believe that their group faces some degree of discrimination, and that whites should work 
together to improve the position of their group. In short, it appears as if whites do possess 
some degree of group consciousness, and these questions seem to capture this construct 
fairly well. Furthermore, these items scale together reliably (alpha=.86). But, is it white 
identifiers that primarily adopt a sense of group consciousness? To find out, I regress 
each of the four measures of group consciousness on white identity.  
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Table 4.7 The Relationship between White Identity and Group Consciousness 
 
Whites work 
together to 
improve 
group 
position 
Whites 
work 
together to 
change 
unfair laws 
Whites 
unable to 
find job b/c 
employers 
hiring 
minorities 
Whites not 
accepted to 
colleges b/c 
they are 
admitting 
minorities  
     
White Identity 
0.827*** 0.714*** 0.566*** 0.511*** 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) 
Constant 
0.041* 0.178*** 0.198*** 0.225*** 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
     
Observations  796  795 792 797 
R-squared 0.397 0.298 0.201 0.168 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All data are weighted. 
All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. 
Source: 2013 Survey Sampling International study. 
 
As Table 4.7 shows, white identity is strongly and significantly related to each 
dimension of group consciousness.  In every case, the magnitude of the coefficients is 
above .5, meaning that a one unit change in white identity equates to movement at least 
halfway up the scales of each of the consciousness items. These results indicate that high 
identifiers seem powerfully disposed toward collective action on behalf of their group. 
They want to improve the position of their group, agree that whites should work together 
to change laws unfair to whites, and believe that minorities are affecting their group’s 
chances at jobs and college admissions.  
That fact that for many whites racial identity seems to have developed into group 
consciousness is especially noteworthy, given that previous work dismissed the existence 
or salience of group identity alone. These results lend further support for the notion that 
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whites are increasingly concerned about and interested on behalf of their racial group. 
What are the political implications of this group consciousness? I do not take up 
answering that question in this dissertation, but previous work suggests that at least 
among racial and ethnic minorities, consciousness is significantly related to political 
engagement and participation. Now that it seems we can measure this sense of collective 
orientation among whites, future work should assess the extent to which consciousness is 
related to behavior.  
Interdependence 
  Beyond identity and consciousness, another concept important to theories of 
group solidarity is interdependence, or linked fate. This concept captures the belief that 
one’s individual fate or outcome is inextricably tied to the fate of the group to which one 
belongs. Much of the theoretical development regarding linked fate has been with respect 
to African Americans. Specifically, political scientists Michael Dawson (1995) and 
Katherine Tate (1993) argue that day-to-day encounters with discrimination and racial 
oppression make blacks aware that they are treated as members of a group, rather than as 
individuals. As a result, black Americans recognize their own fate as tied to that of their 
racial group. This theoretical account is similar to both that of racial alienation and group 
consciousness, both of which develop through shared historical experiences in which 
groups interact within a racial hierarchy.  
 Have threats to whites’ dominance lead to a sense of interdependence? Do whites 
possess a sense of linked fate with their racial group? Measures of linked fate were 
available on both the 2012 ANES and 2013 SSI surveys. In both cases, respondents were 
asked the following: “Do you think that what happens generally to white people in this 
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country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” If they answered 
affirmatively, they were then asked, will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?” 
Thus, the subsequent scaled measured of linked fate therefore had response options 
ranging from “not at all” to “a lot.” Table 4.8 presents the distribution of this measure for 
the ANES and SSI samples. Across the studies, the distribution of responses are quite 
similar. Only a small percentage (between 14 and 18 percent) of whites subscribe to 
linked fate at the highest level. A sizeable minority (between 32 and 37 percent) report 
some degree of interdependence, but an even greater number indicate that their individual 
fate is not very or not at all linked to that of other whites.  
Table 4.8 The Distribution of White Linked Fate 
 
ANES  
Face-to-Face 
(2012) 
ANES 
Internet 
(2012) 
SSI 
 (2013) 
Not at all 41% 36% 43% 
Not very much 9 9 5 
Some 32 40 37 
A lot  18 14 15 
Observations 738 2838 797 
Source: 2012 ANES (face-to-face sample), 2013 Survey Sampling International study. 
Entries are percentages of respondents. ANES data are weighted.  
 
To what extent is linked fate related to white identity? Table 4.9 demonstrates that 
white identity is significantly and positively related to linked fate. Whites who score 
higher on the measure of racial identity are also more likely to report a sense of 
interdependence with their group. The distribution of linked fate, however, clearly does 
not mimic that of racial identity measured with the importance item. While a significant 
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number of whites report that their identity is important, similar numbers do not buy into a 
sense of linked fate. Furthermore, in analysis not presented here, I find that the linked-
fate measure lacks predictive power across the range of dependent variables I examine in 
this dissertation. It is inconsistently related to political preferences, and when it does 
emerge as a significant factor in opinion, the results appear mostly idiosyncratic.  
 
Table 4.9 The Relationship between White Identity and Linked Fate 
 
ANES Face-
to-Face 
ANES 
Internet SSI 
    
White Identity 
0.145*** 0.162*** 0.504*** 
(0.050) (0.030) (0.049) 
Constant 
0.369*** 0.381*** 0.128*** 
(0.028) (0.016) (0.031) 
    
Observations  736  2377  796 
R-squared 0.016 0.021 0.118 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All data are 
weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. 
Source: 2012 American National Election Study, 2013 Survey Sampling International 
study. 
 
 It is not entirely clear why sizeable portions of whites report a sense of racial 
identity while much smaller numbers subscribe to linked fate. Perhaps this is one distinct 
measure of solidarity that truly separates dominant groups from subordinate ones. White 
identity, I argue, develops as a result of group threat, but that threat is, after all, directed 
at a privileged status. The challenges experienced by whites as the dominant group are 
therefore qualitatively different than the long-standing experience of discrimination and 
oppression that scholars argue leads to the development of linked-fate—and these 
differences remain even when whites coopt the language of discrimination and minority 
status to describe the current and future conditions of their racial group.  
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 There is other evidence that white identity and white linked fate are independent 
constructs, and ones that may be capturing very different sentiments. In fact, available 
evidence suggests that whatever white linked fate is measuring, it is an attitude very 
different from what we might expect if linked fate were a response to feelings of 
disenfranchisement or discrimination experienced by whites. Dawson (2009) examined 
white linked fate among respondents in KN’s panel in 2004. The distribution of white 
linked fate in the 2004 KN is essentially identical to that of the 2012 ANES face-to-face 
sample; approximately 17 percent of whites (compared to 45% of blacks) reported that 
what happens to other whites will affect them “a lot.” More interestingly, Dawson 
examined the antecedents of white linked fate. He found that education is positively and 
significantly related to higher levels of white linked fate. My replication of his analysis 
using 2012 ANES data (not shown here) confirms this result.  
This relationship is quite different than what I find with respect to white identity. 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, across every dataset, education is significantly and 
negatively associated with higher levels of racial identity. Furthermore, Dawson also 
offered no coherent interpretation of the predictive power of white linked fate. He even 
goes on to write that “these results are so counterintuitive that we went back to the raw 
data to make sure there were no coding mistakes” (p. 193). Generally, he finds that higher 
levels of white linked fate are associated with racially liberal positions on racialized 
policies like offering apologies and reparations for slavery. In short, Dawson’s earlier 
work and my own findings suggest a need to examine white linked fate more carefully in 
future work.  
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White Privilege and the Valence of White Identity 
I have described how personality, demographic characteristics, and context are 
related to levels of white racial identity. In addition to these factors, the valence of a 
particular identity can affect identity development. In other words, is the group regarded 
positively or negatively? Existing work has suggested that stronger identities are formed 
among members of objectively established higher-status groups because such groups 
might be seen as superior. For example, Swan and Wyer (1997) find that men—members 
of a higher status group—are more likely to identify with their gender when in the 
minority than are women. This expectation is consistent with the motivational hypothesis 
underpinning Social Identity Theory (SIT), which argues that identity is more likely to 
form among high-status groups because membership positively differentiates ingroup 
members from outgroup members. It is also in keeping with Social Identity Theory’s self-
esteem hypothesis, which posits that group-oriented behaviors are part of an ongoing 
process to maintain and protect a positive self-concept (Tajfel and Turner 1979).  
Of course the valence of a white identity might instead be fraught with negative 
associations like white supremacist hate groups, racism, and other taboo connotations—a 
concern I address more completely in Chapter 6. Or perhaps white identity is viewed by 
many Americans in the same way it is described by scholars under the umbrella of 
critical whiteness studies, who focus critically on white privilege and a subscription to a 
sense of collective guilt (Delgado and Stefancic 1997). These “whiteness” studies view 
white identity as a socially constructed concept developed in order to establish and 
maintain a hierarchical system of power and oppression. Such scholars actively call for 
whites to recognize unearned privileges they possess as a result of their race, and to defy 
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such privileges in order to achieve racial equality (Allen 1997; Ignatiev 1996; Roediger 
1994; Saxton 1975). 
While this work is motivated by an important social justice agenda, it seems 
unlikely that the views advanced by academics who study whiteness in this way are 
shared by the majority of white Americans. It is, after all, hard to imagine most whites 
wanting to “abolish” the white race any more than a majority supporting the KKK. Some 
work does suggest, however, that reminding whites of their groups’ privileged status can 
in fact reduce modern racism in some cases and exacerbate it in others (Branscombe, 
Schmitt, and Schiffhauer 2007). Thus, perhaps some whites do in fact reluctantly 
acknowledge their own privileged status and express a degree of guilt in response to such 
recognition.  
 It is difficult to ascertain what valence most white Americans project on white 
racial identity using close-ended survey items. To acquire a better sense of what this 
identity means and whether whites view this identity positively, I conducted a survey in 
November of 2013 in which 373 white U.S. citizens over the age of 18 were asked to 
describe, in their own words, why they responded in the way they did to the close-ended 
racial importance question. I used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service to recruit 
my respondents, and while the sample has some shortcomings (see Berinsky, Huber, and 
Lenz 2010), it is nationally diverse. There are, however, a few other caveats to keep in 
mind before I describe the analysis. First, whites in this sample tend to possess slightly 
lower levels of white identity when compared to the other Internet samples described 
above.46 The difference in the distribution of identity is likely a result of another 
                                                            
46 In response to the question, “How important to you is your identity as a white person?” approximately 11 
percent of whites report that their identity is extremely important, 10 percent report that it is very important, 
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important characteristic of the MTurk sample: participants tend to be more educated than 
the average U.S. population (Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). Thus, one should 
keep in mind that these results potentially represent a more restrained view of white 
identity than we might expect to find in the actual U.S. population.  
 Clear patterns emerge when examining the rationale 79 respondents provided for 
indicating that their identity is either extremely or very important to them. First, 10 
percent positively described their identity as something of which they are proud.47 Some 
stated this simply: “I am white and proud of it” or “I am very proud of who I am, and my 
people’s history as inventors, explorers, and creators.” For others, however, this pride 
does in fact accompany a recognition of group privilege. One respondent, who reported 
that his or her identity is “extremely” important, said as such: “Because I identify and am 
proud to be white. I see all the struggles that minorities go through and I think god 
everyday that I do not have to face those types of situations.” This particular response is 
unique, however, in that it almost goes so far as to express sympathy for non-white 
groups. As I illustrate below, most of the respondents who described a feeling of 
privilege did not discuss feelings of sympathy or guilt:  
Being white automatically gives me the right to be the leader in America. 
 
It is extremely important to me that I am white because I feel no matter how 
politically correct people get in this society a white person has a one up on any 
other race. I am grateful I am white. 
I feel white people are given more privileges in the US. They make up the 
majority and have always been strong leaders and in the wealthier class, which is 
where I’d like to be, so that’s why I like to identify as white. 
 
                                                            
28 percent indicate it is moderately important, 23 percent say it is a little important, and 28 percent report it 
is not at all important.   
47 N=8  
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 I can't imagine being another race. I feel like if I was [sic] born black or Middle 
Eastern I would badly wish I was [sic] white. I am most comfortable around 
other white people. All my friends are white, and I have only dated white girls. 
Most of my hobbies and interests are those probably most popular among white 
males. If I was [sic] a different race, I would be a completely different person. 
 
 I don't like to think of race as very important but the fact is that the successful in 
the world are primarily white males. Going off that I would say I am lucky. 
 
Our society treats people other than a white identity different [sic]. I believe it is 
very important to me to fit in with the rest of my community. African and 
Hispanic Americans are treated differently in terms of jobs, education, and 
general social situations. 
 
 My identity is tied to my family, my profession, my accomplishments. If I will 
be demonized for my skin color by the media proclaiming it somehow a 
privilidge [sic] I abuse, though it denied me scholarships and promotions, I'll 
take pride in the accomplishments of my ancestors. Going to the moon, the 
industrial revolution, antibiotics and other hallmarks of civilization don't belong 
to anyone else. 
 
These individuals clearly recognize that being white affords them advantages, 
even in the face of potential challenges to their group in the form of “political 
correctness” and media proclamations of “abused privilege”. In fact, all told, 34 percent 
of high white identifiers mention that their group is somehow privileged, and another 28 
percent of the moderate identifiers describe their group in this way. What is so revealing 
about such responses is that these individuals both recognize the hardships faced by racial 
and ethnic minorities and sometimes straightforwardly denounce racism, while still 
simultaneously embracing their group’s privilege.  Furthermore, and as SIT would 
predict, many of these whites recognize the benefits this privileged status has for their 
positive self-regard. One respondent put this quite plainly: “I feel that, as a white person, 
my standing in society is a little higher, due to perceptions of race. Therefore, I feel a 
little better about myself and my overall identity.”  
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A noteworthy number of whites (approximately 37 percent) also use privilege as 
an explanation for their lack of identity:   
  
 I'm privileged enough to be in the majority so I don't have to define myself by 
that parameter. 
 
 As a member of the majority (well, according to most people, anyway), I have 
the privilege of not having my skin color define me. 
 
 White people in this country have the luxury of not thinking about race, because 
we are the majority and are identified with having power. I know there are 
priviliges [sic] I enjoy because of my race, but on a daily basis I rarely have to 
think about them. I can choose to ignore my race in most situations. 
 
This rationale is in keeping with Sears’ and others’ explanation for a lack of white 
identity. Most low identifiers, however, do not so explicitly explain that their group’s 
advantages contribute to the irrelevance of this identity; they simply report that their 
identity “doesn’t matter” or that they “don’t think about it.”  
Approximately one quarter of the low-identifiers seem to have adopted a “color-
blind” philosophy. They describe race as not being a feature or characteristic on which a 
person should be judged:  
 Because I don't judge people by what color they are. There are plenty of white 
people I don't like after all. It's all about what's in a person's head and heart.  
And I dislike generalizations such as all {fill in the ethnic or racial 
characteristic} [sic]. White people aren't all alike, black people aren't all alike, 
Asian people are not all alike, and so on.... 
 I want to be identified by who I am not what I am. 
 So my body produces less melanin than some other guy. What's the big deal? 
Martin Luther King was exactly right: It's character that counts, not the color of 
one's skin. 
I think all men and women are creative equal and it doesn't matter about what 
race they are.  To me it is what is on the inside that counts. 
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It doesn't matter what I look like.  People will ultimately judge me by my 
actions. 
What defines someone is their personality, intelligence, how they treat others, 
accomplishments, goals, etc. I don't see how being white has anything to do 
with my identity except my physical traits. It's of little importance. 
What is clear from these responses is that any discussion of collective guilt is 
absent. Only one respondent seemed to adopt such a position: “Because of the atrocities 
our race has committed throughout time, we really shouldn't be allowed to call ourselves 
‘really important’.” Furthermore, only a single respondent suggested that adopting a 
white identity is taboo: “Maybe my identity as a member of specific European ethnicities 
is significant to me, but not the color of my skin. That's just asinine. The only people who 
are ever 'proud' of being white are neo nazis, KKK members, or various unaffiliated 
hicks.”  
The fact that most whites do not seem to describe their identity with the language 
of guilt distinguishes the way I describe identity here from other conceptualizations of 
white racial identity, like Helms’ six-stage model (Helms 1995). Helms argues that 
whites feel discomfort at the recognition of past and present maintenance of a racist 
society. Others have also suggested that awareness of privilege and collective guilt is a 
part of white identity formation (Tatum 1992). Yet these results suggest that for high 
white identifiers, the recognition of group privilege is a facet of which they are proud and 
not self-conscious or embarrassed, as the critical whiteness scholars would predict.  
To see more clearly the extent to which feelings of guilt and privilege might be 
present in the white American population, and whether these attitudes are systematically 
related to white racial identity, I included survey measures of both constructs in the 2013 
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SSI study. These measures were adopted from Swim and Miller (1999), who examined 
racial privilege and guilt among white undergraduate students.  
One important distinction from their work is that I measure white guilt and white 
privilege among a nationally diverse adult sample of white Americans. I also measure 
guilt with four of their items scaled together (as opposed to eleven). These questions ask 
about how often individuals feel guilty about being white given the treatment of non-
whites in the country, how often they feel guilt about the inequalities experienced by 
black Americans, and how often they feel guilty about privileges they receive as a white 
person (alpha=.92).48 Figure 4.6 presents the distribution of the White Guilt Scale (coded 
to range from zero to one) among the SSI respondents.  
Figure 4.6 The Distribution of White Guilt 
 
Source: 2013 Survey Sampling International study. Bars represent percentage of white 
respondents. N=798 
                                                            
48 Complete question wording available in Appendix A.  
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As Figure 4.6 illustrates, I find, just as Swim and Miller (1999), that most whites 
do not report feeling a sense of collective racial guilt.49 The graph is skewed right, with a 
sizeable proportion of the respondents (22 percent) scoring at zero on the scale. 
Furthermore, Swim and Miller do not find a significant correlation between white guilt 
and evaluations of whites on the feeling thermometer. Similarly, as Table 4.10 reveals, I 
find no significant relationship between white identity (measured with the racial 
importance item) and white guilt in a bivariate regression where identity is regressed on 
the guilt scale.  
Again, following Swim and Miller (1999), I adapted their measure of white 
privilege, creating a five-item scale (alpha=.94). Respondents were asked the extent to 
which they feel that white Americans have certain advantages over minorities, the extent 
to which being white grants them unearned privileges, whether having white skin opens 
certain doors for them, whether they have privileges due to their race, and whether being 
white is an asset in their everyday lives.  
Figure 4.7 presents the distribution of scores on the White Privilege scale. It is 
clear that compared to the Guilt Scale, a greater number of whites do report feeling some 
sense of privilege due to their race.50 Furthermore, just as Swim and Miller (1999), I find 
that white privilege is positively and significantly related to white identity. As Table 4.10 
reveals, whites who score higher on the white privilege scale also score significantly 
higher on the white identity scale.  
 
                                                            
49 The mean White Guilt Scale score is .28 (standard deviation=.009) on the scale recoded to range from 
zero to one.  
50 The mean White Privilege Scale score is .35 (standard deviation=.273) on the scale recoded to range 
from zero to one. 
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Figure 4.7 The Distribution of White Privilege 
 
Source: 2013 Survey Sampling International study. Bars represent percentage of white respondents. N=798 
 
 
Table 4.10 The Relationship between White Identity, White Guilt, and White 
Privilege 
   
White Guilt 
-0.051  
(0.038) 
 
White Privilege 
 0.104*** 
 (0.034) 
Constant 
0.586*** 0.535*** 
(0.014) (0.015) 
   
Observations    797  796 
R-squared 0.002 0.012 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All data are weighted. 
All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. 
Source: 2013 Survey Sampling International study. 
 
The empirical analyses examining the relationship between privilege and white 
racial identity comport with what we can glean from the open-ended responses. Many 
white identifiers recognize that their group has particular advantages, and they describe 
feeling grateful for them. For the most part, these feelings of privilege are not described 
in tandem with resentment or animus toward outgroups. Indeed, and most interestingly, 
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racial resentment is significantly and negatively correlated with the white privilege scale 
in the SSI data.51 What the open-ended explanations also demonstrate, however, is that 
these feelings of privilege are not associated with guilt or with a strong desire for more 
equality across racial groups.52 The whites who recognize their privilege, are, for the 
most part, glad for it and not especially interested in relinquishing it.  
Regardless, what is certainly clear is that a number of high white identifiers recognize 
their group’s advantaged status. Rather than expressing guilt or sympathy for outgroup 
members, however, they are mostly satisfied with these privileges. This finding is 
especially interesting, in light of recent media attention to the concept of white privilege. 
In particular, a backlash ensued after Time Magazine published an editorial from 
Princeton University freshman Tal Fortgang (2014), who complained about being told to 
“check his privilege.” Fortgang railed against the notion that being white offered him 
advantages, and that the “check your privilege” phrase undermined the personal 
challenges he had overcome in order to succeed. In a sense, Fortgang was denying the 
notion that his race had offered him particular advantages—a sentiment consistent with 
some whites’ concern over “reverse discrimination” and other disadvantages they feel 
their racial group faces. 
 Interestingly, this denial of privilege was not especially prevalent in the open-
ended responses I collected. Instead, high white identifiers primarily reported that their 
identity was important because it was “who they are,” how they are seen by others, 
reflective of the world in which they were raised, or because it offered them advantages. 
                                                            
51 Pearson’s r=-.52, p=.00 
52 There is a small but significant positive correlation between the white privilege scale and egalitarianism 
(Pearson’s r=.21, p=.00).  
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Furthermore, this recognition of privilege actually served to both strengthen and depress 
group identity, as a number of low identifiers similarly used the language of privilege to 
justify thinking about their racial group only infrequently. More common, among low 
identifiers, however, was the use of “colorblind” ideological terms to explain their lack of 
a racial identity. These individuals seemed to reject a white racial identity on the 
principle that “race doesn’t matter.” 
This latter finding is especially interesting. “Colorblindness” is sometimes seen as 
an ideological tool coopted by conservatives in order to dismiss the existence of 
structural racism and racial inequality. It seems innocuous in that it proposes that 
individuals “ignore” race when making evaluations. But opponents argue that 
colorblindness allows individuals to ignore the very real disadvantages faced by racial 
and ethnic minorities and to deny the privileges enjoyed by whites. Indeed, some scholars 
have proposed that colorblindness is another manifestation of contemporary racism  
(Bonilla-Silva 2014; Haney-Lopez 2014). This project is primarily focused on who 
identifies as white and what the political implications of this identity are, but these results 
suggest that there is much to be learned about racial conflict by examining the individuals 
at the low end of the identity scale as well. It seems that a significant proportion of them 
have adopted a particular racial ideology that may also inform political attitudes.  
Finally, the results presented here hint at the possibility that there are subsets of 
both high and low identifiers, and examining specific heterogeneity among these groups 
is an important undertaking for future research. For example, individuals at the low end 
of the scale might be comprised of both racial liberals and racial conservatives. At the 
high-end of the scale, mixed in with the whites who are comfortable with their group’s 
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privileged status, may be individuals who deny this privilege and worry about 
discrimination. Thus, future work should consider more carefully distinguishing between 
different types of high and low white identifiers.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 The results in this chapter provide more insight with respect content of white 
identity. As expected, as a dominant group identity, white identity is significantly 
associated with national identity. But this relationship is with respect to a particular kind 
of national identity—an exclusionary one that envisions Americans primarily as white, 
English-speaking Christians.  
 White identity is also associated with attitudes that previous work suggests should 
be found primarily among racial and ethnic minorities. In particular, high white 
identifiers report greater perceptions of zero-sum competition over political and 
economic resources, and they possess a greater sense of racial alienation than do low 
identifiers. Furthermore, the social and political conditions, which likely lead to the 
increased salience of white identity, boosted racial consciousness among whites. These 
results are in keeping with the claim that white identity is in part a product of threats to 
whites’ status. When whites feel like their group is threatened, they react much in the 
same way that members of threatened racial and ethnic minority groups do. Future work 
needs to explore the consequences of these attitudes, especially the extent to which group 
consciousness predicts political participation and behavior.  
 In his examination of the determinants of white racial identity, Croll (2008) 
argues that high identifiers possess both “progressive” and “defensive” racial 
characteristics. He suggests that more progressive identifiers see white identity as part of 
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their struggle against racism and they adopt more tolerant and racially liberal attitudes. 
Defensive identifiers, on the other hand, are more racially conservative and are 
potentially most concerned about their own group. Perhaps the results here are picking up 
on this duality. In particular, white identity is associated with a stronger sense of linked 
fate, even though education is significantly related to both these attitudes, but in opposite 
directions. Furthermore, linked fate has been associated with racially liberal policy 
positions, whereas white identity seems either unrelated or to have the opposite effect 
with respect to many of these attitudes. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Power of White Identity 
On April 9, 1924, Senator Ellison DuRant “Cotton Ed” Smith (D-South Carolina) 
stood before members of the U.S. Congress and ardently argued in favor of what would 
become the Immigration Act of 1924. The law, which was an effort to further restrict 
immigration to the U.S. from Southern and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and 
India, largely solidified American immigration policy until the 1950s (Zolberg 2008). In 
its defense, DuRant proclaimed that it was time for America to “shut the door” to any 
further influx of foreigners, and for the nation to instead focus on increasing its 
population of “pure, unadulterated American” citizenry (“Speech by Ellison DuRant 
Smith” 1924). DuRant’s speech made clear the significance of race in defining such 
citizenship:  
Thank God we have in America perhaps the largest percentage of any country in the 
world of the pure, unadulterated Anglo-Saxon stock; certainly the greatest of any nation 
in the Nordic breed. It is for the preservation of that splendid stock that has characterized 
us that I would make this not an asylum for the oppressed of all countries, but a country 
to assimilate and perfect that splendid type of manhood that has made America the 
foremost Nation in her progress and in her power. 
The legislation was passed into law with strong support; only six senators 
dissented. The majority’s view reflected the broader national discourse on citizenship and 
national identity of the time—a conversation that largely centered on the belief that
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Anglo-Saxon heritage should be the prevailing criteria for entry into the U.S. and 
whiteness the defining characteristic of American identity (Jacobson 1999).53 
Explicit discussion of whiteness, immigration, and citizenship, like the debate 
surrounding the Immigration Act of 1924, is not a relic of a distant era in which racial 
prejudice was more widely accepted, nor is similar language in the contemporary period 
relegated to marginalized political extremists. Such debates, it seems, have been rehashed 
in the political arena each time the U.S. has experienced mass immigration, and the 
period following large-scale immigration from Latin American in the 1980s and 1990s is 
no exception. Political scientist Samuel Huntington (2004), for example, warned that the 
influx of Latinos to the U.S. presents “the single most immediate and most serious 
challenge to America’s traditional identity” (p.2). He made clear the exact nature of this 
identity when he asked, “[w]ill the U.S. remain a country with a single national language 
and a core Anglo-Protestant culture” (p. 2)?  
 A number of other scholars and political pundits, including Victor Davis Hanson 
(2003), Francis Fukuyama (1993), Peter Brimelow (1996), and Patrick Buchanan (2011) 
have joined Huntington in lamenting what they argue are the dangers of multiculturalism, 
the rise of group identity politics, and the failure of new immigrant groups to assimilate 
to the dominant American culture.54 They contend that bilingualism, the election of non-
white politicians, population displacement, and even challenges to “racial purity” are all 
threats to white Americans posed by “the browning of America.” 
                                                            
53 The link between race and naturalization was not newly introduced in 1924. In fact, the import of race in 
defining immigration policy appeared much earlier in American history: The U.S. Naturalization Law of 
March 26, 1790 limited naturalization to immigrants who were “free white persons” (Daniels 2002). 
54 To be clear, concern expressed by these individuals regarding identity politics is not with respect to white 
identity politics, but instead to the increased salience of group identities among racial and ethnic minorities.  
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These arguments clearly demonstrate the extent to which whiteness has and 
continues to dominate notions of American national identity, as well as the degree to 
which immigration is seen as threatening such dominance. Consistent with the Dominant 
Group Identity Theory laid out in Chapter 1, several scholars, including Huntington, have 
predicted a backlash among white Americans in response to Latino immigration. 
Huntington claims that initiatives against illegal immigrants, affirmative action, and 
bilingual education are just a few examples of whites’ negative responses. He also 
foreshadows what he sees as inevitable collective action on the part of whites: “If blacks 
and Hispanics organize and lobby for special privileges, why not whites? If the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Council of La Raza 
are legitimate organizations, why not a national organization promoting white interests” 
(Huntington 2004b, p. 3)? Similarly, Swain argues that a rise in white nationalism and 
white racial consciousness is a clear symptom of whites’ concern over Latino 
immigration. She proposes that such a reaction is “the next logical stage for identity 
politics in America” (Swain 2002, p.423). 
In many ways, compared to other potential threats, immigration to the U.S. is 
exceptional in the degree to which it challenges whites’ dominant status. For one, large 
influxes of foreigners with unfamiliar cultures and language may in fact pose a realistic 
threat to the nation’s status quo. But immigration is also a unique threat specifically 
because race has been so significantly implicated in citizenship policies over the course 
of the nation’s history. Efforts to accommodate immigrants who are not part of the 
country’s Anglo-centric culture may be viewed as directly threatening white Americans’ 
cultural hegemony. Indeed, Higham (1955) describes how in the past, nativistic responses 
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among white Americans toward European immigrants were more likely when immigrants 
threatened the order and dominance of Anglo-Saxon Americans. 
Furthermore, whiteness has been so central to American citizenship that previous 
immigrant groups, especially those from Southern and Eastern Europe, deliberately came 
to identify as “white” in order to distance themselves from Chinese immigrants and 
African Americans (Saxton 1975). And the notion that immigrants have adopted a white 
identity in order to gain political and social acceptance in America has been broadly 
documented by historians (Brodkin 1998; Ignatiev 1996; King 2002; Roediger 2006).  
While today’s Latino immigrants may eventually follow the path laid out by 19th and 
early 20th Century European immigrants, eventually becoming subsumed under a white 
identity, this transformation has not yet occurred.55 Thus, in the contemporary period, 
immigration is likely viewed by many whites as a threat to their group’s dominant status.  
In Chapter 1, I argued that threats to dominant status make racial identity salient 
and subsequently forge or strengthen the relationship between this identification and 
political policies or attitudes aimed at eliminating the threat. Accordingly, when 
immigration in the U.S. grows over time, we would expect the relationship between white 
racial identity and immigration opinions increase in strength. In particular, white identity 
should be increasingly associated with opposition to immigration to the U.S. To be clear, 
this expectation does not suppose that most Americans are explicitly aware of the specific 
change in the percentage of immigrants entering the country in a given year.56 Instead, 
                                                            
55 A number of scholars have suggested that Hispanics will eventually be viewed as white (e.g., Sears and 
Savalei 2006; Warren and Twine 1997). 
56 As previous work has demonstrated, most Americans are not widely knowledgeable about specific 
politically relevant facts, and so it would be unreasonable to assume that information about changes in 
immigration levels was widely known by the American population (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). 
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immigration becomes a salient topic through the growing elite discourse that 
accompanies these trends. In other work, my co-authors and I find that news coverage of 
immigration increases in response to growing levels of immigration, and that media 
attention to Latino immigration in particular parallels actual rates of immigration from 
Latin America (Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013).   
In this chapter, I examine directly whether white identity is indeed significantly 
related to changes in immigration, including whether there is any evidence that increasing 
levels of immigration have boosted the impact of white identity on a host of political 
preferences over time. This chapter also considers the specific domains in which white 
identity is influential. White identity should not, for instance, be a predictor of all race-
related evaluations; rather, it should most powerfully predict policies and preferences that 
most clearly benefit or challenge whites’ dominant status.  
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White Identity and Immigration 
In order to determine whether changes in immigration levels have in fact 
moderated the impact of whites’ racial ingroup identification on political preferences, I 
turn first to the American National Election Studies (ANES) time series data. For the 
majority of ANES studies, respondents have been asked to rate a variety of groups, 
including whites, on a scale from zero, indicating negative or cold feelings, to one 
hundred, which indicates positive or warm feelings. While the feeling thermometer falls 
short of measuring ingroup identity explicitly, it does capture a sense of ingroup 
favoritism.  
Beginning in 1992, the ANES asked survey respondents to indicate whether they 
think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the 
U.S. to live should be increased, decreased, or left the same.57 Using this item as a 
dependent variable to determine whether white identity – measured with the feeling 
thermometer – is related to attitudes toward immigration levels, I construct an ordinary 
least squares model with a specification informed by a number of studies on whites’ 
immigration attitudes.58 To date, most of this work contrasts the role of economic 
interests with outgroup attitudes in driving immigration opinion (Citrin, Green, and 
Muste 1997; Clark and Legge 1997; Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ 2007). Thus, the 
model includes evaluations of personal and national financial circumstances and income. 
I also control for education, age, partisanship, and gender. Furthermore, in keeping with 
work showing that affect toward Hispanics is strongly related to immigration attitudes, I 
                                                            
57 Question wording for variables employed in the analyses presented in this paper are provided in 
Appendix A. 
58 An ordered logit estimation produces substantively identical results. OLS is employed here for ease of 
interpretation. 
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include in the model evaluations of Hispanics on the feeling thermometer (Brader, 
Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013).5960  
Before viewing the results of the model, let us first consider trends in immigration 
levels over this same time period. As Figure 5.1 shows, the most recent and significant 
changes in immigration levels occurred in the mid to late 1990s, with levels of both legal 
and illegal immigration peaking between 1999 and 2000 (Passel and Suro 2005). Thus, 
we would expect that the greatest impact of white identity on immigration opinion should 
come slightly after the peak in immigration levels, when national attention to 
immigration was likely to be at its highest and when perceptions of threat were therefore 
likely to be most prevalent. 
  
                                                            
59 This model also includes controls for attitudes toward blacks and Asians for the purpose of comparison, 
as well as political party identification, political ideology, respondents’ age, education level, income, and 
gender. All variables in the model are coded to range from zero to one. 
60 These results are robust to controlling for another measure of outgroup animus – racial resentment. 
However, because racial resentment is designed to measure attitudes toward blacks specifically, and 
immigration is primarily associated with immigration, it is not especially appropriate to include resentment 
in a model of immigration opinion.  
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Figure 5.1 Levels of Immigration to the U.S. 
 
Annual Immigration to the U.S. based on Census 2000, ACS and CPS Data: 1991 – 2004 
(Passel and Suro 2005) 
The results of the immigration opinion model over time, presented in Table 5.1, 
reveal that, with one exception, the white feeling thermometer is indeed a significant 
predictor of immigration opinion such that respondents who rate whites more support a 
decrease in the number of immigrants.61 In fact, the effect of ingroup identity is 
frequently larger than that of the Hispanic feeling thermometer and more often 
significant, suggesting that ingroup concerns are more central to immigration opinion 
than are negative outgroup attitudes. Furthermore, over time, the magnitude of the 
coefficient on the white feeling thermometer item has generally increased. As predicted, 
there is a notable increase in the size of the coefficient in 2000, corresponding to the end 
of a large peak in immigration.  
  
                                                            
61 Results for the full model are available in Appendix D. 
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Table 5.1 The Relationship between White Identity and Support for Increasing Levels of 
Immigration to the U.S. 
 1992 1994 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
White feeling 
thermometer 
-0.240*** -0.080 -0.172** -0.436*** -0.375*** -0.567*** -0.342***
(0.054) (0.056) (0.075) (0.112) (0.084) (0.078) (0.083) 
Hispanic feeling 
thermometer 
0.142** 0.175*** 0.213** 0.090 0.106 0.233** 0.192* 
(0.070) (0.062) (0.096) (0.134) (0.103) (0.097) (0.102) 
Constant 0.037 -0.040 0.106 0.184 0.143 0.174* 0.394***(0.059) (0.071) (0.084) (0.128) (0.099) (0.101) (0.102) 
        
Observations 1126 944 829 342 521 745 554 
R-squared 0.109 0.083 0.061 0.206 0.160 0.201 0.185 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All data are weighted.  
All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. 
Model also includes the black feeling thermometer, Asian feeling thermometer, positive national and 
personal economic evaluations, education, age, income, party identification, ideology, and gender. 
Source: ANES Cumulative Data File. Analysis in 2000 used on the face-to-face respondents.  
 
Furthermore, the largest observed effect of identity on immigration attitudes occurs 
in 2008, coinciding with arguably another threat to whites’ dominant status: the election 
of President Barack Obama—an important potential threat, which I will focus on in more 
detail later. While it is not possible with this particular analysis to determine whether 
Obama’s election was the impetus for the spike in the impact of white racial identity on 
immigration preferences, the results are provocative. 
 If over time, the threat of immigration has solidified the link between ingroup 
identity and immigration opinion, then we should expect that identity strongly and 
consistently predicts a wide range of immigration attitudes and policy preferences in the 
present day. Specifically, higher levels of white identity should be significantly 
associated with more restrictive positions on immigration, like support for decreasing 
levels of immigration, efforts to tighten border security, and negative attitudes toward 
immigrants generally. To test this proposition, I focus next on estimating the present-day 
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impact of white identity on a number of different immigration attitudes across three 
independent public opinion surveys.  
The 2010 KN study, the 2012 ANES, and the 2013 SSI survey all included a host 
of questions about immigration attitudes and policies.62 They also have the virtue of 
including the preferred measure of white identity—the racial importance item. Across 
each of the surveys, I examine the relationship between white identity and a host of 
immigration opinions. First, for the sake of robustness, I again examine responses to the 
immigration-levels item employed in the overtime analysis. Similar results in the KN and 
SSI surveys confirm that the relationship borne out in the ANES is not unique to that 
survey, and suggest that the SSI data do in fact perform similarly to nationally 
representative samples. Each survey asked respondents the extent to which they think 
immigration to the U.S. should be increased, decreased, or left the same. The KN study 
also asked respondents to indicate how important this issue was to them personally on a 
five-point scale ranging from “not at all important” to “extremely important.”  
 In addition to asking respondents their preferences regarding the level of 
immigration to the U.S., the surveys asked two other questions about individuals’ 
preferred policy response to immigration. In both the KN and SSI studies, respondents 
were asked whether federal spending on tightening border security should be increased, 
decreased, or kept the same. The 2012 ANES also included an item intended to gauge 
support for state laws that require police to check the immigration status of suspected 
immigrants. Furthermore, respondents were asked their beliefs about the effects of 
immigration. All three studies asked whether respondents believe immigrants will take 
                                                            
62 The sampling frames and distribution of white identity for each of these surveys is described in detail in 
Chapter 2. 
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jobs away from American citizens, and both the KN and SSI studies inquired about the 
effect of immigration on American culture. KN respondents were also asked the extent to 
which they agree that immigrants make America more open to new ideas and cultures, 
while the SSI survey included an item about the likelihood that immigrants will change 
American traditions. Finally, the ANES had respondents indicate how they feel toward 
immigrants themselves; the survey included a feeling thermometer measure for illegal 
immigrants.  
To determine whether white racial identity is significantly related to whites’ 
orientation toward a range of immigration-related policies and attitudes, I employ a 
model whose specification is similar to that of the overtime immigration analyses 
described above.63 Table 5.2 presents the results of an ordinary least squares regression 
model estimating the impact of white identity on immigration-related policies and 
attitudes among non-Hispanic whites within each of the three datasets. Each column 
presents the estimated effect of white identity.64 
                                                            
63 In both SSI and KN, the model includes evaluations of personal and national financial circumstances, 
evaluations of Hispanics on the feeling thermometer, party identification, political ideology, support for 
limited government, age, education level, income, and gender. The specification of the model employing 
the KN data is nearly the same, except that measures of limited government and national economic 
evaluations were not available. Across each dataset, all variables are recoded to range from zero to one.  
64 Tables presenting the results of the entire models are available in Appendix D. 
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Table 5.2. White Identity and Attitudes toward Immigration  
  Coefficient associated with white identity 
Dependent variable  KN ANES SSI 
Decrease number of immigrants  
  0.147*** 0.120*** 0.153** 
 (0.050) (0.038) (0.060) 
Importance of immigration level issue  
  0.152***   
 (0.039)   
Decrease federal spending on 
tightening border security  
 0.107***  0.178*** 
 (0.029)  (0.048) 
Immigrants make America more open 
to new ideas & culture (strongly 
disagree) 
  0.192***   
 (0.036)   
Immigrants change American culture 
and values (extremely likely) 
   0.284*** 
   (0.073) 
Immigrants take jobs away from 
American citizens (strongly agree) 
  0.255*** 0.093*** 0.353*** 
 (0.041) (0.045) (0.071) 
Support law checking immigration 
status 
  0.071  
  (0.052)  
Illegal immigrant feeling thermometer 
  -0.033  
  (0.032)  
Concern about changing ethnic 
makeup of U.S. 
 0.340***  0.422*** 
 (0.051)  (0.068) 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. KN & ANES data are 
weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. All models include 
controls for the Hispanic feeling thermometer, age, education, party identification, ideology, gender, 
income, and, positive personal economic outlook. SSI and ANES also both control for positive national 
economic outlook and limited government. The SSI and KN models include dummy variables to control 
for the effects of experimental conditions. Source: 2010 Knowledge Networks study, 2012 ANES, 2013 
Survey Sampling International study. 
 
For most of the immigration-related dependent variables, white identity is 
significantly related to more restrictive immigration policies and more negative attitudes 
toward immigrants above and beyond personal or sociotropic economic concerns, 
political orientations, and outgroup attitudes. What is more, these results are robust across 
multiple surveys. Whites who report that their racial identity is important to them favor 
reducing the level of immigrants in the U.S., and the results from the KN data reveal that 
they are also more apt to indicate that this issue is extremely important to them. High 
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white identifiers also favor increasing federal spending on tightening border security, and 
do not endorse the notion that immigrants make America open to new cultures and ideas. 
They do believe that immigrants change American culture and values, and while these 
two sentiments might seem at odds with one another, it is likely because making America 
open to new ideas is framed as a benefit of immigration, which white identifiers reject. 
White individuals whose racial identity is important to them also believe it is likely that 
immigrants take jobs away from people in the U.S., support police checks on the 
immigration status of suspected undocumented immigrants, and more negatively evaluate 
illegal immigrants on the feeling thermometer.65 Finally, high white identifiers are also 
significantly more worried about ethnic change in the U.S. than other whites, even after 
controlling for other predispositions, outgroup attitudes, and demographic characteristics. 
In short and as expected, possessing a strong racial group identity is significantly and 
consistently associated with opposition to immigration among whites.  
Not only do these results demonstrate that white racial identity is broadly linked 
to immigration attitudes, but they also reveal some important trends. First, just as was 
generally the case with the overtime analysis gauging attitudes toward levels of 
immigration, the measure of ingroup identity is more substantively influential—and at 
times more significant—than attitudes toward outgroups (Hispanics, in this case). It is 
also worth noting that across immigration items, the coefficient on white identity is 
smallest in the models predicting attitudes toward immigrants themselves. These results 
lend support to the notion that a desire to protect the ingroup, rather than dislike for the 
                                                            
65 These latter two results are not statistically significant, although the relationships are in the expected 
direction. 
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outgroup, primarily drives immigration opinion.66 Furthermore, the coefficients on 
identity tend to be largest for items that tap beliefs about the effects of immigration, 
suggesting that identity is especially linked to perceptions of threat posed by 
immigration, and is not just another measure of outgroup animus.  
White Identity and the 2012 Election 
 As the demographic composition of the country has changed due to immigration, 
the aging of the population, and differential birth rates across racial and ethnic groups, the 
country has witnessed some important racial milestones. In 2012, America’s first African 
American president was reelected with 93% of the black vote and 71% of the Hispanic 
vote, but only 39% of the white vote. Other presidential candidates (although none who 
were victorious) have received lower levels of support from the white electorate, but the 
fact that Obama faired so poorly drew significant attention to the racial divisions that 
characterized the election. Empirical evidence from survey analysis conducted around the 
2008 election makes it clear that white racial animus plays an important role in the lack 
of support for Obama (Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012; Tesler and Sears 2010). Yet 
Obama’s election is also especially symbolic of shifts in the racial hierarchy in which 
white Americans no longer maintain a monopoly at the highest levels of political office.  
 During the 2008 and 2012 campaigns, a number of conservative political pundits 
did not shy away from blatantly claiming Obama’s election posed a threat to white 
Americans.  Several, like Rush Limbaugh, capitalized on the idea that whites were now 
an oppressed group:  
                                                            
66 There may be some question that it is ingroup favoritism coupled with outgroup animus, or 
ethnocentrism, that is driving these results. Valentino, Brader, and Jardina (2013) demonstrate that 
ethnocentrism no longer primarily explains immigration opinion among U.S. whites.  
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 How do you get promoted in a Barack Obama administration, by hating white people, or 
even saying you do, or that they’re not good, or whatever. Make white people the new 
oppressed minority and they are going along with it, because their shutting up. 
They’removing to the back of the bus. They’re saying I can’t use that drinking fountain, 
ok. I can’t use that restroom, ok. That’s the modern day Republican Party, the equivalent 
of the Old South, the new oppressed minority (Limbaugh 2009). 
 
On the evening of the 2012 election, as the vote counts rolling in signaled an Obama 
victory, Fox News host Bill O’Reilly offered an explanation for the outcome: “It’s not 
traditional America anymore…The white establishment is now the minority” (LoGiurato 
2012).  
If white Americans do indeed perceive Obama’s election as threatening to their 
group’s relative status, then white identity should be implicated in electoral support for 
Barack Obama. That is, higher levels of white identity should be associated with less 
support for Obama and more support for Mitt Romney. Thus, I test whether whites bring 
their racial identity to bear on their attitudes toward Obama in the 2012 election using the 
2012 ANES. 
 I turn first to determining whether white identity played a significant role in vote 
choice. I estimate voting for Obama (coded as zero if the respondent reported voting for 
Mitt Romney and one for Obama), as a function of white identity, racial resentment, 
demographic characteristics, and other potentially related predispositions.67 Results of the 
logit estimation indicate that white identity was in fact significantly associated with not 
voting for Obama in 2012, even after controlling for racial resentment, partisanship, 
political ideology, and other relevant factors.68 For ease of interpreting the results of the 
                                                            
67 The model also includes controls for age, education, party identification, political ideology, 
egalitarianism, gender, income, support for limited government, personal and national economic 
evaluations, South (lives in one of eleven former Confederate states), household union membership, and 
marital status.  
68 Full results of the logit estimation are available in Appendix D.  
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logit model, Figure 5.2 plots the predicted probability of voting for Obama at each level 
of white identity while holding all other variables in the model at their mean values. 
Movement from the lowest value to the highest value of white identity results in a 27 
percentage point decrease in the likelihood of voting for Barack Obama.  
Figure 5.2 Predicted Probability of Voting for Obama  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 2012 ANES. N=451. Shaded area represents 95% confidence 
interval. Vote choice is coded 1 if respondent reported voting for Obama and 
0 for Romney. All variables coded from zero to one. See Table A2 for full 
presentation of logit estimation and list of controls.  
 
 One facet of the threat Obama embodies may be the belief that he 
disproportionately favors outgroup members over whites. The 2012 ANES also includes 
a measure making it possible to capture whites’ belief that Obama does not represent all 
racial groups equally. Respondents were asked to indicate whether Obama favors blacks 
over whites or whites over blacks. To determine whether white identity is indeed 
associated with the belief that Obama favors his own ingroup members, I estimate the 
same logit model as specified above for vote choice, but this time the dependent variable 
is coded at zero if respondents indicated that Obama favors whites over blacks and one 
for the belief that he favors blacks over whites. In this case, white identity is positively 
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associated with the belief that Obama favors blacks.69 Figure 5.3 plots the predicted 
probability of believing that Obama favors blacks over whites at each level of white 
identity. Moving from the lowest to the highest level of racial identity results in a nine 
percentage point increase in the belief that Obama favors blacks over whites.  
 
Figure 5.3 Predicted Probability of Believing that Obama Favors Blacks Over Whites  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 2012 ANES. N=574. Shaded area represents 95% confidence interval. Values 
of the dependent variable are coded such that 1 indicates the belief that Obama favors 
blacks over whites and zero for whites over blacks. All variables coded from zero to 
one. See Table A2 for full presentation of logit estimation and list of controls. 
 
 Taken together, these results suggest that white identity is in fact powerfully 
related to attitudes toward Obama. The effect with respect to vote choice is particularly 
noteworthy, especially in light of the substantial evidence that racial outgroup animus so 
strongly influenced opposition to Obama in 2008 (Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012; Piston 
2010; Tesler and Sears 2010). It is worth noting that the results of the vote choice model 
described above indicate that when white identity is accounted for in a model that 
predicts voting for Obama over Romney, racial resentment is not statistically 
                                                            
69 Results are marginally significant at p=.069. 
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significant.70 These results strongly imply that ingroup attitudes—at least in the present—
indeed play a significant role in electoral politics. And not only do these attitudes play a 
role above and beyond racial animus, but they are a crucial predictor of one of the 
disciplines’ most important outcomespresidential vote choice.  
White Identity and Social Welfare Policy 
  Thus far, I have described how white identity is strongly related to two perceived 
threats’ to whites’ dominant status: immigration and the election of Barack Obama. I also 
argued in Chapter 1, however, that white identity ought to be related to support for 
policies and programs perceived as protecting or disproportionately benefitting whites as 
a group.  Conversely, white identity should be either unrelated or negatively associated 
with policies thought to benefit outgroup members.  
 Several scholars, including Winter (2006, 2008), argue that Social Security is 
especially perceived as benefitting whites as a result of the way in which it has largely 
been framed in political discourse over the past fifty years. The policy, he explains, has 
been consistently and deliberately linked by political elites with values generally 
associated with whiteness, like hard work and legitimately earned rewards. Kinder and 
Kam (2010) argue that Medicare has been similarly framed, and that like Social Security, 
support for these social insurance programs is in part a manifestation of ingroup 
favoritism.71  Both show that whites’ ingroup attitudes consistently and strongly predict 
support for these social welfare programs.Winter (2008) and others, like Gilens (1999), 
                                                            
70 Multicollinearity is likely not a problem here. The correlation between white identity and racial 
resentment is not especially strong (.13).  
71 Kinder and Kam’s goal is to demonstrate the role of ethnocentrism, which embodies both ingroup 
favoritism and outgroup animosity, but they suggest that for some policies, ingroup attitudes are more 
central. 
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posit that other government social spending programs, like welfare, have been also been 
racialized, except these programs have been symbolically associated with benefitting 
racial and ethnic minorities. They have shown that among whites, outgroup attitudes are 
strongly related to opposition to these types of policies (Gilens 1999; Kinder and Sanders 
1996; N. J. G. Winter 2008). Winter finds that ingroup attitudes are only occasionally 
associated with such policies.  
If the political impact of white identity has increased over time, then we might 
expect to see this relationship appear with respect to attitudes toward Social Security 
when white identity is measured using the white feeling thermometer. But we should also 
expect to see that in the present day, white identity—measured with the importance 
item—predicts positive attitudes toward both Social Security and Medicare. I turn first to 
exploring the relationship between ingroup attitudes, measured with the feeling 
thermometer, and support for Social Security using ANES time series data from 1984 
(when attitudes toward Social Security were first measured) to 2012. The models, run 
separately for each year, control for attitudes toward blacks, Hispanics, and Asians (also 
measured with the feeling thermometers), personal and sociotropic financial evaluations, 
demographic characteristics, party identification, political ideology, and support for 
limited government. The results, presented in Table 5.3, first make clear that ingroup 
favoritism among whites has significantly and fairly consistently predicted support for 
Social Security. Furthermore, while trends in the magnitude of the coefficient on the 
white feeling thermometer show some idiosyncrasies, generally, the relationship has 
grown stronger over time.72 In the 1980s, the coefficient was .074, but by 2012, it had 
                                                            
72 It is not surprising that the results from 2004 are especially unusual. Public opinion was still very much 
affected by the September 11th terrorist attacks, and other work has found that in 2004, attitudes toward 
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increased to .271. Unfortunately, public opinion data with all necessary measures is not 
available prior to what Winter (2006) describes as the racialization of Social Security in 
the 1970s. If we were able to measure attitudes toward Social Security in earlier years, 
we would expect that whites’ ingroup attitudes played even less of a role in support for 
this program. 
                                                            
Muslims were most salient in predicting a range of political preferences (Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 
2013). 
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Table 5.3 Support for Social Security 
 
 1984 1988 1992 1994 1996 2000 2002 2004 2008 2012 
White 
Feeling 
Thermometer 
0.074** 0.068** 0.071** 0.124*** 0.160*** 0.152*** 0.196*** 0.064 0.088* 0.271*** 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.037) (0.052) (0.052) (0.038) (0.060) (0.048) (0.091) 
Constant 0.925*** 0.839*** 0.893*** 0.889*** 0.845*** 0.885*** 0.931*** 1.041*** 0.931*** 0.814*** (0.039) (0.040) (0.036) (0.045) (0.069) (0.067) (0.043) (0.046) (0.055) (0.089) 
           
Observations 958 841 1159 945 835 346 787 520 742 558 
R-squared 0.124 0.087 0.116 0.135 0.116 0.188 0.074 0.180 0.101 0.135 
 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Data are weighted. 
All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. 
All models include controls for age, education, party identification, ideology, gender, income, and, positive personal economic outlook. SSI and ANES 
also both control for positive national economic outlook and limited government. 
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Next, I turn to examining the relationship between both Social Security and 
Medicare and ingroup identity. Here, I employ the preferred measure of white identity, 
the racial importance item. Using multiple datasets when all appropriate variables are 
available, I regressed attitudes toward these “white” social spending policies on white 
identity, racial resentment, national and personal economic attitudes, education, age, 
income, party identification, political ideology, gender, and support for limited 
government.73 The results in Table 5.4 confirm that whites who identify with their racial 
group are in fact more supportive of Social Security and Medicare, even after controlling 
for these other factors—a finding that is both consistent with the previous work done by 
Winter and others, but one that also confirms the import of white identity with respect to 
particular political preferences.   
Table 5.4 Attitudes toward “White” Social Welfare Policy 
 Increase Social Security 
spending  
Support for 
Medicare 
 SSI ANES Face-to-Face  SSI 
White identity 0.098* 0.094**  0.152*** 
 (0.054) (0.039)  (0.053) 
Racial resentment -0.056 0.141**  -0.098 
 (0.069) (0.068)  (0.067) 
Constant 0.796*** 0.822***  0.968*** 
 (0.117) (0.101)  (0.113) 
     
Observations  299     572      300 
R-squared 0.175 0.140  0.146 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. KN & ANES data 
are weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. All 
models include controls for age, education, party identification, ideology, gender, income, and, 
positive personal economic outlook. SSI and ANES also both control for positive national 
economic outlook and limited government. The SSI models include dummy variables to control 
for the effects of experimental conditions. Source: 2012 ANES, 2013 Survey Sampling 
International study 
 
                                                            
73 A question assessing support for Medicare was available only in SSI.  
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What about attitudes toward programs that have been traditionally associated as 
benefitting racial and ethnic minorities? Does white identity predict opposition to these 
programs? To find out, I regressed attitudes toward welfare spending and support for 
federal spending on aid to blacks on the same public opinion model employed to estimate 
attitudes toward Social Security and Medicare, again employing multiple datasets. The 
results, presented in Table 5.5, reveal that white identity is not significantly related to 
these attitudes. Across all three surveys, the coefficient on white identity is statistically 
insignificant and close to zero. Instead, and as previous work has consistently 
demonstrated, racial resentment is the driving force behind opposition to these programs, 
which elites have generally associated with blacks and other racial and ethnic minorities 
(Gilens 1999).     
 
Table 5.5 Attitudes toward “Non-White” Social Welfare Policy 
 Increase welfare spending  Aid to blacks 
 KN SSI ANES Face-to-Face  SSI 
White identity 0.008 0.049 -0.027  -0.023 
 (0.041) (0.065) (0.041)  (0.030) 
Racial resentment -0.365*** -0.363*** -0.229***  -0.493*** 
 (0.066) (0.083) (0.067)  (0.044) 
Constant 0.025 1.182*** 0.717***  0.654*** 
 (0.083) (0.139) (0.095)  (0.075) 
      
Observations   736   298    585          522 
R-squared 0.255 0.321 0.287  0.438 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. KN & ANES data are 
weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. 
All models include controls for age, education, party identification, ideology, gender, income, and, 
positive personal economic outlook. SSI and ANES also both control for positive national 
economic outlook and limited government. The SSI and KN models include dummy variables to 
control for the effects of experimental conditions. Source: 2010 Knowledge Networks study, 2012 
ANES, 2013 Survey Sampling International study. 
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It is interesting to note that, at least with respect to the particular social insurance 
programs examined here, that there is no persistent overlap in terms of the predictive 
power of ingroup and outgroup attitudes. When it comes to support for Medicare, racial 
resentment is wholly unrelated, and while it does predict support for Social Security in 
the ANES dataset, it does not in data from SSI. Furthermore, there is no indication that 
ingroup attitudes predict preferences for welfare or federal spending on aid to blacks. In 
fact, examining the relationship between white identity and other racialized policies 
normally associated with racial and ethnic minorities yields similar results. Table 5.6 
presents estimates of the effect of white identity on affirmative action at universities and 
in the work place, government efforts to ensure fair treatment for blacks in the work 
place, and support for neighborhood segregation. 
 
Table 5.6 Support for Race Policies 
 
Affirmative action – 
universities 
Affirmative action - 
work place 
Fair 
treatment 
in jobs 
Support for 
neighborhood 
segregation 
 
KN 
ANES 
Face-to-
Face 
SSI 
ANES 
Face-to-
Face 
KN 
ANES 
Face-to-
Face 
SSI 
White identity -0.022 -0.008 -0.103 0.046 -0.003 0.064 0.263***
(0.037) (0.034) (0.096) (0.033) (0.038) (0.057) (0.063) 
Racial 
resentment 
0.491*** 0.406*** 0.601*** 0.342*** 0.467*** -0.891*** 0.064 
(0.060) (0.058) (0.121) (0.060) (0.057) (0.079) (0.080) 
Constant -0.034 0.389*** 0.043 0.553*** -0.044 1.181*** 0.037 (0.071) (0.085) (0.207) (0.087) (0.065) (0.147) (0.136) 
        
Observations 722 577 301 581 724 571 301 
R-squared 0.260 0.234 0.320 0.219 0.234 0.327 0.116 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. KN & ANES data are 
weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. All models 
include controls for age, education, party identification, ideology, gender, income, and, positive 
personal economic outlook. SSI and ANES also both control for positive national economic outlook 
and limited government. The SSI and KN models include dummy variables to control for the effects of 
experimental conditions. Source: 2010 Knowledge Networks study, 2012 ANES, 2013 Survey 
Sampling International study. 
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For the most part, white identity is not significantly associated with these policies. 
Across all three data sets, high white identifiers are not more or less opposed to 
affirmative action at universities or in the workplace, nor are they more or less supportive 
of the government ensuring fair treatment in jobs for blacks. Attitudes toward these 
policies are overwhelmingly associated with racial outgroup sentiments with one 
exception: high white identifiers significantly favor neighborhood segregation. Even 
when controlling for racial resentment, white identity is strongly associated with the 
belief that whites have a right to keep blacks out of their communities (versus allowing 
blacks to live wherever they can afford).74 This result is perhaps surprising, as we might 
expect the public’s attention to residential segregation to have waned in the post-Civil 
Rights era. Yet these results suggest that a concern over the composition of one’s 
neighborhood is in fact important to many white Americans. Perhaps, then, these results 
are not as unexpected as we might suggest at first blush; restricting who lives within 
ones’ immediate community arguably has as much to do with protecting one’s ingroup as 
it does with dislike for an outgroup. Taken as a whole then, these results provide even 
more evidence that ingroup favoritism and outgroup animus are not regularly symbiotic; 
racial animus and racial favoritism are not simultaneously driving support for or 
opposition to these programs and policies. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
                                                            
74 The proportion of whites who endorse neighborhood segregation in this sample is relatively small, but 
not inconsequential (approximately 10 percent). But those who do endorse neighborhood segregation score 
quite high on white identity (mean=.79 on a zero to one scale). 
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 The analyses presented in this chapter testify that the political impact of white 
identity has in fact grown over time, most clearly with respect to immigration attitudes, 
and that white identity today powerfully predicts a range of political preferences. 
Consistent with my expectation that identity is strongly associated with policies and 
attitudes that are directly related to threat, in the present day, identity is a driving force 
behind whites’ opposition to immigration, which they perceive as changing American 
culture, and not for the better. Of equal importance, and consistent with theoretical 
expectations, the influence of white identity arises for issues and evaluations that 
implicate threats to white dominance and the preservation of white interests. In contrast, 
the impact of this identity disappears, for the most part, when whites evaluate policies 
linked to other groups; in those cases, outgroup attitudes, not white identity, shape 
preferences. 
 In 2012, identity was a strong and substantially important factor in white 
American’s vote choice; high white identifiers were significantly less likely to vote for 
Barack Obama and much more likely to believe that Obama favors whites over blacks, 
two outcomes that lend support for the hypothesis that Obama’s election was threatening 
to whites. Finally, identity predicted support for neighborhood segregation, a finding 
which suggests that high white identifiers are also supportive of protecting their physical 
space from perceived threats posed by non-whites. These results also show that white 
identity is not exclusively related to policies associated with threats to group status. It is 
also an important predictor of policies arguably framed as disproportionately benefitting 
whites and serving to maintain their dominant status, Social Security and Medicare. 
Furthermore, just as with immigration, as the status of whites has become more 
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precarious over time, so has the extent to which identity is brought to bear on attitudes, at 
least with respect to Social Security. In an effort to maintain their status, however, white 
identifiers are not necessarily interested in eliminating programs or policies that benefit 
racial and ethnic minorities, as white identity is not significantly associated with 
opposition to social welfare programs like welfare or with policies like Affirmative 
Action.  
This analysis also helps to delineate the boundaries for where white identity 
matters and where it does not. Whites bring their racial identity to bear on political 
preferences clearly related to threats to their status, or to policies that help whites 
preserve their privileges. Furthermore, these results provide important evidence of 
discriminant validity: White identity is not simply a proxy for outgroup animus. When it 
comes to racialized policies that have been framed as benefitting racial and ethnic 
minorities, white identity is largely unrelated to attitudes. That is, high white identifiers 
are not significantly more opposed to such policies, and as previous work has routinely 
demonstrated, it is in fact racial resentment which best explains whites’ attitudes in this 
domain. These results are consistent with work by Marilynn Brewer (1999), who argues 
that ingroup identification is independent of  negative attitudes toward outgroups. White 
identification, it seems, is not another manifestation of racial prejudice.  
 151 
 
CHAPTER 6 
The Threat of Population Displacement 
Whether you describe it as the dawning of a post-racial age or just the end of white America, 
we’re approaching a profound demographic tipping point. According to an August 2008 report 
by the U.S. Census Bureau, those groups currently categorized as racial minorities—blacks and 
Hispanics, East Asians and South Asians—will account for a majority of the U.S. population by 
the year 2042. Among Americans under the age of 18, this shift is projected to take place in 2023, 
which means that every child born in the U.S. from here on out will belong to the first post-white 
generations. 
Hua Hsu, The End of White America? (2009) 
 
In the preceding chapter, I argue that threats to whites’ dominant status are the 
driving force linking whites’ racial identity to their political attitudes. Yet, it is difficult to 
determine causality from cross-sectional data. In other words, the changing coefficients 
on white identity over time and the relationship between white identity and political
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preferences in the present day only hint at the possibility that perceptions of threat 
moderate the relationship between ingroup identity and attitudes or political preferences. 
One way to better understand whether individuals who identity with their fellow whites 
do indeed react to challenges to the status of their racial group is by exposing them to 
such a threat in an experimental design and then observing their response.  
I suggested in Chapter 2 that there are several potential threats to whites’ 
dominant status, but that the threat of population displacement is potentially one of the 
most tangible and formidable. According to demographers, whites will no longer 
comprise a majority of the U.S. population in the next few decades. These demographic 
shifts are in part due to higher birth rates among native racial and ethnic minorities, but 
they are also the result of widespread immigration to the U.S., which may leave many 
whites concerned about threats potentially posed by an influx of individuals with foreign 
cultures and traditions. It seems likely that many Americans are also aware of this 
information, as the news about impending population displacement has been widely 
publicized. Every major media outlet in the country has covered the Census projections 
describing these changes, featuring headlines like “Census: White majority in U.S. gone 
by 2043” (Kayne 2013) and “Census: Minority babies are now majority in U.S.” 
(Morello 2012). Such articles have identified how waves of immigrants from Latin 
America, lower birth rates among whites, and the aging of the white American population 
have contributed to these demographic outcomes. Despite the widespread coverage of 
these projections, however, we know very little about how white Americans are 
responding to this news.  Are whites reacting negatively to these population changes and 
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are their reactions influencing their political opinions?  Are they responding, as some 
pundits have suggested, like an embattled minority group (Blake 2011)? 
White Anxiety 
Some hints regarding whites’ response to these demographic changes do come 
from cross-sectional data. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, white Americans are 
anxious about the growing multiculturalism of the U.S. As Table 6.1 shows, 
approximately 22 percent of white Americans reported feeling very worried about the 
changing ethnic makeup of the U.S., and an additional 42% are somewhat worried. 
Furthermore, the results from the regression analysis in the previous chapter demonstrate 
that even after controlling for a number of demographic and political variables, high 
white identifiers are more likely to express this concern than are those who score low on 
the white identity measure.  
Table 6.1 Whites Attitudes toward Changing Ethnic Makeup of U.S. 
Very worried 21.8% 
Somewhat worried 42.1% 
Not at all worried 36.1% 
  
N 120 
Source: 2010 Knowledge Networks Study. Data are weighted.75 
 
Similarly, an Esquire-NBC News survey of registered voters in 2013 found that 
one third of the “American Center”—a category they define as consisting of four distinct 
subpopulations of Americans, most of whom are white (78 percent), but all of whom are 
ideological centrists—is worried about how “increasing diversity” will affect the 
country’s future. Moreover, 65 percent report that diversity does not leave them hopeful 
                                                            
75 Results are from respondents in the study’s control condition. 
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for the future (NBC News 2013). The results from this study are especially worth 
mentioning, as the survey was conducted by leading Republican and Democratic 
pollsters, one of whom described the results as nothing short of “a bible” when it comes 
to future successful political messages.76 In other words, powerful political strategists and 
politicians are paying attention to this apparent growing anxiety among white Americans.  
But what are the political implications of this anxiety? These limited survey 
questions do not provide tremendous insight regarding the extent to which perceptions of 
threat are connected to whites’ political attitudes. Furthermore, if whites do indeed feel 
threatened, it is important to consider which whites are responding to such threats. That 
is, does the threat of population displacement differentially affect low and high white 
identifiers?  
One observable implication of experiencing threat to one’s group comes from 
Intergroup Emotions Theory, which argues that individuals will experience emotions on 
behalf of their collective group based on their appraisal of the group’s security (E. R. 
Smith, Seger, and Mackie 2007). Thus, events that are assessed as threatening to one’s 
ingroup should produce a negative emotional response. In particular, individuals should 
report feeling angry when they believe that their group is losing valuable resources or that 
their goals are being obstructed. They should feel fear when they perceive uncertainty 
about their group’s well-being (Cottrell and Neuberg 2005). Accordingly, the impending 
                                                            
76 The bipartisan study of 2,410 registered voters was conducted from August 5-11, 2013 by Benenson 
Strategy Group (the lead pollster for Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012), and by Neil Newhouse of Public 
Opinion Strategies (the lead pollster for Mitt Romney in 2012). An interactive guide to the complete results 
and detailed descriptions of the subgroups that comprise the “American Center” is available at 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/53277240#intro.  
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relative loss of status due to demographic shifts should produce negative emotional 
reactions among white identifiers.77  
A second outcome one might observe among white identifiers is that group threat 
serves as a prime, making particular ideas or identities—in  this case white identity—
cognitively accessible, and increasing the likelihood that such considerations are 
automatically employed in subsequent evaluations (Iyengar and Kinder 1987a; S. E. 
Taylor 1978). In other words, threat may establish or strengthen the relationship between 
identity and political attitudes. The optimal way to observe such an effect directly and 
empirically is by first measuring the predisposition purported to be primed (racial 
identity).  Then several weeks later, subjects receive an experimental intervention, 
usually in the form of a political advertisement or news article, designed to prime the 
previously-measured predisposition. Upon exposing subjects to the treatment, the 
researcher subsequently measures whether an interactive effect is present between the 
previously measured predisposition and the treatment, such that individuals who received 
the intervention are more or less likely to bring that predisposition to bear on their 
political attitudes compared to individuals in the control condition (Iyengar and Kinder 
1987b; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2004). Thus, if threat primes 
identity, I should find that identity is significantly related to political preferences among 
whites who are exposed to threatening information about their group, compared to those 
whites who are not exposed to such a threat.  
                                                            
77 Outten et al. (2012) have demonstrated that when exposed to information about demographic changes, 
White Americans do report feeling more negative emotions. This work does not, however, consider 
differences in responses by levels of ingroup identity, nor does it explore the political implications of these 
effects. Furthermore, this work focuses on negative reactions to outgroups, rather than negative reactions 
more broadly.  
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Experimental Design 
Do high and low white identifiers experience different emotions in response to 
threatening information, and in particular, to the displacement of their group as the 
numerically dominant population in the U.S.? Furthermore, does this threat moderate the 
relationship between identity and political attitudes? To obtain some purchase on these 
questions, I turn to an experiment to test these relationships more systematically.  
The most effective way to test whether the effect of threat does in fact motivate 
the relationship between white identity and political preferences is with an experimental 
design in which whites are exposed to information about population changes. The virtue 
of an experimental method is that it allows the researcher to manipulate the information 
frame subjects receive while holding all other aspects of a message constant across 
conditions. Coupled with random assignment, the experimental design allows us to 
determine that the exposure to a given treatment is the causal force affecting the 
relationship between particular variables (Kinder and Palfrey 1993). 
The study presented here was conducted among a nationally diverse sample of 
455 white adult U.S. citizens recruited by the survey firm Survey Sampling International 
(SSI) in June of 2013. Each subject completed a pre-test survey questionnaire designed to 
measure their levels of racial identification and other demographic characteristics. A 
week after completing the pre-test, subjects were re-invited to complete a post-test 
survey, which included an experimental manipulation. Each subject was randomly 
assigned to either the control condition or one of two treatment conditions.78 Those in the 
                                                            
78 The study actually included three treatments groups, but given the aims of this chapter, I only focus on 
respondents in the first two treatments. The respondents in the third treatment viewed a version of the story 
which argued that while whites would lose their majority status, in the future many of today’s racial and 
ethnic minority group members would be subsumed under a white identity, as happened with the Irish and 
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control condition read an article about trends in age with respect to cell-phone carrier 
subscriptions, and the article (like all the other articles in the experiment) was formatted 
to look as if it had appeared on the ABC News website. What is important about this 
control article is that it was wholly unrelated to race or to demographic changes.79 The 
purpose of this article was simply to give individuals in the control condition the same 
experience of reading a news article as those in the treatment conditions.  
In the first treatment condition, which I will refer to as the “population 
displacement condition,” subjects read a fabricated newspaper article claiming that by the 
end of the present decade, white Americans will no longer comprise a majority of the 
population. This article was modeled after several stories that actually appeared in 
sources like The New York Times and The Washington Post.  The headline of the article 
boldly stated, “Minority population in U.S. Overtakes Whites,” and an accompanying 
graph showed that the non-white population of the U.S. was projected to be much greater 
than that of the white population. The text of the article explained that Hispanics, blacks, 
and Asians will outnumber whites as a result of higher birthrates and increased 
immigration. The purpose of this treatment was to clearly and directly present subjects 
with the threat of population displacement.  
In the second treatment condition, called the “population maintenance condition,” 
subjects were exposed to an article with information completely counter to what 
respondents in the first treatment read.80 This article claimed that white Americans would 
                                                            
Italians during the initial decades of the 20th century. With this treatment, I hypothesized that racially 
prejudiced white identifiers would feel more threatened than would high white identifying racial liberals, 
but these predictions were not born out in the data.  
79 The full-text of the experimental treatments are provided in Appendix B 
80 It is important to note that while the nature of the message changes across treatments, a great deal of 
effort was put into trying to achieve parity in language and presentation across the two articles. In most 
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continue to comprise a majority of the U.S, population at the end of the current decade, 
and that they would maintain their majority status through at least midcentury. The 
headline of this article read “Minority Population in U.S. Shrinking Relative to Whites,” 
and subjects were told that these trends were the result of lower birthrates and declining 
levels of immigration. The purpose of this article was to reduce perceptions of threat and 
to suggest that whites should feel confident that their group will maintain its majority 
status.  
Results: Emotional Reactions 
Are whites threatened by demographic change? Subjects’ reported emotional 
reactions to the stories they read may provide some evidence. Immediately after viewing 
the fabricated news stories, subjects were given a list of different emotions and were 
asked to indicate if the story made them experience any of these emotions. Consistent 
with other work on emotions (Banks and Valentino 2012; Valentino et al. 2008, 2011), I 
combined the available measures into three dimensions: fear (uneasy and afraid), anger 
(angry, disgusted), and enthusiasm (hopeful, proud, happy). All measures were rescaled 
to range from zero to one. Do high and low white identifiers respond differently to stories 
describing demographic changes? Differences in emotional responses by treatment and 
levels of identity—measured here with the identity item that combines the strength and 
importance questions—are presented in Table 6.2. 
                                                            
cases, each sentence of the treatments is similar, except where the information presented needed to be 
reworded to express the opposite sentiment.  
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Table 6.2 Emotional Response to Articles about Demographic Change 
 Anger Fear Enthusiasm 
White identity 0.029 0.034 0.252** 
 (0.072) (0.106) (0.115) 
Treatment 1 0.003 0.072 0.169 
(Displacement) (0.064) (0.094) (0.103) 
Treatment 2 -0.023 -0.055 -0.060 
(Maintenance) (0.066) (0.097) (0.105) 
Treatment 1 x White identity 0.233** 0.374** -0.362** 
 (0.102) (0.150) (0.164) 
Treatment 2 x White identity 0.094 0.216 0.278* 
 (0.102) (0.150) (0.164) 
Constant 0.012 0.032 0.031 
 (0.045) (0.066) (0.072) 
    
Observations       340      340       340 
R-squared 0.113 0.181 0.104 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All data are weighted. 
All variables are coded 0 to 1. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. 
Source: 2013 Survey Sampling International study  
 
The results indicate that compared to the control condition, high white identifiers 
who read the story about white population displacement (Treatment 1 x White identity) 
reported significantly higher levels of both anger and fear. They were also significantly 
less enthusiastic. Conversely, high identifiers who read the story indicating that their 
group would not be displaced did not report feeling more angry or afraid. In fact, they 
were marginally more likely to feel some level of enthusiasm.   
Figure 6.1 presents the predicted levels of anger and fear at each level of white 
identity in the control group and in the threatening displacement treatment.81 In both the 
control and treatment groups, we can see that low identifiers do not report feeling angry. 
                                                            
81 High identifiers are those respondents who received a score of one on the zero to one scale. Low 
identifiers are those individuals coded at zero on the scale. 
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They do report feeling marginally more fearful in the threatening condition. But the 
important differences to observe are with regards to the high identifiers. In the control 
conditions, there is no significant difference between the high and low identifiers with 
regards to their reported levels of anger or fear—the predicted effect is essentially zero. 
In the threatening displacement condition, however, high identifiers report significantly 
higher levels of anger than do low identifiers (an average level of .28 on the zero to one 
scale). It is fear, however, that appears to be the most salient emotional reaction among 
high identifiers exposed to the threatening demographic information. The predicted level 
of fear among high identifiers is .51 – just over halfway up the zero to one scale, and a 
much higher reported level compared to anger.  
Figure 6.1 Predicted Level of Emotional Response after Exposure to Population 
Displacement Treatment 
 
Source: 2013 SSI survey (N=334). Predicted values of OLS estimation. All variables coded from 0 to 1. 
Shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals. X-axis values represent each level of white identity. 
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Appraisal theories of emotions offer further insight when it comes to interpreting 
these results (C. A. Smith and Ellsworth 1985). According to appraisal theory, the 
particular emotional reactions individuals experience in a given situation depend on how 
individuals interpret or assess threats or opportunities in their environment (Lazarus 
1991a). Individuals respond to threats with fear when such threats are either difficult to 
control or it is unclear how to address them.  They respond with anger when there is 
certainty about the source of a threat, when where blame should be directed is clear, and 
where control over the situation seems attainable (Huddy et al. 2005; Lazarus 1991b; C. 
A. Smith and Ellsworth 1985). With regards to racial attitudes, existing work suggests 
that anger is primarily linked to symbolic racism because according to this theory, whites 
believe blacks choose not to work hard, and therefore blame blacks for their own 
disadvantages. On the other hand, group-oriented theories like Group Position Theory 
(Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 1996) and the Power-Threat Hypothesis (Key 1949) 
suggest that fear underlies the threat of resource redistribution and changes in social 
hierarchies.  
When it comes to the threat of population displacement, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that high white identifiers respond with both feelings of anger and fear. Because the 
source of the threat is somewhat identifiable (e.g., Latino immigrants moving to the U.S., 
sometimes illegally), it is consistent with appraisal theory that individuals would respond 
with some degree of anger. Yet many aspects of this threat are difficult to address (e.g., 
differences in birth rates, the aging of the population) and solutions, like revised 
immigration policies, are complicated. Furthermore, and consistent with group-oriented 
theories like Group Position Theory, population displacement is a very real manifestation 
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of changes in a racial hierarchy, one that involves, for many whites, a sense of 
uncertainty regarding the future of the group and its access to power and resources. 
Accordingly, and quite in keeping with appraisal theory, it makes sense that the primary 
response would be one of fear. Thus, not only do these results demonstrate that high 
white identifiers respond to group-threat much differently than do low identifiers, but 
they also lend credence to the argument that white identity is indeed a group-based 
disposition that is conceptually distinct from outgroup attitudes like symbolic racism or 
racial resentment.  
Results: The Moderating Effect of Threat 
Taken as a whole, the results indicate that high white identifiers do in fact react 
negatively to threats directed at their group—in this case, the notion that their group will 
be demographically displaced in the U.S. In response to this information, white 
identifiers respond with both anger and fear. When assured that their group will maintain 
its relative status, however, white identifiers react with enthusiasm. To what extent, 
however, does exposure to this threatening information moderate the degree to which 
identity is brought to bear on political evaluations? That is, does threat more strongly link 
white racial identity to whites’ political evaluations? Recall in Chapter 2, I argued that 
identity, when salient, should be positively related to policies that benefit whites, 
negatively related to policies that threaten whites’ dominant status, or negatively related 
to political figures associated with such threats. Thus, the expectation is that reminding 
whites of a threat to their group should make identity a strong predictor of these types of 
political evaluations. 
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To test this possibility, I again estimate the impact of white racial identity across 
the conditions of the design, but this time focus on attitudes toward immigration policy. I 
turn first to examining the relationship between immigration policy opinions and identity 
in each of the two treatment conditions. In Chapter 5, I showed that white identity is 
significantly linked to immigration attitudes. Does the threat of population displacement 
further strengthen this relationship? Table 6.3 provides an answer. Each column in the 
table presents the results of a separate OLS regression model estimating the effect of 
white identity in the two treatment conditions (compared to the subjects in the control 
condition who read the cell-phone article) on a particular immigration related opinion. In 
the first column, the dependent variable is support for decreasing levels of immigration. 
In the second and third columns, I examine the joint effect of the experimental treatments 
and white identity on endorsement of the belief that immigrants take jobs and support for 
the notion that immigrants change American traditions in values, respectively.82 In each 
model, all variables are recoded to range from zero to one, and higher values of the 
dependent variable coincide with anti-immigration attitudes.  
 
  
                                                            
82 Full question-wording for these immigration dependent variables is provided in Appendix A. 
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Table 6.3 The Effect of White Identity on Immigration Attitudes by Experimental 
Condition 
  Immigration level 
Immigration 
takes jobs 
Immigration 
changes 
values 
White identity 0.243** 0.436*** 0.267** 
 (0.095) (0.111) (0.111) 
Treatment 1 0.047 -0.105 -0.103 
(Displacement) (0.084) (0.099) (0.098) 
Treatment 2 0.034 0.044 -0.001 
(Maintenance) (0.087) (0.102) (0.101) 
Treatment 1 x White identity -0.037 0.137 0.177 
 (0.134) (0.158) (0.157) 
Treatment 2 x White identity -0.064 -0.125 0.073 
 (0.135) (0.158) (0.157) 
Constant 0.457*** 0.325*** 0.276*** 
 (0.059) (0.069) (0.069) 
    
Observations 338 336 336 
R-squared 0.044 0.131 0.091 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Higher values indicate higher levels of reported emotion. Source: 2013 SSI Study 
The first result to observe is that the interaction of white identity and either 
treatment condition yields no significant results. Higher levels of white identity are not 
associated with greater opposition to (or support for) immigration nor with more negative 
(or positive) views of immigrants in either the displacement condition or the maintenance 
condition. Thus, it appears that in this case, exposure to news about the threat of 
population displacement does not moderate the relationship between identity and 
immigration attitudes. It is also important to notice, however, that the coefficient on white 
identity alone is positive and significant in each of the three columns. These values 
represent the effect of white identity on each immigration attitude among subjects in the 
control condition. The significant coefficients indicate that absent any intervention, white 
identity is already strongly associated with immigration opinion.  
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Figure 6.2 illustrates these relationships even more clearly. The bars represent the 
predicted value of each of the three immigration dependent variables among high (darker 
bars) and low (lighter bars) white identifiers in the displacement treatment and control 
conditions.  
Figure 6.2 Immigration Attitudes in Response to Population Displacement 
Treatment 
Source: 2013 SSI survey (N=334). Predicted values of OLS estimation. All variables coded from 0 to 1. 
 
There are two noteworthy relationships to observe from this chart. The first is that 
for each of the dependent variables, low identifiers, on average, express less opposition to 
immigration and more positive views of immigrants than do high identifiers. The second 
is that across the control and treatment conditions, the predicted response among high 
identifiers is not significantly different. High white identifiers are, on average, quite 
opposed to immigration and endorse negative views of immigrants. In fact, predicted 
values among high identifiers, when it comes to support for decreasing levels of 
immigration and the belief that immigrants take jobs, are over .7 on the zero to one scale. 
With predicted opposition already so high, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
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displacement treatment had no effect; there is little room for these whites to express even 
greater opposition to immigration or more disapproval of immigrants.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
The aim of the experiment described here was twofold: first, to demonstrate that 
group-threat is strongly linked to group identity, and that high white identifiers respond 
differently to threats to their group than do low identifiers. Second, the study was 
designed to test the hypothesis that threat directly moderates the relationship between 
identity and political evaluations. The former goal was clearly achieved. The results here 
demonstrate that whites most attached to their racial group appear to be most affected by 
the possibility of losing their numerical majority in the U.S., and consistent with appraisal 
theory, they respond somewhat with anger, but mostly with fear.  
Banks and Valentino (2012) have demonstrated that individual emotional 
responses are significantly intertwined with racial attitudes.  Specifically, they find that 
contemporary racial animus—namely in the form of symbolic racism—is rooted in blame 
appraisals and consequently, in anger.  Their studies reveal that when individuals high on 
symbolic racism experience anger, they are more opposed to affirmative action and other 
racial policies. Triggering fear, however, does not have the same effect. One conclusion 
to draw from their findings is that expressions of racial outgroup animus are not 
uniformly grounded in a host of negative emotions, but instead almost exclusively in 
anger. This distinction is worth highlighting, because it provides some direction for future 
work. Are the emotional substrates of white identity similar to those of racial resentment? 
There are some hints that it is primarily fear or anxiety that undergirds white identity. For 
instance, in Chapter 2, I show that individuals with less emotionally stable personalities 
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seem more likely to adopt a white identity. And here, fear is primarily triggered in 
response to threatening information. Perhaps it is fear that underlies this identity. 
The second objective of the experiment was less clearly accomplished. At least 
with regards to the threat of population displacement, exposure to such information did 
not uniformly increase the extent to which racial identity was brought to bear on whites’ 
political attitudes. Whites who identify with their racial group and who were exposed to 
this threatening information, were no more or less opposed, for example, to increasing 
levels of immigration to the U.S., nor were they more or less favorable toward 
immigrants generally. In part, the lack of a priming effect observed here may be because 
the link between identity and these evaluations existed absent any experimental 
intervention. White identity was already strongly associated with these political attitudes. 
These latter findings lend more support for the notion that white identity is now 
chronically salient. Priming white racial identity is difficult because this identity is 
already activated, especially as a result of threatening information about population 
changes. 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from these results. First, white 
identity is indeed significantly linked to anxiety about the group’s status in the racial 
hierarchy. Consistent with Group Position Theory and other group-oriented theories of 
racial conflict, whites respond negatively to the possibility that their group will be 
displaced numerically in the population. In fact, information about population changes, or 
lack thereof, creates a general sense of emotional arousal among white identifiers. They 
respond with negative emotions when their group is threatened, and positive emotions 
when assured their group will maintain its dominance. Low identifiers, on the other hand, 
 168 
 
have no emotional response to either type of information. These results further validate 
the notion that white identity is meaningful for many individuals. The fact that threats to 
the group have the capacity to arouse emotions in individuals is consistent with the 
expectations laid out in social identity theory and intergroup emotions theory. 
Unfortunately, the conclusions we can draw about whether threat primes white 
identity’s impact on political evaluations are somewhat murky. For one, it was difficult to 
boost or establish a moderating effect between identity and political attitudes with the 
employed treatment, in part because identity was already strongly linked to a number of 
evaluations. This result was somewhat unexpected given that in a study conducted in 
2010, my co-authors and I find that when whites receive information highlighting their 
group’s economic vulnerability relative to the success of blacks, white racial identity is 
powerfully linked to a variety of political attitudes (Hutchings et al. 2010).  
There are a number of reasons why the results generated by my own study 
conducted in 2013 were inconsistent with the 2010 results. Methodological factors like 
the nature of the samples and survey firm house effects may partly explain such 
differences. It is also possible that the nature of the threatening treatment was not 
effective at boosting the association between identity and the particular range of political 
evaluations I examined. Other work, for instance, has found evidence of shifts in political 
evaluations when whites are exposed to information about population changes. In their 
experiment involving whites who identify as political independents, Craig and Richeson 
(2014) find that exposure to information about white Americans’ impending “majority-
minority” status leads whites to endorse more conservative policy positions. Perhaps, 
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however, the threat of population displacement has already left white identifiers strongly 
entrenched in such political views.  
It is also likely that in the three years between the KN and SSI studies, factors in 
the political and social environment made identity more chronically salient, wholly 
eliminating the possibility of priming this identity. This outcome would of course not 
preclude the possibility that threat is the most important catalyst in linking identity to 
political evaluations. It simply means that instigating and observing these relationships in 
an experimental setting is more challenging, since the political world has already forged 
these relationships.  
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CHAPTER 7 
When White Racial Identity is Taboo 
Whiteness describes, from Little Big Horn to Simi Valley, not a culture but precisely the 
absence of culture. It is the empty and therefore terrifying attempt to build an identity 
based on what one isn’t and on whom one can hold back. 
 David Roediger, Toward the Abolition of Whiteness (1994) 
 
The common understanding at present is that open expressions of race consciousness are 
taboo for white-Anglo Americans, but just fine for everyone else. A leading black 
presidential candidate subtitles his best-selling biography “A Story of Race and 
Inheritance”; the main lobbying organization for Hispanics carries the proud title 
“National Council of the Race”; and so on. This word is, however, not available to 
white-Anglo Americans in reference to themselves, and white-Anglo Americans are 
indoctrinated from childhood to believe, or to pretend to believe, that race is an empty 
category. 
 John Derbyshire, “Towards a White Minority” (2007) 
  
As I argued in Chapter 1, social scientists have frequently dismissed the 
significance of white racial identity, particularly because as a dominant group identity, it 
is sometimes latent and difficult to detect. There are a number of potential reasons for the 
general “invisibility” of this identity; perhaps first and foremost, white identity lies 
dormant because dominant group members, compared to members of subordinate groups, 
are reminded less frequently of social and cultural differences between their group and 
others. Generally, dominant groups appropriate the social, cultural, and political customs 
collectively considered “mainstream” in society. This “normalization of dominant group 
culture” means that group members largely seem unaware of the cultural and social 
practices that define their group (Doane 1997, p. 378). Rather than fostering group
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identity, this widespread sense of “sameness” promotes a culturelessness among 
dominant group members (Perry 2001) and leads to attachment to a national identity, 
rather than to a racial or ethnic group (Frankenberg 1993; Higham 1955). Furthermore, 
dominant group members are far less likely to experience discrimination as a result of 
their objective group membership (Williams et al. 1997) and are therefore rarely made 
conscious of their identity through such experiences.  As a result of these factors, I have 
argued that a dominant group identity, like white racial identity, may at times appear 
insignificant, until activated when group members perceive a threat to the status of and 
privileges possessed by their group.  
There is, however, another potential and somewhat overlooked reason why social 
scientists may have had difficulty observing white racial identity and its political 
consequences: the adoption and expression of this identity may be socially stigmatized. 
As legal scholar Cheryl Harris notes, whiteness was “built both on exclusion and racial 
subjugation” (Harris 1992, p.1737). In the past, strong white identities have been 
associated with marginalized extremist groups like the Klu Klux Klan, Neo-Nazi’s, and 
other white supremacist organizations (Adams and Roscigno 2005; Harris 1992). Thus, 
out of concern for violating social norms, many whites may reject this identity, or at least 
may be reluctant to report such an identification on an opinion survey. Indeed, because 
attachments to dominant groups are sometimes associated with aggressive and explicit 
subordination of outgroup members, the tendency for individuals to recoil from adopting 
these identities is not unprecedented. Previous work found, for example, that German 
students were reluctant to display strong ingroup favoritism, particularly in a context 
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where Israeli students were referenced as an outgroup (Schwartz, Struch, and Bilsky 
1990).  
 If social desirability concerns ever dissuaded whites from claiming that their 
racial identity is important to them, it appears few whites have reservations in the present 
day. As I discussed in Chapter 3, a sizeable portion of the white American population is 
willing to indicate that their identity as a white person is very, if not extremely, important 
to them. In fact, because the percentage of white Americans who express this sentiment is 
so high, it seems quite unlikely that reporting a strong white identification feels widely 
inappropriate or in violation of a norm in recent years.83 Unfortunately, a paucity of 
public opinion surveys with optimal measures of white identity over time makes it 
difficult to determine whether whites were once more widely hesitant to proclaim this 
sort of attachment to their racial group. If such tentativeness existed, however, it is likely 
that the same confluence of events, which today is making white identity salient, has also 
made this identity more socially acceptable.  
In the present day, greater attention to white identity in the media and in pop 
culture provides anecdotal evidence that it is no longer seen as socially offensive to 
discuss whiteness or to identify as white. Generally, these discussions have taken two 
forms, each of which is entrenched in both class and partisan identities. The first of these 
conversations tends to be characterized by a rather tongue-in-cheek, anti-elitist, and 
somewhat demeaning position taken up by whites who recognize that they themselves are 
among the white elite. Popular blogs like the satirical and self-deprecating “Stuff White 
People Like” seem hyper-aware of white privilege, and mock the mores of left-wing, 
                                                            
83 As I discussed in Chapter 4, somewhere between 27 percent and 41 percent of white Adult U.S. citizens 
report that their racial identity is very, if not extremely, important.  
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upper-middle-class whites (Mieszkowski 2008). Similarly, online sites, such as the 
entertainment curator, Buzzfeed, have published comedic lists like “The 25 Whitest 
Things That Have Ever Happened” (Stopera 2013) and popularized the Twitter hashtag, 
“#WhitePeople.” Salon.com has an entire category of articles on “white people” and the 
publication’s editor-at-large, Joan Walsh, declared 2013 “the year in whiteness” (Walsh 
2013a).84 Generally, these sources take a more critical view of whiteness, adopting an 
almost ironic attachment to an identity they see as inane at best or deeply problematic at 
worst.   
The second prevalent discourse regarding whiteness has been captured by 
conservative political elites like Pat Buchanan, Glenn Beck, and Rush Limbaugh. 
Buchanan, for example, has explicitly advocated for the rise of white racial consciousness 
in response to white Americans’ demographic displacement (Buchanan 2011). Glenn 
Beck has argued that Barack Obama has a “deep seated hatred of white people or the 
white culture” (Associated Press 2009). This side of the whiteness conversation is rooted 
in populist appeals to white Americans who seem to reject notions that they are among 
the elite or in any way privileged. Accordingly, these particular political pundits seem to 
have struck a resonant chord among the white working-class Americans most concerned 
with demographic shifts, multiculturalism, and globalization. For these whites, such 
concerns have engendered “a solidarity defined by a yearning for American 
‘authenticity,’ a folksy realness that rejects the global, the urban, and the effete in favor 
of nostalgia for ‘the way things used to be’” (Hsu 2009).  These are the anxieties that 
primarily undergird the nature of the white identity I have described in this dissertation.  
                                                            
84 See http://www.salon.com/topic/white_people/ for Salon.com’s articles tagged under the category of 
“white people”.  
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What is important to recognize with respect to these two dialogues is that while 
the first does adopt a more critical view of “white privilege,” neither perspective 
generally associates whiteness with extremism. Furthermore, regardless of the divergent 
nature of these discourses, they both provide important evidence that in the contemporary 
period, whiteness is increasingly discussed openly. This candor, coupled with the survey 
evidence indicating that many whites feel comfortable reporting a racial identity, suggests 
that identifying as white is not widely and generally taboo in the present day.   
Social Desirability Biases and Whiteness 
In spite of the openness with which white identity seems to be discussed today, it 
is possible that the historical association of this identity with supremacy and hate groups 
continues to prompt some social desirability bias among whites, and therefore some high 
white identifiers may be reticent to report this identity on public opinion surveys. In other 
words, survey measures of white identity might be under-measuring levels of white racial 
identity in the U.S. population. Fortunately, the 2012 American National Election Study 
(ANES) provides a means by which to investigate this possibility. In addition to the 
traditional face-to-face survey mode, the principal investigators of the ANES also fielded 
a companion survey conducted entirely over the Internet among a nationally 
representative sample of adult U.S. citizens.85  
 If some whites find it objectionable to report their racial identity during a face-to-
face interview, then they may likely feel more comfortable doing so in the private and 
relatively anonymous survey environment offered by the Internet mode.86 In this case, we 
                                                            
85 The Internet sample was drawn from panel members of GfK Knowledge Networks.  
86 Previous work has shown that Internet survey modes reduce social desirability biases that accompany 
sensitive questions (Chang and Krosnick 2009).  
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should expect to see an even greater percentage of whites indicating that their racial 
identity is either somewhat, very, or extremely important to them.87 Table 7.1 
comparesthe distribution of the white identity, measured with the racial importance item, 
across the two survey modes:  
Table 7.1 The Distribution of White Racial Identity Across Survey Modes 
  Face-to-face Internet 
Not at all important 23.1% 21.8% 
A little important 18.4% 20.0% 
Moderately important 24.8% 27.6% 
Very important 19.9% 19.4% 
Extremely important 13.9% 11.2% 
   
Observations 860 2836 
Data are weighted. Source: 2012 American National Election Study 
 
Comparing the two columns in Table 7.1 reveals that the distribution of this 
measure in the face-to-face mode is not significantly different from the Internet mode. If 
anything, respondents taking the survey via the Internet are more likely to temper their 
responses to the identity question; a slightly smaller percentage were willing to indicate 
that their identity is extremely important to them. At the same time, however, slightly 
fewer of the whites in the Internet sample were clustered in the lowest end of the identity 
measure, reporting that their identity is “not at all important”. Across both modes, a 
majority of the respondents indicated that their racial identity is “moderately important”. 
In short, the similarity in responses across the two survey modes suggests that social 
                                                            
87 During the 2012 face-to-face interview, the white identity measure was asked using a Computer-Aided 
Self-Interview (CASI) format, whereby the interviewer handed a tablet computer to the respondent, and the 
respondent answered the questions privately. This method was implemented to reduce social desirability 
bias, but one could argue that the setting, where the interviewer remained in the room, would not 
necessarily reduce bias in the same way that taking the entire survey anonymously on the Internet might.  
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desirability bias is not dramatically affecting individuals’ willingness to claim a racial 
identity.  
Race of Interviewer Effects 
Even if many whites possess a racial identity and usually feel comfortable 
revealing their identification on anonymous opinion surveys, it is still possible that in 
specific circumstances, white identifiers might feel reluctant to express their identity. For 
instance, it is possible that to whom they are reporting this identity matters. Some whites 
may feel comfortable revealing their white identity to fellow whites, but are potentially 
uncomfortable doing so in the presence of non-white individuals. One way to uncover 
this potential bias is by comparing whites’ responses to the racial identity question on the 
ANES in the face-to-face interview when their interviewer was white, to responses given 
when the interviewer was black or of some other race or ethnicity.  
Table 7.2 presents the mean level of white identity (measured with the importance 
item and rescaled to range from zero to one) among white respondents in the face-to-face 
survey when the interviewer was white, black, or “other”.88 The results reveal some 
important differences in respondents’ willingness to express an identity. When white 
respondents are interviewed by a white individual, their average reported level of white 
identity is .45, which is equivalent to a response of “moderately important”.  Whites 
interviewed by an interviewer who self-identifies as “other” report nearly the same level 
of white identity (.46). But whites interviewed by a black individual report significantly 
                                                            
88 On the 2012 ANES, interviewers self-report their race, and the options available are limited to white, 
black, or other. The analysis here uses the race of the interviewer from the post-test survey, since the white 
identity question was asked on the post-test survey.  
 177 
 
lower levels of white identity, on average.89 The mean level of racial identity among 
whites interviewed by blacks is .35, which falls between “only a little” and “moderately” 
important.  
 
 
Table 7.2 Mean Levels of White Identity by Race of Interviewer 
  White interviewer Black interviewer Other interviewer 
Mean 0.451 0.355 0.461 
 (0.017) (0.038) (0.047) 
N 787 105 122 
Standard errors in parentheses. Data are weighted. Source: 2012 American National Election Study 
 
 
Of course race-of-interviewer effects are not a new phenomenon. A robust line of 
research has documented the fact that the race of the interviewer can significantly affect 
survey-takers’ responses to questions, particularly on face-to-face surveys (Guterbock 
and Borg 1991; Hyman 1954; Krysan 1998). Some work demonstrates that in the 
presence of interviewers of the same race, respondents are more likely to be open or 
honest. Other times, however, respondents attempt to save face with interviewers of their 
own race by giving what they believe is the “correct” or most socially desirable response 
(Anderson, Silver, and Abramson 1988). Comparing the average level of white identity 
among whites who had a white interviewer to those white respondents who took the 
survey over the Internet sans interviewer, there appears to be no difference in levels. 
Thus, it seems that white respondents were not over-reporting their racial identification.  
                                                            
89 Mean difference (.095) in white identity when the interviewer is black compared to white is significant at 
p = .022, two-tailed.  
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A number of studies have also demonstrated that whites tend to give more racially 
liberal responses to race-related questions when their interviewer is of a different race or 
ethnicity – or in the case of telephone surveys, perceived to be non-white (Hatchett and 
Schuman 1975; Hyman 1954; Krysan 1998). Similarly, the fact that whites tend to report 
lower levels of racial identity in the presence of blacks suggests that some degree of self-
monitoring is occurring, and that a meaningful percentage of white respondents feel 
uncomfortable declaring that their racial identity is important to a black interviewer. 
Furthermore, while the interviewer remained present when respondents answered the 
racial identity questions, these items were self-administered, meaning that the presence of 
the black interviewer alone affected results, even when respondents could feel somewhat 
confident that their responses were anonymous. Thus, it appears that the expression of 
white identity may be conditioned on circumstances, and that under certain conditions, 
some whites feel that it is inappropriate to proclaim an identification with their race.    
White Identity and Extremism – An Experiment 
The race of interviewer effects provide some evidence that whites express lower 
levels of racial identity in certain contexts where it seems socially undesirable to do so. 
Are there other circumstances in which whites are either reluctant to express their 
identity, or in which the relationship between this identification and political preferences 
is altered? One possibility is that while many whites do not ordinarily associate racial 
identification with white supremacy, they do actively reject their racial identity when it is 
associated with extremist hate groups, like white supremacists. Furthermore, such 
associations may alter the relationship between identity and political preferences, such 
that identity is no longer associated with particular attitudes and policy positions.  
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To explore whether whites who identify with their racial group react to 
associations between their group and the label “white supremacist,” I designed an 
experiment in which white respondents were exposed to news information about the 
formation of a white interest group at a small mid-Atlantic college. While the actual 
language of the news articles was fabricated, the events referenced in the article were 
mostly real. In the fall of 2012, a student at Towson University received national media 
attention when he sought to start a student group specifically for whites. The student, 
Matthew Heimbach, argued that the group’s intentions were similar to the advocacy work 
done by campus organizations that serve the interests of racial and ethnic minorities. 
Heexplained his position to the student newspaper: “You have a Black student Union 
who promotes black heroes, we want to do the same thing” (Munshaw and Bauer-Wolf 
2012).  
Heimbach’s proposed White Student Union was certainly controversial; some 
Towson students denounced the group as racist, and the Southern Poverty Law Center 
pointed out Heimbach’s association with the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (Kingkade 
2012; Lenz 2013). Furthermore, Heimbach was not alone in his efforts; reports surfaced 
that similar groups had formed at Georgia State University and Indiana University 
(Wildeman 2013; Witteman 2013).  A cursory glance at the online comments in response 
to reports of these student unions suggested that whites’ reactions were mixed. Some 
expressed outrage at what they argued was a “double standard,” whereby racial and 
ethnic minorities were able to form student organizations without a widespread backlash. 
Yet other commenters seemed to side with the notion that Heimbach and his compatriots 
should be considered leaders of hate groups. Of course, individuals who respond to such 
 180 
 
articles are not likely to be representative of the larger white adult population (Kingkade 
2012). So how might white Americans more broadly react to the formation of 
organizations designed to promote white interests, and further, how might they respond 
when such efforts are linked to white supremacist groups? More importantly, how are any 
potential reactions conditioned by individuals’ levels of racial identification?  
As I argued in Chapter 1, white racial identification is not synonymous with the 
radical endorsement of white supremacy. It is likely that a select few who possess high 
level of white identity are in fact bona fide white supremacists, but by and large, most 
white identifiers do not endorse these extremist views. Therefore, while many high 
identifiers may not be troubled by the notion that individuals are forming groups 
designed to promote white identity or white interests, they ought to reject this identity 
when it is associated with extremism. Furthermore, when exposed to information 
associating their group with extremism, white identity should no longer be linked as 
strongly to policies that benefit whites, since identifiers should subsequently reject efforts 
to maintain their privilege and status.   
Experimental Design 
The news articles in my experiment used language similar to that found in actual 
local and national news coverage of Heimbach’s efforts to start a “White Student Union.” 
Both articles were designed to look as if they had appeared on the ABC News website, 
were of similar length, identically formatted with a photograph on the right-hand side, 
and featured nearly identical text. The two articles viewed by the experimental groups 
differed from each other in a few important ways, however.90 In the control condition, 
                                                            
90 The full text of the fabricated newspaper articles is available in Appendix C.  
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subjects read an article with the headline “Student Starts Campus Group for Whites” that 
straightforwardly described the formation of a white student union. In the article, 
Heimbach explains that the group seeks to advocate for white students in the same way 
that other race-related groups on campus, like the Black Student Union, do for students. It 
goes on to describe some of the group’s aims, like starting a scholarship fund for white 
students and declaring December as “White History Month.” Accompanying the article 
was a photo designed to look like a screenshot taken from television news coverage of 
the story. It included a photo of one of the organization’s campus fliers, which read as 
follows: “Love your race. Support a White Student Union.” Across the bottom of the 
screen, a banner stated, “Controversy heats up over White Student Union.” Importantly, 
this article was devoid of any editorializing about the group. There was no mention that 
such efforts might be seen as racially prejudiced, nor any suggestion that group members 
had ties to white supremacist groups.  Further, while the banner across the bottom of the 
photograph used the word “controversy,” the text included no explanation for why the 
group was seen as provocative. Thus, this article straightforwardly describes whites 
organizing a racial group to promote group members’ collective interests.  
In the treatment condition, subjects read a nearly identical article, save for a few 
important changes. First, the headline for this article read “Student Starts Campus Group 
for Whites; Denounced as White-Supremacist.” The accompanying photograph was also 
the same, except the banner across the bottom of the screen had an additional row of text 
which stated, “Group called white supremacists.” Compared to the control condition, this 
version of the article also had three additional sentences, which described the activities of 
the White Student Union as a “thinly veiled appeal to white supremacy” and pointed out 
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that, as is often the case, supporters of these groups are associated with white nationalist 
groups like the KKK and the neo-Nazis. These remarks were attributed to a fictitious 
organization – the National Human Rights Center. This treatment was designed to clearly 
and overtly associate the formation of a white interest group with extremism.  
The study was conducted over the Internet in July of 2013 among a nationally 
diverse sample of 460 white adult U.S. citizens who were recruited by the firm Survey 
Sampling International (SSI). SSI recruits participants to their online panel via opt-in 
methods, and provides a census-balanced sample. All subjects completed an online pre-
test survey, which included measures of their racial identity, other measures of racial 
attitudes, and a variety of demographic questions. A week later, participants viewed one 
of the two fabricated newspaper articles, depending on the condition to which they were 
randomly assigned, and then completed a post-test survey. The lag-time between the pre-
test and the experimental intervention was intentional; such a design helps mitigate the 
possibility that questions on the pre-test are themselves serving as a sort of prime or 
treatment that may be altering responses to the post-test survey independent of (or in 
interaction with) the experimental conditions. Thus, the lag helps ensure that any 
significant differences observed across the experimental conditions are a result of the 
treatments themselves.  
Experimental Results 
In order to gauge their reactions to the White Student Union articles, subjects 
were asked whether they experienced any one of several emotions immediately following 
exposure to the treatment. Because we would expect different reactions to the two White 
Student Union stories, the emotions items also serve as a manipulation check. Just as with 
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the population displacement experiment analysis in Chapter 5, I scaled together the 
emotions measures into three dimensions: fear (uneasy and afraid), anger (angry, 
disgusted), and enthusiasm (hopeful, proud, happy). These scales are coded so that the 
values range from zero to one, with higher values indicating the presence of an emotional 
response. Table 7.3 provides the results of three separate ordinary least squares regression 
models predicting emotional reactions when respondents read the white supremacist 
version of the story compared to the neutral version of the story. The model includes 
respondents’ level of white identity as measured in the pre-test, as well as an indicator 
variable for the white supremacist treatment.  
Table 7.3 Effect of White Identity, by Experimental Condition, on Emotional Reactions to 
White Student Union Stories 
  Anger Fear Enthusiasm 
White identity -0.117 -0.187 0.528*** 
 (0.107) (0.123) (0.131) 
White supremacist treatment -0.003 -0.101 -0.106 
 (0.094) (0.108) (0.115) 
White identity * White supremacist treatment 0.251* 0.285 -0.163 
 (0.152) (0.174) (0.186) 
Constant 0.201*** 0.342*** 0.121 
 (0.067) (0.077) (0.082) 
    
Observations 224 224 224 
R-squared 0.060 0.020 0.153 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Higher values indicate higher levels of reported emotion. Source: 2013 SSI White Supremacy Study 
 
If we consider first the coefficient for the white identity measure, which is the 
effect of white identity on each emotional response among respondents in the neutral 
condition, we can see that these individuals did not, on average, report different levels of 
anger or fear compared to those who read the white supremacist article. In fact, while not 
statistically significant, the coefficients on both the measures of fear and anger were 
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negative, suggesting that high white identifiers felt comparatively lower levels of these 
emotions in response to the neutral versions of the story. They did, however, respond 
more enthusiastically. That is, high white identifiers reacted significantly more positively 
compared to low identifiers in response to the article that described the formation of the 
white student union without reference to white supremacists.  
Examining the interaction between the white supremacy treatment and white 
identity, however, we can see that high white identifiers, compared to those in the neutral 
treatment, reported feeling more angry in response to the race-neutral story. Furthermore, 
while the relationship is not statistically significant, the coefficient on the measure of fear 
is also fairly large and positive, suggesting that high white identifiers were inclined to 
report feeling more anxious or afraid in response to the supremacy story. Figure 7.1 
illustrates the relationship between high and low identifiers in the control and treatment 
conditions more clearly.  The bars represent the predicted level of each emotional 
response among high and low identifiers, in the two experimental conditions.  
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Figure 7.1 Predicted Level of Emotional Response after Exposure to White 
Student Union Stories 
  
Source: 2013 SSI survey (N=334). Predicted values of OLS estimation. All variables coded from 0 to 1. 
Shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals. X-axis values represent each level of white identity. 
We can see that in the neutral condition, high white identifiers have slightly, but 
insignificantly, lower predicted levels of anger and fear, and a much higher level of 
enthusiasm compared to low identifiers. In other words, the high identifiers respond more 
positively to the neutral white student union story. These relationships, however, are 
significantly altered in the supremacy condition. High identifiers who viewed the story in 
which the organization of the Student Union is associated with white supremacy reported 
higher levels of anger and fear, and lower levels of enthusiasm. In short, these emotional 
reactions suggest that high white identifiers somewhat endorse the formation of a white 
student union, unless such an organization is associated with extremism.  
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In addition to gauging their emotional reaction to the stories, the post-test survey 
also included the same measure of white identity as was on the pre-test. Measuring white 
identity again allows me to determine whether the white supremacy condition had any 
effect on individual’s reported levels of identification. Table 7.4 presents the mean values 
of white identity as measured in the post-test, across the two experimental conditions.  
 
Table 7.4 Mean Levels of Identity by Experimental Condition 
  Neutral White supremacy 
Mean 0.513 0.525 
 (0.027) (0.027) 
N 111 105 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: 2013 SSI White Supremacy Study. 
 
The difference between the two means is negligible (.012) and statistically insignificant 
(p=.752). In sum, whites who received the white supremacist version of the story did not 
report significantly different levels of white identity, on average, compared to those who 
read the neutral version of the student union story.  These results indicate that whites do 
not reject – nor adopt, for that matter – a strong white identity when group members’ 
efforts to organize around racial interests are associated with extremism.  
In addition to items ascertaining their emotional reactions and levels of identity, 
subjects also answered a variety of questions regarding their policy preferences. Several 
of these items ascertained the extent to which respondents believed that the federal 
government should do more to help whites and how much they support increasing federal 
spending on aid to members of different racial groups.91 Table 7.5 presents the results of 
                                                            
91 The first question asked whites, “wow much do you think the federal government should be doing to help 
white Americans?” and response options ranged from “nothing at all” to “a great deal.” The federal 
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ordinary least squares regression models, where both attitudes toward the federal 
government helping whites and toward support for increasing federal spending (recoded 
to range from zero to one, with higher values indicating greater support) are regressed on 
the measure of white identity, the indicator variable for the white supremacy condition, 
and the interaction between the two.  
                                                            
spending items were arranged on a grid, and asked respondents “should federal spending on aid to the 
following groups be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?” Whites’ responses were independently 
recorded for whites Americans, black Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Asian Americans.  
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Table 7.5 The Effect of White Identity, by Experimental Condition, on Federal Assistance Programs 
  Fed govt. help whites 
Spending on 
whites 
Spending on 
blacks 
Spending on 
Hispanics 
Spending on 
Asians 
White identity 0.427*** 0.273*** -0.057 0.018 -0.014 
 (0.105) (0.088) (0.092) (0.092) (0.088) 
White supremacist treatment -0.061 -0.053 -0.151* -0.110 -0.132* 
 (0.092) (0.077) (0.081) (0.081) (0.077) 
White identity * White supremacist treatment 0.061 0.070 0.244* 0.107 0.246** 
 (0.148) (0.124) (0.130) (0.131) (0.124) 
Constant 0.254*** 0.357*** 0.508*** 0.480*** 0.479*** 
 (0.066) (0.055) (0.058) (0.058) (0.055) 
      
Observations 218 221 221 220 221 
R-squared 0.154 0.104 0.021 0.018 0.032 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Higher values indicate support for policy. Source: 2013 SSI White Supremacy Study. 
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As the results in Table 7.5 indicate, high white identifiers in the neutral condition 
significantly support both greater federal government assistance for whites and increasing 
federal spending on aid for fellow whites. These individuals do not, however, 
significantly support more, nor less, federal aid for blacks, Hispanics, or Asians.92 
Interestingly, high identifiers in the supremacy condition significantly endorsed 
increasing federal spending on aid for blacks and Asians.93Apparently, when it comes to 
outgroups, the white supremacy condition fostered much more generous and liberal 
positions among white identifiers.   
This pattern of results is borne out much more starkly with respect to attitudes 
toward racialized social welfare programs like Medicaid, welfare, and federal spending 
on efforts to eliminate unemployment. As I argued in Chapter 4, whites’ attitudes toward 
these programs, which through historical elite framing efforts are generally seen by 
whites as benefitting racial or ethnic minorities, are generally unrelated to white racial 
identity. Yet the experimental results here demonstrate that these relationships can be 
fundamentally altered. Table 7.6 provides results from and ordinary least squares 
regression model, which estimates support for these programs among high and low white 
identifiers in the neutral and supremacy conditions. As expected, in the neutral condition, 
white identity is not significantly related to attitudes toward these policies. Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, high identifiers in the white supremacy condition are significantly 
more supportive of these policies. 
  
                                                            
92 This finding arguably lends further support to the notion that white identity is ingroup focused.  
93 The coefficient on support for increasing federal spending for Hispanics among high white identifiers in 
the white supremacy condition is also positive, but the effect is not statistically significant.  
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Table 7.6 The Effect of White Identity, by Experimental Condition,  
on Support for Social Welfare Programs 
  Support for Medicaid 
Support for 
Welfare 
Support for 
eliminating 
unemployment 
White identity -0.078 -0.147 -0.116 
 (0.094) (0.111) (0.094) 
White supremacist treatment -0.198** -0.220** -0.156* 
 (0.082) (0.097) (0.083) 
White identity * White supremacist 
treatment 0.360*** 0.348** 0.319** 
 (0.131) (0.155) (0.133) 
Constant 0.744*** 0.672*** 0.716*** 
 (0.059) (0.070) (0.059) 
    
Observations 217 218 218 
R-squared 0.045 0.025 0.030 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Higher values indicate support for policy. Source: 2013 SSI White Supremacy Study. 
 
Figure 7.2 illustrates these differences more clearly. The bars represent the predicted 
levels of support for each of the social welfare policies among high and low identifiers in 
both the neutral and supremacy conditions. Across each of the three policies in the 
neutral condition, high white identifiers possess lower levels of support than low 
identifiers. This pattern is reversed, however, among subjects who read the supremacy 
article. In this condition, not only do high identifiers become more supportive of these 
policies, but low identifiers actually become less supportive than they were in the neutral 
condition. Thus, the results are being driven both by low identifiers becoming more 
conservative in their positions after viewing the supremacy article, and by high identifiers 
becoming significantly more liberal.94 
                                                            
94 Graphs plotting the marginal effect of white identity in both the neutral and supremacy conditions on 
each policy preference are presented in Appendix D. For Medicaid, the significant effects are being driven 
by both the low and high identifiers (the marginal effect among low and high identifiers is p=.017 in both 
cases). For support for welfare, differences are primarily driven by low idemtifiers (p=.024 among low 
identifiers and p=.109 among high identifiers). Finally, with respect to support for federal spending on 
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Figure 7.2 Attitudes toward Social Welfare Spending by Experimental Condition 
 
Source: 2013 SSI survey (N=334). Predicted values of OLS estimation. All variables coded from 0 to 1. 
 
It is not entirely clear why the supremacy condition drives low identifiers to adopt 
more conservative policy positions. What is clear is that when their group’s collective 
efforts are associated with extremism, high identifiers seem to over-compensate with 
regards to their policy positions by supporting policies that provide assistance to groups 
that would likely be the target of racial hate-groups.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
The analysis presented here provides compelling evidence that, generally, whites 
who identify with their racial group do not have major reservation about expressing their 
identification unless they are asked to do so in the presence of blacks. This particular 
reservation suggests, however, that some white identifiers do worry that the expression of 
their identity may be misinterpreted, or seen as racially insensitive. Despite this reticence, 
white identifiers do not reject their identity when it is associated with white supremacy. 
                                                            
ending unemployment, differences are reflected among both low identifiers (p=.06) and high identifiers 
(p=.018). 
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Reported levels of white identity were not significantly lower among whites who viewed 
the article associating a white interest group with the KKK and Neo-Nazis. Instead, white 
identifiers seem to, in a sense, qualify their identity when it is associated with these 
marginalized groups. Specifically, white identifiers in the supremacy treatment group 
appeared much more racially liberal in their policy preferences, mainly by becoming 
more generous with regards to policies that benefit racial and ethnic minorities. They 
were not significantly less supportive of policies that benefitted their own group, like 
federal spending on whites, but they had much more favorable reactions to federal 
assistant programs like spending on aid to blacks, welfare, and Medicaid.  
In addition to exploring how whites react to associations between white identity 
and supremacy, the experiment here also gauged how whites react to the basic idea of 
white individuals forming groups around shared racial interest. The results make it clear 
that high white identifiers generally viewed such efforts favorably; they responded with 
more enthusiasm than low identifiers to the possibility of the white student union. Such 
results suggest that while efforts like those undertaken by Heimbach may indeed arise 
from an underlying belief in white supremacy, many white American’s do not readily 
associate such activities with supremacy, nor do they see white-only interest groups as 
fundamentally problematic. If anything, many likely endorse the sentiment frequently 
expressed by online commentators in response to the real White Student Union stories – 
the notion that groups specifically for whites are simply equitable and fair in a world 
where racial and ethnic minorities frequently form such organizations.    
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
Through the work presented here, I join the company of a handful of social 
scientists who have turned their attention to the meaning and significance of identity 
among members of dominant groups in recent years (Doane 1997; Knowles and Peng 
2005; McDermott and Samson 2005). Despite decades of arguments and evidence 
suggesting that white identity is a meaningless construct, I provide preliminary evidence 
that when their group’s status is challenged, members of dominant groups—in this case 
white Americans—do in fact embrace their ingroup identity in large numbers and bring it 
to bear on their political preferences. Furthermore, I show that the extent of self-
conscious identification may be captured with explicit survey questions, and that items 
gauging the importance and strength of identity are particularly suitable and effective for 
this purpose.  
More importantly for political science, in this paper, I provide a preponderance of 
evidence that white identity is a meaningful antecedent of political attitudes. The results 
of the over-time ANES analysis suggest that as levels of immigration to the U.S. sharply 
increased, so did the extent to which whites brought their identity to bear on their 
attitudes toward immigration. Furthermore, I show that there is strong evidence linking 
identity to a variety of political evaluations in the present-day. 
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White identity is significantly related to political evaluations in domains where 
whites’ status is threatened– like immigration policy —as well as to policies associated 
with benefitting whites as a group—like Social Security and Medicare. In fact, white 
identity appears to be sufficiently powerful that it was a significant predictors of vote 
choice in the 2012 election. High white identifiers were more likely to report voting for 
Mitt Romney and more likely to believe that Barack Obama favors blacks over whites. 
The results of an experiment in which whites were exposed to information about 
shifts in the racial make-up of the country suggest that white identifiers are responding 
especially negatively to the notion that they will be displaced as a group. High white 
identifiers reported feeling angry and especially afraid after reminders of their impending 
displacement as the majority, indicating that individuals do identify with their racial 
group feel measurable concern over their group’s status.  
I also find evidence that, while a sizeable portion of whites feel comfortable 
identifying with their racial group, some do express reservations. The race-of-interviewer 
effects I present in Chapter 6 suggest that the presence of blacks may suppress whites’ 
proclivity to identify explicitly as white. That said, most white Americans do not readily 
recoil at the notion of their group members organizing collectively to promote their racial 
interests. They did not, for example, reject plans for the formation of a white student 
organization on a college campus. Associating such efforts with the extremism of white 
supremacist hate groups, however, profoundly affects attitudes. Suggesting that white-
only organizations are a manifestation of white supremacy does not cause whites to reject 
their racial identity, but it does dramatically push high identifiers to adopt more liberal 
policy positions. These results suggest that not only can different frames affect the 
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attitudes of white identifiers, but also that most white identifiers do not condone white 
supremacism or see a connection between their racial identity and these hate-groups.  
In demonstrating that white racial identity exists and is politically consequential, I 
offer a revised account of our understanding of racial dynamics in the contemporary U.S.. 
The results here make a strong case for the claim that racial attitudes are multi-
dimensional. When it comes to a number of evaluations and attitudes, predispositions like 
racial resentment, symbolic racism, and ethnocentrism account for our understanding of 
whites’ orientations and behavior. For other attitudes, and under certain conditions, a 
desire to protect group interests seems to explain more accurately whites’ preferences. 
Knowing the difference is crucial for our understanding of political attitudes and racial 
conflict, especially as the racial and ethnic composition of the U.S. continues to change 
dramatically over the next several decades.  
For Further Consideration 
 The research here raises a number of questions important for future consideration. 
For instance, in Chapter 5, I failed to find priming effects when exposing whites to 
threatening information about impending demographic changes. High white identifiers 
responded with more emotional arousal to this information, but exposure did not result in 
a greater propensity to bring racial identity to bear on political evaluations and attitudes.95 
One reasonable explanation for these results is that white identity is chronically salient at 
present, and thus, it is not possible to prime something that is already activated. There is 
certainly evidence for this account; absent the threatening information, white identity 
                                                            
95 Another possibility for the lack of priming results could be that the way population displacement was 
raised in the experiment failed to register effectively among whites. This explanation, however, seems less 
likely given the powerful emotional responses that the experiment generated.  
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predicts a wide range of preferences. Yet I also want to raise the possibility that the threat 
employed in the experiment is too proximate to the identity and outcomes I seek to 
predict. In other words, the associations that demographic changes have made for whites 
between ingroup identity and the range of dependent variables I included on my survey 
may be already fixed across the white population. But perhaps different threats and 
different information frames may make white identity a relevant predictor of attitudes and 
behavior I have yet to consider.  For example, the threat of political displacement, and the 
increased success of non-white candidates across elective office might strengthen the link 
between identity and candidate or party evaluations. Exposure to economic threats from 
racial and ethnic minorities might forge a relationship between white identity and 
attitudes toward taxes or wealth redistribution. Additional experiments could readily test 
these possibilities.  
Another important relationship not considered here is that some racial groups may 
be more threatening to whites than others. Elsewhere, my colleagues and I find that white 
identity is activated when whites believe that their economic success is waning relative to 
blacks, but this relationship does not hold when the threat is framed as originating with 
Hispanics (Hutchings et al. 2010). These results suggest, as others have, that the 
relationship between blacks and whites is unique (Sears and Savalei 2006). Indeed, 
scholars have argued that when groups are ordered hierarchically, blacks are situated at 
the bottom (Kim 2000). Perhaps the historical experiences of conflict between blacks and 
whites, coupled with blacks’ place on the hierarchy, makes the perception of legitimate 
challenges from this group seem most threatening to whites in certain domains.  
Additional studies examining whether the same threats originating from different racial 
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groups have equivalent effects may be a worthwhile focus of future work.   
In addition to expanding the range of threats and testing whether different 
outgroups generate different reactions, future studies should also examine a wider range 
of attitudes and evaluations. Does white identity, for example, strongly predict attitudes 
toward other policies that predominately benefit whites, like abolishing inheritance taxes, 
other efforts to limit wealth redistribution, or eliminating affirmative action programs in 
college admissions? Furthermore, I find in analysis not presented in this dissertation, that 
white identity strongly and consistently predicts support for the death penalty, as well as 
an endorsement of an isolationist foreign policy, a desire to restrict outsourcing of jobs, 
and support for limiting foreign imports. Some of these latter preferences may be tapping 
into ethnocentrism, or they may reflect white Americans anxiety about their loss of power 
globally. Explaining the relationship between this identity and support for the death 
penalty seems more challenging, but important to pursue.  
New efforts to examine the import of white identity also need to consider 
developing multi-item measures of the construct. The racial importance item clearly has 
powerful predictive capacity, but a multi-item measure may prove to be more reliable, 
and it may be necessary in order to capture multiple dimensions of white identity, should 
they exist. One possible approach may be adapting Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) 
collective self-esteem measure, which breaks identity down into four subscales and has 
been used most widely (Crocker et al. 1999; Huddy 2003). 
Results presented throughout this dissertation also hint at the possibility that there 
may be important subsets of high and low identifiers. Croll (2008) argues that white 
identity is comprised of both progressive and defensive identifiers, with the former 
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adopting more racially liberal and tolerant attitudes. Developing a measurement strategy 
to untangle these groups is important. Furthermore, the results in this dissertation tell us 
something important about the low identifiers. While I do provide evidence that low 
white identifiers often seem to adopt racially progressive attitudes, the responses to open-
ended questions—designed to understand more completely why some whites adopt or 
reject a racial identity—suggest that many of these low identifiers are espousing 
colorblind racism.96 In short, these results suggest that understanding the attitudes of low 
identifiers may be just as important as work on high identifiers.   
Finally, the demographic changes threatening whites’ dominance are not limited 
to the U.S. Western Europe is experiencing a similar decline in white birth rates and 
many of these countries have also been subject to decades of increased immigration. Is 
racial identity now salient among white Europeans? Does it similarly predict political 
evaluations? One important difference between the U.S. and Europe is that across the 
pond, viable right-wing political parties can run on explicitly anti-immigration, 
nationalistic political platforms. In Britain, the anti-immigrant UK Independence Party 
recently made significant gains in local elections. The Front National Party topped the 
polls in France. The Danish People’s party won a sizeable victory in Denmark’s 
parliamentary elections (Traynor 2014). As these populist, far-right parties dominate 
                                                            
96 Scholars of race are increasingly turning their attention to whites’ subscription to “colorblindness”, and 
these attitudes were brought into sharp relief with the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision to uphold 
Michigan’s controversial ban on affirmative action in public college admissions.  In her dissenting opinion, 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor rejected the argument put forth by proponents of colorblindness – that race does 
not matter and that raising the issue of race is in itself detrimental. She wrote, “As members of the judiciary 
tasked with intervening to carry out the guarantee of equal protection, we ought not sit back and wish away, 
rather than confront, the racial inequality that exists in our society. It is this view that works harm, by 
perpetuating the facile notion that what makes race matter is acknowledging the simple truth that race does 
matter" (Demby 2014) But Sotomayor’s opinion is likely an unpopular one, and individual support for 
policies on the grounds that they are “race-neutral” are increasingly fueled by political efforts to promote 
“colorblindness” (Bonilla-Silva 2014). 
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European elections, it seems especially worthwhile to consider how racial identity might 
affect public opinion across the European Union.  
The Future of White Identity 
As the population of the U.S. change, and as non-whites continue to achieve 
greater political representation, the importance of white racial identity to politics may 
only grow. This mounting significance has important implications. For one, it may give 
way to greater political polarization and more racialized partisan attachments in the U.S. 
in the coming years. If whites continue to feel threatened, they may move further away 
from the Democratic Party. As Democrats continue to court successfully racial and ethnic 
minorities, however, political observers suggest that the Republican Party must develop a 
new strategy that lures these voters without alienating their already disaffected base of 
white voters (Teixeira and Abramowitz 2013; Walsh 2013b). Of course, Republicans 
may instead continue to focus on primarily wooing whites, leading to greater racial 
polarization in the American party system (Trende 2013). Such efforts will likely call 
greater public attention to the notion that whites are a more cohesive group with shared 
political interests.  
Presently, there is also at least some anecdotal evidence that at the elite level, 
explicit attention to white racial identity is intensifying. Swain and Nieli (2003), for 
example, document the rise of a white nationalist movement, beginning in the 1990s, 
whose proponents are making strides to distance themselves from the image of 1950s and 
1960s-era Ku Klux Klan members. Leaders of this movement include the Yale-educated
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Jared Taylor, who argues in his most recent book that white Americans have racial 
interests they should seek to protect (2011). Others, like conservative political pundit 
Patrick Buchanan explicitly advocate for the rise of “white racial consciousness” as part 
of a collective effort on the part of whites to protect the nation from the effects of 
changing demographics (Buchanan 2011). Talk-show host Rush Limbaugh has suggested 
that President Obama’s administration hates “white people” and that whites are being 
sent to “the back of the bus” (Limbaugh 2009).  
Currently, these elite-driven efforts to appeal directly and explicitly to white 
identity are at the margins of political discourse, but if white identity grows at the mass 
level, this kind of rhetoric may become more mainstream. The combination of these 
factors suggests that over the coming years, race-relations in the U.S. may be increasingly 
defined by whites’ efforts to assert pro-white policies and practices. The research here 
suggests, in part, that these efforts are not necessarily motivated by outgroup animus. 
Rather, conflict may be more about the maintenance of power and privilege. 
Nevertheless, in their efforts to preserve ingroup privileges, white identifiers may, under 
some circumstances, come to embrace policies that discriminate against minorities in 
practice.  
Furthermore, demographic changes in which whites’ relative share of the 
population continues to decrease may lead whites to believe that their relative power as a 
group has waned considerably. They may subsequently come to believe more fully that 
racial equality has been achieved—a point that rings especially true when one considers 
the popular promulgation that a post-racial America had been realized after the election 
of Obama—and may therefore become increasingly opposed to policies aimed at 
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reducing structural inequalities between minorities and whites. Whites also may come to 
believe that their group is actually racially disadvantaged, furthering their support for 
policies that disproportionately benefit their group (Morrison, Plaut, and Ybarra 2010). 
Troublingly, the work here implies that elites have the power to amplify these attitudes 
among whites by reminding them of impending demographic changes, and the efforts of 
political elites like Buchanan and Limbaugh suggest that these strategies are already 
being employed.  
The results also suggest, however, that not all whites will respond negatively to 
population changes, nor do all whites identify strongly with their racial group. In fact, it 
appears that low white identifiers are actually quite supportive of population changes, and 
additional work needs to be done in order to understand more fully the political 
preferences and behavior of both low and high white identifiers. Furthermore, other 
research has shown that when members of dominant groups recognize that their group is 
somehow illegitimately privileged, they are more likely to support practices that reduce 
their relative power (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Schiffhauer 2007). Thus, many whites 
may not respond with anger and fear to threats to whites’ status.  
Another implication of this project is that elites have the power to quell conflict 
by reframing policies as non-threatening to group status. Furthermore, work by scholars 
like Gaertner and colleagues (1997), under the umbrella of aversive racism, proposes that 
intergroup bias can be reduced by efforts to re-categorize groups under single, 
superordinate identities (see also Sherif (1958) and Transue (2007)). Some work, for 
instance, has shown that when whites prioritize an American identity over a more 
inclusive “Caucasian” identity, they tend to be more amenable to policies designed to 
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benefit blacks (H. Smith and Tyler 1996). Thus, redirecting ingroup favoritism may 
prove to be a powerful strategy for addressing racial biases resulting from whites’ 
ingroup identities.  
 I have provided evidence that white identity is now chronically salient, and thus, 
white identity is likely to play an important role in U.S. politics for the foreseeable future. 
But is a desire to protect group interests likely to define whites’ race-related political 
attitudes in the very long-term? Probably not. As Sears and Savalei suggest, “the new 
immigrant groups may well enter the United States as somewhat alien and therefore 
stigmatized minority groups, but in the long run are not likely to face the same 
impermeable color line as blacks” (2006, p. 917) Many of these groups, just as the Irish 
and Italians immigrants of the early 20th century, will likely be subsumed under the 
umbrella of whiteness. When this process is complete, other forms of racial attitudes may 
more strongly govern opinion. The process of assimilation is an inter-generational one, 
however, and it still may forever change the now predominantly Anglo-Protestant nature 
of American culture. Therefore, instead of seeing this identity as only temporary, we 
should expect its salience to wax and wane over time as whites’ dominance fluctuates. 
Thus, the import of white identity in the coming decades cannot be ignored. 
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Appendix A: Full Wording of Survey Questions 
 
Survey Sampling International (SSI) Study 
 
Closeness 
People have a lot of different feelings toward a variety of groups in society. We would 
like to get a sense of how you feel toward different groups. Now, you'll see a list of 
groups in American society. Indicate how close you feel to whites in your ideas, interests, 
and feelings about things. 
1. Not at all close 
2. A little close 
3. Moderately close 
4. Very close 
5. Extremely close 
 
White Identity  
As you know, people have different identities. They think of themselves as black, white, 
etc. We would like to ask you how you think about yourself. How important to you is 
your identity as a white person? Would you say that it is extremely important, very 
important, moderately important, a little important, or not at all important? 
1. Extremely important 
2. Very important 
3. Moderately important 
4. A little important 
5. Not at all important 
 
How strongly do you identify with other white people? Do you identify: extremely 
strongly, very strongly, moderately strongly, not very strongly, or not at all strongly? 
1. Extremely strongly 
2. Very strongly 
3. Moderately strongly 
4. Not very strongly 
5. Not at all strongly 
 
 
Linked fate 
Do you think that what happens generally to white people in this country will have 
something to do with what happens in your life? 
1. Yes 
2. No
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Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much? 
1. A lot 
2. Some 
3. Not very much 
 
American Identity 
How important to you is your identity as an American?  Would you say that it is 
extremely important, very important, moderately important, a little important, or not at all 
important? 
1. Extremely important  
2. Very important  
3. Moderately important  
4. A little important  
5. Not at all important  
 
Group Consciousness 
How important is it that whites work together to improve the position of their group? 
1. Extremely important 
2. Very important 
3. Moderately important 
4. A little important 
5. Not important at all 
 
How important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites? 
1. Extremely important 
2. Very Important 
3. Moderately important 
4. A little important 
5. Not at all important 
 
How likely is it that many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring 
minorities instead? 
1. Extremely likely 
2. Very likely 
3. Moderately likely 
4. Slightly likely 
5. Not likely at all 
 
How likely is it that many whites are not accepted to some colleges because these 
colleges are admitting minorities instead? 
1. Extremely likely 
2. Very likely 
3. Moderately likely 
4. Slightly likely 
5. Not likely at all 
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Social Dominance Orientation  
The next statements are about the way different people view basic values in American 
society. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, 
or strongly disagree with each of the following statements. 
We should try to get ahead by any means necessary. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Somewhat agree 
4. Neither agree nor disagree 
5. Somewhat disagree 
6. Disagree 
7. Strongly disagree 
 
Sometimes war is necessary to put other nations in their place. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Somewhat agree 
4. Neither agree nor disagree 
5. Somewhat disagree 
6. Disagree 
7. Strongly disagree 
 
Winning is more important than how the game is played. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Somewhat agree 
4. Neither agree nor disagree 
5. Somewhat disagree 
6. Disagree 
7. Strongly disagree 
 
Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Somewhat agree 
4. Neither agree nor disagree 
5. Somewhat disagree 
6. Disagree 
7. Strongly disagree 
 
 
Feeling Thermometer Evaluation 
We would like to get your feelings about some groups in American society. When you 
see the name of a person or group, please rate it with what we call a feeling thermometer 
by moving the mouse pointer and clicking on the thermometer on a number from 0 to 
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100. Ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that you don't feel favorably toward the 
person or group and that you don't care too much for that person or group; ratings 
between 51 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorably and warm toward the person or 
group. If you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward a person or group you would 
rate them at 50 degrees. 
 
Using the feeling thermometer below, how do you feel toward whites? 
 
 
 
White Guilt 
Please tell us how often you think or feel the following: 
 
How often do you feel guilty about the benefits and privileges that you receive as a white 
American? 
1. Extremely often 
2. Very often 
3. Somewhat often 
4. Not very often 
5. Never 
 
How often do you feel guilty about the past and present social inequality of black 
Americans (i.e., slavery, poverty)? 
1. Extremely often 
2. Very often 
3. Somewhat often 
4. Not very often 
5. Never 
 
How often do you feel guilty about social inequality between white and black 
Americans? 
1. Extremely often 
2. Very often 
3. Somewhat often 
4. Not very often 
5. Never 
 
When you think about the history of this country and the treatment of different non-white 
groups, how often do you feel guilty because you are white? 
1. Extremely often 
2. Very often 
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3. Somewhat often 
4. Not very often 
5. Never 
 
 
 
White Privilege 
Please indicate the extent to which you think or feel the following: 
 
To what extent does your status as a white person grant you unearned privileges in 
today's society? 
1. A great deal 
2. A lot 
3. A moderate amount 
4. A little 
5. None at all  
 
To what extent do you feel that white people have benefits or privileges due to their race? 
1. A great deal 
2. A lot 
3. A moderate amount 
4. A little 
5. None at all  
 
To what extent does having white skin in the United States open doors for whites during 
their everyday lives? 
1. A great deal 
2. A lot 
3. A moderate amount 
4. A little 
5. None at all  
 
To what extent do you feel that having white skin is an asset to you in your everyday life? 
1. A great deal 
2. A lot 
3. A moderate amount 
4. A little 
5. None at all  
 
To what extent do white Americans have certain advantages that minorities do not have 
in this society? 
1. A great deal 
2. A lot 
3. A moderate amount 
4. A little 
5. None at all  
 208 
 
 
 
Authoritarianism 
Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every 
person thinks that some are more important than others. We are going to show you pairs 
of desirable qualities. Please say which items are more important for children to have: 
Obedience or self-reliance 
1. Obedience 
2. Self-reliance 
 
Independence or respect for elders 
1. Independence 
2. Respect for elders 
 
Curiosity or good manners 
1. Curiosity 
2. Good manners 
 
Considerate or well behaved 
1. Considerate 
2. Well behaved 
 
 
Limited Government  
Next, we are going to ask you to choose which of two statements you see comes closer to 
your own opinion. You might agree to some extent with both, but we want to know 
which one is closer to your own views. 
 
1. The main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it has 
gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves;  
2. Government has become bigger because the problems we face have become 
bigger. 
 
1. Government is bigger because it's involved in things people should handle 
themselves 
2. Government is bigger because the problems we face have become bigger 
 
1. The less government, the better 
2. There are more things that government should be doing 
 
 
Racial Resentment  
Please tell us whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or 
strongly disagree with the following statements: 
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Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their 
way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Somewhat agree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Somewhat agree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
It is really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try 
harder they could be just as well off as 
Whites. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Somewhat agree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
Generations of discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to 
work their way out of the lower class. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Somewhat agree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
 
Alienation  
Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, somewhat agree, neither agree or 
disagree, somewhat disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with following statements. 
 
American society owes white people a better chance in life than they currently have. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Somewhat agree 
4. Neither agree nor disagree 
5. Somewhat disagree 
6. Disagree 
7. Strongly disagree 
 
American society has provided white people a fair opportunity to get ahead in life. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Somewhat agree 
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4. Neither agree nor disagree 
5. Somewhat disagree 
6. Disagree 
7. Strongly disagree 
 
 
 
Egalitarianism 
Please tell us the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
 
If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Somewhat agree 
4. Neither agree nor disagree 
5. Somewhat disagree 
6. Disagree 
7. Strongly disagree 
 
Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal 
opportunity to succeed. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Somewhat agree 
4. Neither agree nor disagree 
5. Somewhat disagree 
6. Disagree 
7. Strongly disagree 
 
This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Somewhat agree 
4. Neither agree nor disagree 
5. Somewhat disagree 
6. Disagree 
7. Strongly disagree 
 
 
 
Party ID 
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a DEMOCRAT, a 
REPUBLICAN, an INDEPENDENT, or what?  
1. Democrat 
2. Republican 
3. Independent 
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4. No preference 
5. Other party: specify 
 
[If select Democrat] Would you call yourself a STRONG Democrat or a NOT VERY 
STRONG Democrat? 
1. Strong 
2. Not very strong 
 
[If select Republican] Would you call yourself a STRONG Republican or a NOT VERY 
STRONG Republican? 
1. Strong 
2. Not very strong 
 
[If select Independent] Do you think of yourself as CLOSER to the Republican Party or 
the Democratic Party? 
1. Closer to the Republican 
2. Closer to the Democratic 
3. Neither 
 
 
Ideology 
In general, do you think of yourself as... 
1. Extremely liberal 
2. Liberal 
3. Slightly liberal 
4. Moderate, middle of the road 
5. Slightly Conservative 
6. Conservative 
7. Extremely Conservative 
8. I haven't thought much about this 
 
 
Political Interest and Engagement  
How interested are you in information about what's going on in government and politics? 
1. Extremely interested 
2. Very interested 
3. Moderately interested 
4. Slightly interested 
5. Not at all interested 
 
 
Political Knowledge 
Next are some questions to help us see how much information about politics gets out to 
the public. Many people don’t know the answers to these questions, but we would be 
grateful if you would please answer every question even if you are not sure what the right 
answer is.  
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What job or political office is held by John Boehner? 
1. U.S. Secretary of Defense 
2. Vice President of the United States 
3. Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives 
4. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
5. None of these 
Which party currently has the majority of the seats in the U.S. Senate? 
1. Republicans 
2. Democrats 
3. Neither 
 
What is the job or political office held by John Roberts? 
1. U.S. Secretary of Defense 
2. Vice President of the United States 
3. Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives 
4. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
5. None of these 
 
 
Personal Economic Evaluations  
We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say 
that you and your family living with you are better off, neither better off nor worse off, or 
worse off financially than you were a year ago? 
1. Better off  
2. Neither better off nor worse off  
3. Worse off  
 
 
National Economic Evaluations 
Now thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that over the 
past year the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse? 
1. Better off  
2. Neither better off nor worse off  
3. Worse off  
 
 
Gender  
Please indicate your gender. 
1. Male 
2. Female 
 
 
Education  
Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed. 
1. No formal education   
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2. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th grade    
3. 5th or 6th grade   
4. 7th or 8th grade   
5. 9th grade   
6. 10th grade   
7. 11th grade   
8. 12th grade NO DIPLOMA   
9. High School Graduate - High school diploma   
10. Some college, no degree   
11. Associate Degree   
12. Bachelors Degree   
13. Masters Degree   
14. Professional or Doctorate Degree   
 
 
Income 
Please indicate your yearly household income. 
1. Less than $5,000   
2. $5,000 to $7,000    
3. $7,500 to $9,999   
4. $10,000 to $12,499   
5. $12,500 to $14,999   
6. $15,000 to $19,999   
7. $20,000 to $24,999   
8. $25,000 to $29,999   
9. $30,000 to $34,999   
10. $35,000 to $39,999   
11. $40,000 to $49,999   
12. $50,000 to $59,999   
13. $60,000 to $74,999   
14. $75,000 to $84,999   
15. $85,000 to $99,999   
16. $100,000 to $124,999  
17. $125,000 to $149,999  
18. $150,000 to $174,999  
19. $175,000 or more  
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Employment Status  
We would like to know if you are working now, temporarily laid off, Unemployed, 
retired, permanently disabled, a homemaker, student, or something else? 
1. Working now   
2. Temporarily laid off    
3. Unemployed   
4. Retired   
5. Permanently disabled   
6. Homemaker   
7. Student   
8. Something else (Please specify)  
 
 
Emotions 
Please let us know if the news story you read made you feel any of the following 
emotions. Did the story make you feel...  
 Anxious?      
 Proud?     
 Angry?     
 Hopeful?      
 Afraid?    
 Excited?     
 Happy?    
 Depressed?    
 Sad?     
 Uneasy?    
 Disgusted?      
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
 
Presidential Approval 
Do you approve, disapprove, or neither approve nor disapprove of the way Barack 
Obama is handling his job as president? 
1. Approve extremely strongly   
2. Approve moderately strongly    
3. Approve slightly strongly   
4. Neither approve nor disapprove   
5. Disapprove slightly strongly   
6. Disapprove moderately strongly   
7. Disapprove extremely strongly   
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Group Obama Favors  
In general, do you think the policies of the Obama administration favor whites over 
blacks, favor blacks over whites, or do they treat both groups the same? 
1. Favors whites over blacks   
2. Favors blacks over whites    
3. Both groups treated the same   
 
 
Neighborhood Segregation 
Which of these statements would you agree with:  
1. White people have a right to keep black people out of their neighborhoods if they 
want to.  
2. Black people have a right to live wherever they can afford to, just like anybody 
else.  
 
Affirmative Action  
Some people say that because of past discrimination it is sometimes necessary for 
colleges and universities to reserve openings for black students. Others oppose quotas 
because they say it discriminates against whites. What about your opinion—do you 
support or oppose quotas to admit black students? 
1. Support a great deal   
2. Support a moderate amount    
3. Support a little   
4. Neither support nor oppose   
5. Oppose a little   
6. Oppose a moderate amount   
7. Oppose a great deal   
 
Some people say that because of past discrimination it is sometimes necessary for 
colleges and universities to reserve openings for black students. Others oppose quotas 
because they say quotas give blacks advantages they haven't earned. What about your 
opinion--do you support or oppose quotas to admit black students?  
1. Support a great deal   
2. Support a moderate amount    
3. Support a little   
4. Neither support nor oppose   
5. Oppose a little   
6. Oppose a moderate amount   
7. Oppose a great deal   
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Should federal spending on aid to whites be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?  
1. Increased a great deal 
2. Increased a moderate amount 
3. Increased a little 
4. Kept about the same 
5. Decreased a little 
6. Decreased a moderate amount 
7. Decreased a great deal  
8. Cut out entirely 
 
Some people say the following things are important for being truly American. Others say 
they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is? 
 To have been born in America   
 To have lived in America for most of one's life    
 To be a Christian   
 To be able to speak English   
 To have American citizenship   
 To feel American   
 To respect America's political institutions and laws   
 To have American ancestry   
 To be white   
  
1. Not at all important 
2. A little important 
3. Moderately important 
4. Very important 
5. Extremely important  
 
 
Support for Medicare 
Do you support or oppose expanding the Medicare program to pay for nursing home care 
and long hospital stays for the elderly? 
1. Support a great deal   
2. Support a moderate amount    
3. Support a little   
4. Neither support nor oppose   
5. Oppose a little   
6. Oppose a moderate amount   
7. Oppose a great deal   
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Support for Welfare 
Do you support or oppose welfare programs? 
1. Support a great deal   
2. Support a moderate amount    
3. Support a little   
4. Neither support nor oppose   
5. Oppose a little   
6. Oppose a moderate amount   
7. Oppose a great deal   
 
 
Support for Social Security  
Should federal spending on Social Security be increased, decreased, or kept about the 
same? 
1. Increased a great deal   
2. Increased a moderate amount    
3. Increased a little   
4. Kept about the same   
5. Decreased a little   
6. Decreased a moderate amount   
7. Decreased a great deal   
8. Cut out entirely   
 
 
 
Immigration Attitudes 
Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to 
come to the United States to live should be increased, decreased, or left the same as it is 
now? 
1. Increased a great deal   
2. Increased a moderate amount    
3. Increased a little   
4. Left the same as it is now   
5. Decreased a little   
6. Decreased a moderate amount   
7. Decreased a great deal   
 
Please tell us how likely you think each of the following are when it comes to new 
immigrants to America. How likely is it that new immigrants to America will... 
 
Take jobs away from American citizens?  
1. Extremely likely 
2. Very likely 
3. Moderately likely 
4. Slightly likely 
5. Not likely at all 
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Change American traditions and values?  
1. Extremely likely 
2. Very likely 
3. Moderately likely 
4. Slightly likely 
5. Not likely at all 
 
Quickly blend into American society? 
1. Extremely likely 
2. Very likely 
3. Moderately likely 
4. Slightly likely 
5. Not likely at all 
 
 
Group Conflict  
For the next few questions please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or 
strongly disagree. 
 
More good jobs for Hispanics mean fewer good jobs for members of other groups. 
1. Strongly agree   
2. Agree    
3. Disagree   
4. Strongly disagree   
The more influence Hispanics have in politics, the less influence members of other 
groups will have in politics. 
1. Strongly agree   
2. Agree    
3. Disagree   
4. Strongly disagree   
 
More good jobs for blacks mean fewer good jobs for members of other groups. 
1. Strongly agree   
2. Agree    
3. Disagree   
4. Strongly disagree   
 
The more influence blacks have in politics, the less influence members of other groups 
will have in politics. 
1. Strongly agree   
2. Agree    
3. Disagree   
4. Strongly disagree   
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Concern over Ethnic Composition of U.S. 
How worried are you that the changing ethnic makeup of the United States will make it 
hard to maintain the American way of life? Would you say that you are very worried, 
somewhat worried, or not at all worried about this? 
1. Extremely worried   
2. Very Worried    
3. Moderately worried   
4. A little worried   
5. Not at all worried   
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Knowledge Networks Study  
 
 
Linked Fate 
Do you think what happens to whites will affect your life? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much at all?  
1. A lot 
2. Some 
3. Not very much at all  
 
 
White Identity 
How important to you is your identity as a white person? Would you say that it is very 
important, somewhat important, not very important, or not at all important? 
1. Very important  
2. Somewhat important 
3. Not very important 
4. Not at all important  
 
 
Closeness 
Now we have some more questions about different groups in society.  How close do you 
feel to [whites] in your ideas, interests, and feelings about things?  
1. Very close 
2. Fairly close 
3. Not too close 
4. Not at all close  
 
 
American Identity 
Please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or 
strongly disagree with the following statement. 
 
Being an American is a very important part of how I see myself. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Somewhat agree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
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Personal Economic Evaluations  
We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say 
that you and your family living with you are better off, neither better off nor worse off, or 
worse off financially than you were a year ago? 
1. Better off 
2. Neither better off nor worse off 
3. Worse off 
 
 
Racial Resentment  
Below are several additional statements.  Please tell us whether you strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, or strongly disagree with each statement. 
 
Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their 
way up.  Blacks should do the same without any special favors. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
It is really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try 
harder they could be just as well off as Whites. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
Generations of discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to 
work their way out of the lower class. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
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Group Conflict 
For the next few questions please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or 
strongly disagree. 
 
 
More good jobs for blacks/Hispanics mean fewer good jobs for members of other groups. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
The more influence blacks/Hispanics have in politics, the less influence members of other 
groups will have in politics. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
As more good housing and neighborhoods go to blacks/Hispanics, there will be fewer 
good houses and neighborhoods for members of other groups. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
Many blacks/Hispanics have been trying to get ahead economically at the expense of 
other groups.  
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
 
Group Influence 
Next, we would like you to answer some questions about groups in America.  Some 
people think that certain groups have too much influence in American life and politics, 
while others feel that they don't have enough influence. You will be presented with a list 
of groups and for each one please tell us whether that group has too much influence, just 
about the right amount of influence, or too little influence.   
Blacks / Hispanics  
1. Too much influence  
2. Just about the right amount of influence 
3. Too little influence 
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Affirmative Action  
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose affirmative action policies for Blacks 
in the workplace?  
1. Favor 
2. Neither favor nor oppose  
3. Oppose 
Do you strongly [FAVOR/OPPOSE] or not strongly [FAVOR/OPPOSE] affirmative action 
policies for Blacks in the workplace? 
1. Strongly 
2. Not strongly 
 
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose affirmative action policies for Blacks 
in colleges and universities?  
1. Favor 
2. Neither favor nor oppose  
3. Oppose 
  
Do you strongly [FAVOR/OPPOSE] or not strongly [FAVOR/OPPOSE] affirmative action 
policies for Blacks in colleges and universities? 
1. Strongly 
2. Not strongly 
 
 
Immigration Attitudes 
Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following 
statements?  
 
Immigrants make America more open to new ideas and cultures. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
Immigrants take jobs away from American citizens. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
Support for Welfare 
Do you think federal spending on welfare programs should be increased, decreased, or 
kept about the same?  
1. Increased 
2. Kept about the same 
3. Decreased 
 224 
 
 
Do you think federal spending on welfare programs should be [INCREASED/DECREASED] 
a great deal, a moderate amount, or a little? 
1. A great deal 
2. A moderate amount 
3. A little 
 
Support for Social Security  
Do you think federal spending on Social Security should be increased, decreased, or kept 
about the same? 
1. Increased 
2. Kept about the same 
3. Decreased 
 
Do you think federal spending on Social Security should be [INCREASED/DECREASED]  a 
great deal, a moderate amount, or a little? 
1. A great deal 
2. A moderate amount 
3. A little 
 
 
Concern about Ethnic Composition of U.S. 
How worried are you that the changing ethnic makeup of the United States will make it 
hard to maintain the American way of life?  Would you say that you are very worried, 
somewhat worried, or not at all worried about this? 
1. Very worried 
2. Somewhat worried 
3. Not at all worried 
 
 
Presidential Approval 
Do you approve, disapprove, or neither approve nor disapprove of the way Barack 
Obama is handling his job as president? 
1. Approve 
2. Neither approve nor disapprove 
3. Disapprove 
 
 
Obama Favors Groups 
In general, do you think the policies of the Obama administration favor Whites over 
Blacks, favor Blacks over Whites, or do they treat both groups the same? 
1. Favors Whites over Blacks 
2. Both groups treated the same 
3. Favors Blacks over Whites 
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Alienation  
Please tell us whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the 
following statements. 
 
American society owes white people a better chance in life than we currently have. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
American society has provided white people a fair opportunity to get ahead in life. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
American society just hasn’t dealt fairly white people. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Disagree 
4. Strongly disagree  
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Appendix B: Population Displacement Experiment Conditions 
Control 
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Treatment 1: Population Displacement Condition 
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Treatment 2: Population Maintenance Condition 
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Appendix C: White Identity and Extremism Experiment Conditions 
Control 
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Treatment: White-Supremacist Condition 
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Appendix D: Complete Version of In-text Tables 
 
Table D1 The Relationship between Personality Traits, Demographics, and 
White Identity 
 ANES Face-to-
Face 
ANES 
Internet KN SSI 
     
Extraversion 
0.206** 0.076*   
(0.083) (0.042)   
Agreeableness 
0.020 -0.000   
(0.114) (0.054)   
Conscientiousness 
-0.005 0.073   
(0.105) (0.053)   
Emotional Stability 
-0.350*** -0.064   
(0.092) (0.046)   
Openness to Experience 
0.126 -0.043   
(0.111) (0.053)   
Authoritarianism 
0.036** 0.100***  0.038 
(0.017) (0.029)  (0.028) 
Social Dominance 
   0.507*** 
   (0.037) 
Age 
0.164** 0.110*** 0.098* 0.072** 
(0.072) (0.039) (0.052) (0.036) 
Education 
-0.096 -0.187*** -0.407*** -0.084 
(0.114) (0.067) (0.093) (0.076) 
Female 
0.054 -0.002 -0.013 0.022 
(0.034) (0.018) (0.025) (0.017) 
Income 
-0.088 0.030 0.030 0.014 
(0.064) (0.030) (0.059) (0.040) 
Constant 
0.441*** 0.424*** 0.853*** 0.391*** 
(0.121) (0.073) (0.073) (0.062) 
Observations 502   2288  752 780 
R-squared 0.087 0.039 0.048 0.223 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All data, except SSI, ae 
weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. Source: 2010 
Knowledge Networks study, 2012 ANES, 2013 Survey Sampling International study. 
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Table D2.1 Support for Increasing Levels of Immigration to the United States 
 1992 1994 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
White Feeling Thermometer -0.240*** -0.080 -0.172** -0.436*** -0.375*** -0.567*** -0.342*** 
(0.054) (0.056) (0.075) (0.112) (0.084) (0.078) (0.083) 
Hispanic Feeling Thermometer 0.142** 0.175*** 0.213** 0.090 0.106 0.233** 0.192* 
(0.070) (0.062) (0.096) (0.134) (0.103) (0.097) (0.102) 
Black Feeling Thermometer 0.215*** 0.070 0.068 0.279* 0.300*** 0.054 -0.048 
(0.064) (0.066) (0.093) (0.145) (0.098) (0.100) (0.127) 
Asian Feeling Thermometer 0.207***   0.083 0.126 0.517*** 0.262** 
(0.070)   (0.160) (0.110) (0.104) (0.103) 
Positive National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.035 0.073*** 0.058 0.011 0.001 0.101 -0.098* 
(0.031) (0.026) (0.036) (0.047) (0.038) (0.069) (0.058) 
Positive Personal Financial 
Evaluations 
0.006 -0.018 0.047 -0.045 -0.028 0.082*** -0.014 
(0.023) (0.025) (0.030) (0.045) (0.036) (0.031) (0.043) 
Education 
 
0.110*** 0.176*** 0.145*** 0.170* 0.312*** 0.224*** 0.136*** 
(0.036) (0.042) (0.044) (0.088) (0.058) (0.059) (0.044) 
Age 
 
0.115** 0.156*** 0.058 0.169** -0.001 0.000 0.037 
(0.045) (0.051) (0.052) (0.083) (0.076) (0.069) (0.043) 
Income 
 
0.020 -0.015 -0.023 0.245*** 0.000 -0.057 0.097** 
(0.037) (0.040) (0.045) (0.068) (0.051) (0.059) (0.043) 
Party ID (1=Republican) 
 
0.063** 0.011 -0.065 0.046 0.009 0.038 -0.024 
(0.029) (0.036) (0.042) (0.059) (0.053) (0.055) (0.059) 
Ideology (1=conservative) -0.134*** -0.060 -0.106 -0.259*** -0.130* -0.130* -0.074 
(0.046) (0.057) (0.066) (0.088) (0.078) (0.075) (0.079) 
Female 
 
0.000 -0.000 0.007 0.029 -0.063** -0.030 -0.060** 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.034) (0.028) (0.027) (0.024) 
Constant 0.037 -0.040 0.106 0.184 0.143 0.174* 0.394*** 
(0.059) (0.071) (0.084) (0.128) (0.099) (0.101) (0.102) 
        
Observations 1126 944 829 342 521 745 554 
R-squared 0.109 0.083 0.061 0.206 0.160 0.201 0.185 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 2000 sample includes only face-to-face 
respondents. Data are weighted. Source: ANES Cumulative File. 
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Table D2.2a Knowledge Networks Opposition to Immigration  
.  Decrease number of 
immigrants 
 Importance of 
immigration level 
issue 
 Increase federal 
spending on border 
security 
White identity  0.147***  0.152***  -0.107*** 
 (0.050)  (0.039)  (0.029) 
Hispanic Feeling 
Thermometer 
 -0.365***  -0.132**  0.191*** 
 (0.057)  (0.054)  (0.036) 
Age  0.219***  0.065  -0.130*** 
 (0.061)  (0.049)  (0.040) 
Education  -0.293***  -0.014  0.175*** 
 (0.088)  (0.092)  (0.064) 
Party ID (1=Republican)  0.113**  0.008  -0.047 
 (0.053)  (0.041)  (0.037) 
Ideology (1=conservative)  0.036  0.085  -0.232*** 
 (0.077)  (0.059)  (0.057) 
Female  -0.020  -0.022  0.043** 
 (0.028)  (0.022)  (0.018) 
Income  -0.072  -0.059  0.018 
 (0.064)  (0.044)  (0.042) 
Positive personal financial 
outlook 
 0.074  -0.057  0.030 
 (0.062)  (0.054)  (0.040) 
Treatment 2  -0.037  -0.009  0.016 
 (0.050)  (0.041)  (0.036) 
Treatment 3  -0.000  -0.017  -0.027 
 (0.046)  (0.036)  (0.031) 
Treatment 4  0.047  0.007  -0.038 
 (0.050)  (0.038)  (0.032) 
Treatment 5  0.041  -0.008  -0.032 
 (0.046)  (0.036)  (0.030) 
Treatment 12  0.076  -0.069  0.022 
 (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.051) 
Treatment 13  0.018  0.035  -0.048 
 (0.080)  (0.043)  (0.047) 
Treatment 14  0.008  0.027  -0.005 
 (0.084)  (0.072)  (0.052) 
Treatment 15  -0.031  0.111**  0.003 
 (0.065)  (0.053)  (0.042) 
Treatment 16  0.041  -0.016  -0.096** 
 (0.065)  (0.049)  (0.049) 
Constant  0.806***  0.491***  0.235*** 
 (0.092)  (0.095)  (0.058) 
Observations  723 728 729 
R-squared  0.207 0.098 0.252 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Data are 
weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. Source: 
Knowledge Networks 2010 Survey. 
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Table D2.2b Knowledge Network Opposition to Immigration  
. Immigrants make 
America more open to 
new ideas & culture 
(strongly disagree) 
 Immigrants take jobs 
away from American 
citizens (strongly agree) 
 Worried about 
ethnic change 
White identity 0.192*** 0.255***  0.340*** 
 (0.036) (0.041)  (0.051) 
Hispanic Feeling Thermometer -0.392*** -0.358***  -0.218*** 
 (0.049) (0.051)  (0.067) 
Age 0.067 -0.037  0.024 
 (0.050) (0.042)  (0.059) 
Education -0.202*** -0.275***  -0.458*** 
 (0.072) (0.070)  (0.098) 
Party ID (1=Republican) 0.010 0.021  0.039 
 (0.039) (0.041)  (0.055) 
Ideology (1=conservative) 0.086 0.117*  0.249*** 
 (0.058) (0.060)  (0.073) 
Female 0.007 0.015  0.031 
 (0.022) (0.021)  (0.027) 
Income -0.020 -0.093*  0.084 
 (0.047) (0.049)  (0.057) 
Positive personal financial outlook -0.056 0.007  -0.120* 
 (0.050) (0.055)  (0.065) 
Treatment 2 -0.014 0.010  -0.007 
 (0.039) (0.038)  (0.047) 
Treatment 3 -0.055 0.016  0.030 
 (0.041) (0.040)  (0.049) 
Treatment 4 -0.000 0.036  0.077* 
 (0.037) (0.036)  (0.045) 
Treatment 5 -0.017 0.012  -0.002 
 (0.037) (0.036)  (0.048) 
Treatment 12 0.009 0.087*  0.035 
 (0.038) (0.045)  (0.074) 
Treatment 13 0.041 0.030  0.075 
 (0.066) (0.050)  (0.059) 
Treatment 14 -0.070 0.009  -0.115 
 (0.062) (0.057)  (0.079) 
Treatment 15 -0.047 0.099**  0.045 
 (0.049) (0.040)  (0.062) 
Treatment 16 -0.067 0.022  -0.055 
 (0.054) (0.072)  (0.068) 
Constant 0.595*** 0.761***  0.443*** 
 (0.075) (0.071)  (0.099) 
Observations 718 722 728 
R-squared 0.266 0.303 0.271 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Data are weighted.  
All variables are coded 0 to 1. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. Source: Knowledge Networks 2010 Survey 
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Table D2.3 ANES Opposition to Immigration 
 Decrease 
number of 
immigrants  
Immigrants 
take jobs away 
from American 
citizens 
(strongly 
agree) 
 
Support law 
checking 
immigration 
status  
Illegal 
immigrant 
feeling 
thermometer 
White identity 0.071  0.120***  -0.033  0.093** 
(0.052)  (0.038)  (0.032)  (0.045) 
Hispanic Feeling 
Thermometer 
-0.250***  -0.172***  0.381***  -0.347*** 
(0.086)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.063) 
Age -0.020  -0.040  0.058  -0.162*** 
(0.072)  (0.045)  (0.041)  (0.054) 
Education -0.175**  -0.143***  0.037  -0.127** 
(0.072)  (0.045)  (0.040)  (0.053) 
Party ID 
(1=Republican) 
0.141*  -0.026  -0.069  -0.013 
(0.077)  (0.058)  (0.044)  (0.063) 
Ideology 
(1=conservative) 
0.401***  0.105  -0.132*  0.232*** 
(0.117)  (0.084)  (0.070)  (0.086) 
Female 0.037  0.062**  0.035*  0.023 
(0.036)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.030) 
Income -0.084  -0.096**  0.026  -0.007 
(0.079)  (0.043)  (0.039)  (0.056) 
Limited government 0.146**  -0.046  -0.030  -0.040 
(0.060)  (0.038)  (0.032)  (0.045) 
Positive personal 
financial outlook 
-0.098  0.023  0.041  -0.039 
(0.065)  (0.044)  (0.037)  (0.055) 
Positive national 
financial outlook 
-0.046  -0.140**  -0.033  -0.105 
(0.081)  (0.058)  (0.050)  (0.069) 
Constant 0.625***  0.802***  0.162***  0.737*** 
(0.128)  (0.070)  (0.058)  (0.089) 
Observations 
566 555 576 571 
R-squared 0.287  0.167  0.220  0.159 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Data are weighted.  
All variables are coded 0 to 1. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed.  
Source: ANES Cumulative Data File 
 236 
 
 
Table D2.4. SSI Opposition to Immigration 
 Decrease 
number of 
immigrants 
 Increase 
federal 
spending on 
border 
security 
 Immigrants change 
American culture 
and values 
(extremely likely) 
 Immigrants take 
jobs away from 
American 
citizens (strongly 
agree) 
White identity 0.153**  0.178***  0.284***  0.353*** 
(0.060)  (0.048)  (0.073)  (0.071) 
Hispanic Feeling 
Thermometer -0.134** 
 0.006  -0.063  -0.171** 
(0.061)  (0.049)  (0.074)  (0.072) 
Age 0.238***  0.186***  0.033  0.022 
(0.068)  (0.055)  (0.083)  (0.080) 
Education -0.140  -0.061  0.120  -0.238 
(0.136)  (0.110)  (0.165)  (0.161) 
Party ID 
(1=Republican) -0.054 
 0.033  0.155**  -0.047 
(0.060)  (0.048)  (0.072)  (0.070) 
Ideology 
(1=conservative) 0.124* 
 0.105*  -0.097  0.108 
(0.070)  (0.056)  (0.085)  (0.083) 
Female 0.060**  -0.012  -0.060  0.005 
(0.030)  (0.025)  (0.037)  (0.036) 
Income -0.032  0.004  -0.074  -0.043 
(0.073)  (0.059)  (0.088)  (0.086) 
Limited 
government -0.025 
 -0.041  -0.021  -0.099** 
(0.039)  (0.032)  (0.048)  (0.047) 
Positive personal 
financial outlook 0.000 
 -0.017  -0.062  0.070 
(0.048)  (0.039)  (0.059)  (0.057) 
Positive national 
financial outlook 0.115** 
 0.125***  0.104*  0.091 
(0.050)  (0.041)  (0.061)  (0.059) 
Treatment 1 0.049  0.019  0.034  0.009 
(0.036)  (0.029)  (0.044)  (0.043) 
Treatment 2 -0.006  -0.017  0.073  0.000 
(0.037)  (0.030)  (0.045)  (0.043) 
Constant 0.474***  0.522***  0.212  0.552*** 
(0.133)  (0.107)  (0.161)  (0.156) 
Observations      301      300          299          299 
R-squared 0.178  0.231 0.135 0.232 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. 
Source: Survey Sampling International 2013 survey. 
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Table D3 Logit Estimations of Vote Choice and Belief that Obama Favors Blacks 
over Whites 
 Voted For Obama  Obama Favors Blacks 
Over Whites 
White identity 
 
-1.272** 1.091** 
(0.552) (0.477) 
Racial resentment 
 
-0.867 1.429* 
(1.355) (0.810) 
Age 
 
0.086 0.235 
(0.795) (0.672) 
Education 0.790 -0.616 
(0.869) (0.619) 
Party ID (1=Republican) -4.707*** 0.212 
(0.956) (0.754) 
Ideology (1=Conservative) -3.600** 0.779 
(1.461) (0.980) 
Egalitarianism -3.427** 3.890*** 
(1.721) (0.913) 
Female 
 
-0.219 -0.056 
(0.479) (0.320) 
Income 
 
-0.713 0.739 
(0.995) (0.661) 
Limited government -0.291 0.386 
(0.748) (0.588) 
Positive personal financial outlook 
 
0.175 -0.142 
(0.886) (0.616) 
Positive national financial outlook 
 
4.555*** -2.415*** 
(0.948) (0.853) 
South 
 
0.101 -0.298 
(0.481) (0.341) 
Union membership 
 
0.140 -0.057 
(0.604) (0.452) 
Married 
 
-0.465 0.051 
(0.431) (0.329) 
Constant 3.547** -3.636*** 
(1.505) (0.939) 
Observations        451            574 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Data are weighted. 
All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed. 
Source: ANES Cumulative Data File
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Table D4 Support for Social Security over Time 
 
 1984 1988 1992 1994 1996 2000 2002 2004 2008 2012 
White Feeling 
Thermometer 
0.074** 0.068** 0.071** 0.124*** 0.160*** 0.152*** 0.196*** 0.064 0.088* 0.271*** 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.037) (0.052) (0.052) (0.038) (0.060) (0.048) (0.091) 
Hispanic Feeling 
Thermometer 
-0.118*** 0.055 -0.034 -0.041 -0.140** 0.134 -0.067 0.086 0.002 -0.151 
(0.040) (0.036) (0.041) (0.040) (0.066) (0.098) (0.049) (0.060) (0.047) (0.111) 
Black Feeling 
Thermometer 
0.083* -0.032 -0.016 0.018 -0.018 -0.140 -0.148*** -0.030 0.099 0.010 
(0.043) (0.036) (0.043) (0.045) (0.069) (0.088) (0.050) (0.073) (0.061) (0.105) 
Asian Feeling 
Thermometer 
  0.014   -0.041 0.005 -0.058 -0.149** -0.057 
  (0.046)   (0.062) (0.047) (0.068) (0.058) (0.110) 
Positive National 
Economic 
-0.032** -0.023 -0.030 -0.034** -0.018 -0.035 -0.031 -0.031 -0.015 0.076 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) (0.041) (0.064) 
Positive Personal 
Financial Evaluations 
-0.007 0.033** -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 0.026 -0.037* -0.011 -0.113** 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.025) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.052) 
Education -0.099*** -0.045** -0.096*** -0.155*** -0.112*** -0.090** -0.083*** -0.168*** -0.046 -0.139** (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.032) (0.038) (0.022) (0.029) (0.032) (0.055) 
Age -0.055** -0.017 -0.038 -0.030 -0.003 -0.067 0.015 -0.041 0.053 0.001 (0.025) (0.030) (0.024) (0.031) (0.040) (0.043) (0.035) (0.040) (0.038) (0.055) 
Income -0.067*** -0.024 -0.074*** -0.022 -0.046 0.032  -0.048 -0.038 -0.070 (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.031) (0.034)  (0.034) (0.027) (0.059) 
Party ID 
(1=Republican) 
0.063*** 0.036* 0.019 0.036* 0.100*** 0.049* 0.037* 0.009 0.000 0.041 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.031) (0.029) (0.020) (0.026) (0.028) (0.064) 
Ideology 
(1=conservative) 
-0.054** -0.087*** -0.006 -0.071** -0.041 -0.001 -0.038 -0.012 -0.091** -0.116 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.034) (0.042) (0.036) (0.028) (0.041) (0.037) (0.085) 
Female 0.029*** 0.050*** 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.039** 0.048*** 0.009 0.036** 0.034** 0.094*** (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.030) 
Limited Government   -0.048***   -0.102***  -0.095*** -0.066*** -0.062   (0.015)   (0.028)  (0.021) (0.022) (0.044) 
Constant 0.925*** 0.839*** 0.893*** 0.889*** 0.845*** 0.885*** 0.931*** 1.041*** 0.931*** 0.814*** (0.039) (0.040) (0.036) (0.045) (0.069) (0.067) (0.043) (0.046) (0.055) (0.089) 
           
Observations 958 841 1159 945 835 346 787 520 742 558 
R-squared 0.124 0.087 0.116 0.135 0.116 0.188 0.074 0.180 0.101 0.135 
Source: ANES Cumulative Data File. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D5.1. SSI Social Welfare and Race Policy Data 
 Increase 
social 
security 
spending 
 
Increase 
Medicare 
spending 
 
Increase 
welfare 
spending 
 
Affirmative 
action – 
universities 
 
 
Support for 
neighborho
od 
segregation 
White identity 0.098*  0.152***  0.049  -0.103  0.263*** 
(0.054)  (0.053)  (0.065)  (0.096)  (0.063) 
Racial 
resentment 
-0.056  -0.098  -0.363***  0.601***  0.064 
(0.069)  (0.067)  (0.083)  (0.121)  (0.080) 
Age 0.212***  0.093  -0.102  0.057  -0.082 
(0.063)  (0.061)  (0.075)  (0.103)  (0.073) 
Education -0.213*  -0.256**  -0.321**  0.175  -0.032 
(0.125)  (0.121)  (0.149)  (0.213)  (0.146) 
Party ID 
(1=Republican) 
0.014  -0.000  -0.011  0.060  0.062 
(0.055)  (0.054)  (0.067)  (0.092)  (0.065) 
Ideology 
(1=conservative) 
-0.211***  -0.160**  -0.178**  0.046  -0.031 
(0.065)  (0.063)  (0.078)  (0.110)  (0.076) 
Female 0.029  0.031  -0.044  0.006  0.018 
(0.028)  (0.027)  (0.034)  (0.048)  (0.033) 
Income -0.131*  -0.057  -0.154*  0.122  -0.148* 
(0.067)  (0.065)  (0.080)  (0.119)  (0.078) 
Limited 
government 
0.083**  0.079**  0.153***  -0.047  -0.038 
(0.037)  (0.035)  (0.044)  (0.061)  (0.042) 
Positive personal 
financial outlook 
0.007  -0.020  0.023  0.001  -0.030 
(0.044)  (0.043)  (0.053)  (0.074)  (0.051) 
Positive national 
financial outlook 
0.010  0.022  -0.074  0.028  -0.017 
(0.047)  (0.046)  (0.056)  (0.079)  (0.055) 
Treatment 1 0.053  0.010  0.016  -0.009  0.033 
(0.033)  (0.032)  (0.040)  (0.058)  (0.039) 
Treatment 2 -0.004  -0.014  0.080**  0.019  0.033 
(0.034)  (0.033)  (0.040)  (0.056)  (0.039) 
Constant 0.796***  0.968***  1.182***  0.043  0.037 
(0.117)  (0.113)  (0.139)  (0.207)  (0.136) 
Observations 299 300 298 301 301 
R-squared 0.174 0.146 0.321 0.320 0.116 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
All variables are coded 0 to 1. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. Source: Survey Sampling International 2013 survey. 
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Table D5.2 Knowledge Networks Social Welfare and Race Policy Data 
  Increase welfare 
spending  
Affirmative action - 
universities  
Affirmative action - 
workplace 
White identity  -0.041  -0.032  0.074* 
 (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.039) 
Racial resentment  -0.400***  -0.351***  0.382*** 
 (0.061)  (0.068)  (0.062) 
Age  0.008  0.008  0.116** 
 (0.048)  (0.059)  (0.048) 
Education  0.201**  0.197**  -0.140* 
 (0.087)  (0.088)  (0.080) 
Party ID 
(1=Republican) 
 -0.379***  -0.315***  0.427*** 
 (0.046)  (0.049)  (0.050) 
Ideology 
(1=conservative) 
 -0.293***  -0.276***  0.330*** 
 (0.062)  (0.068)  (0.069) 
Female  -0.014  0.004  0.006 
 (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.023) 
Income  -0.118**  -0.062  0.088 
 (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.055) 
Positive personal 
financial outlook 
 0.060  0.015  -0.126** 
 (0.062)  (0.067)  (0.063) 
Treatment 2  0.078**  0.023  -0.023 
 (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.043) 
Treatment 3  0.040  0.038  0.019 
 (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.045) 
Treatment 4  0.003  -0.021  0.032 
 (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.046) 
Treatment 5  0.031  -0.006  -0.031 
 (0.040)  (0.037)  (0.041) 
Treatment 12  0.118**  0.092  -0.046 
 (0.059)  (0.061)  (0.047) 
Treatment 13  -0.071  -0.048  0.037 
 (0.048)  (0.066)  (0.053) 
Treatment 14  -0.012  -0.053  0.037 
 (0.057)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
Treatment 15  -0.069  -0.092  -0.004 
 (0.046)  (0.064)  (0.053) 
Treatment 16  0.067  0.133**  0.048 
 (0.065)  (0.060)  (0.082) 
Constant  0.952***  0.925***  -0.010 
 (0.093)  (0.098)  (0.086) 
Observations   657  659     727 
R-squared  0.482 0.373 0.504 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Data are 
weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. Source: 
Knowledge Networks 2010 Survey. 
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Table 5.3a ANES Social Welfare and Race Policy Data  
 
Social security  Welfare spending  Aid to blacks 
White identity 0.094** -0.027  -0.023 
 (0.039) (0.041)  (0.030) 
Racial resentment 0.142** -0.229***  -0.493*** 
 (0.068) (0.067)  (0.044) 
Age -0.029 0.174***  0.046 
 (0.055) (0.050)  (0.039) 
Education -0.140** 0.019  -0.044 
 (0.058) (0.052)  (0.038) 
Party ID (1=Republican) 0.058 -0.016  0.074 
 (0.065) (0.060)  (0.049) 
Ideology (1=conservative) -0.152* -0.304***  -0.090 
 (0.081) (0.083)  (0.067) 
Female 0.095*** 0.046*  -0.020 
 (0.029) (0.027)  (0.020) 
Income -0.061 -0.181***  -0.054 
 (0.056) (0.053)  (0.041) 
Limited government -0.062 -0.186***  -0.032 
 (0.046) (0.044)  (0.034) 
Positive personal financial 
outlook 
-0.122** -0.014  0.042 
 (0.053) (0.057)  (0.041) 
Positive national financial 
outlook 
-0.080 0.031  0.070 
 (0.063) (0.068)  (0.046) 
Constant 0.822*** 0.717***  0.654*** 
 (0.101) (0.095)  (0.075) 
Observations    572   585     522 
R-squared 0.140 0.287  0.438 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Data are 
weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed. Source: ANES 2012 
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Table D5.3b ANES Social Welfare and Race Policy Data  
 
 Affirmative action - 
universities  
Affirmative action - 
workplace  
Fair treatment in 
jobs 
White identity -0.008 0.046  0.064 
 (0.034) (0.033)  (0.057) 
Racial resentment 0.406*** 0.342***  -0.891*** 
 (0.058) (0.060)  (0.079) 
Age -0.024 -0.031  -0.038 
 (0.041) (0.042)  (0.068) 
Education 0.041 -0.003  -0.023 
 (0.045) (0.048)  (0.073) 
Party ID 
(1=Republican) 
-0.032 -0.081  0.001 
 (0.058) (0.059)  (0.095) 
Ideology 
(1=conservative) 
0.082 -0.025  0.019 
 (0.076) (0.080)  (0.126) 
Female 0.010 0.008  -0.045 
 (0.025) (0.025)  (0.039) 
Income 0.101** 0.060  0.011 
 (0.048) (0.047)  (0.071) 
Limited government 0.065* 0.097**  -0.263*** 
 (0.035) (0.038)  (0.064) 
Positive personal 
financial outlook 
-0.073 -0.125***  -0.023 
 (0.045) (0.046)  (0.073) 
Positive national 
financial outlook 
-0.006 0.031  0.032 
 (0.049) (0.050)  (0.090) 
Constant 0.389*** 0.553***  1.181*** 
 (0.085) (0.087)  (0.147) 
Observations      577    581     571 
R-squared 0.234 0.219  0.327 
Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Data are 
weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tailed.  
Source: ANES 2012
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